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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES

TOWARD JUSTICE IN TOBACCO
POLICYMAKING: A CRITIQUE OF HANSON
AND LOGUE AND AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH TO THE COSTS OF CIGARETTES
Paul A. LeBer and Richard C. Ausness··
I. INTRODUCTION

No contemporary problem poses more of a challenge to the legal
system than dealing with the consequences of smoking. The issues
and institutions implicated by the problem cover a vast range of the
legal landscape .
• Fundamental questions are posed about compensation for
product-related injuries, about regulatory authority over a
legal but lethal product and over the anticompetitive practices
of the industry that produces and markets it, about the

• Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. The authors wish to
acknowledge the contributions made by Professor Andrew R. Klein and his colleagues at
Cumberland School of Law, Samford University, for the opportunity to present the ideas
in this Article at a faculty colloquium and to the Cordell Hull Speakers Forum .
•• Ashland Oil Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
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accommodation of the competing interests of smokers and
those affected by that activity, about the interplay between the
exercise of basic constitutional rights and the acknowledgement of even a minimal debt owed to the citizens of the society
in which those rights are enjoyed, and about the jurisdictional
allocation between federal and state governments.
• The social and public policy ripples that extend outward
from the legal system's attempts to alleviate the problem raise
complex and interrelated issues relating to the promotion of
public and pediatric health, to the economic prosperity of
entire regions of our nation and of the workers and businesses
that depend in one way or another on the tobacco industry,
and to the distribution of the costs of end-of-life care for
individuals who are debilitated decades after their initial
decisions about whether and how much to smoke.
• A national dialogue about the problem engages the specialized talents and calls for the informed perspectives of politicians, litigators, educators, and social scientists, and it
requires a candid recognition of the deeply conflicted opinions
that are held among members of the general public who
contribute to, who are subjected to, and who bear the burden
of the risks associated with tobacco products.
• Recommendations of solutions for a problem this massive
and this interwoven with so many strands of the social fabric
need to be sensitive to the overlapping and sometimes inconsistent demands of corrective, distributive, retributive,
intergenerational and international justice.
It is undoubtedly safe to say that no solution can hope to achieve
political viability, economic soundness, moral responsibility, and
legal acceptability without the most painstaking consideration of a
variety of options. Indeed, it would be surprising if there were a
single "magic bullet" solution that attends to all the facets of the
problem. A more likely scenario would contemplate patching
together the best features of a range of diverse responses, and
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employing an incremental trial-and-error process in which the
lessons of experience are carefully folded into the insights of theory.
For a brief time, the tobacco industry's decades-long record of
successful resistance to governmental attempts to hold it responsible for the harm caused by cigarettes appeared to be in jeopardy.
Developments in 1998 indicate, however, that the hurdles confronting regulators, llitigators, 2 and legislators3 may be as formidable as
they have historically been. The present political and legal moment
may be more in the nature of entre acte than denouement. If so, the
time is ripe for a reassessment of the course to be followed, but the
most recent experience suggests a need for a realistic understanding
of the pitfalls that lie ahead on that course.
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HANSON AND LOGUE'S THE COSTS OF
CIGARETTES

The recent article by Jon Hanson4 and Kyle Logue, 5 entitled The
Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based
Regulation, 6 is a lengthy and often quite compelling exploration of
the performance and the promise of the legal system's response to
disease and other harms caused by smoking. Following up on
earlier articles advocating an enhanced version of tort liability to
allocate the costs of product-related injuries, 7 the authors of The
I Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155,176 (4th Cir. 1998) (2-1
decision) (holding that Food and Drug Administration lacks jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products, invalidating regulations issued by agency in 1996) cert. granted, 119 S.
Ct. 1495 (1999).
2 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 723 So.2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(reversing plaintiffs judgment on 1996 verdict awarding $750,000 to ex-smoker, holding
that action was barred by statute of limitations).
3 144 CONGo REC. S6486 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (recommittal of Tobacco Products
Control Act of 1998, S. 1415, following unsuccessful attempts by legislative supporters of
the measure to invoke cloture and cut off debate).
~ Professor, Harvard Law School.
S Professor, University of Michigan Law School.
.) 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998) [hereinafter Hanson & Logue, Costs].
7 See id. at 1175 n.40 for citations to the published and unpublished articles by Hanson
and Logue, along with others co-authored by Hanson with Steven P. Croley, Professor
Logue's colleague at Michigan, and with Michael Zamore. The two articles that are most
directly the conceptual predecessors of Costs are Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson,
Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683
(1993) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Liability], and Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D.

696

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:693

Costs of Cigarettes present an extended analysis of market failures
that justify regulatory intervention in the operation of the tobacco
industry. They then offer a series of arguments for overcoming
those market failures and attaining economic efficiency by employing a particular kind of legal regulation, which they label "ex post
incentive-based regulation."g They had developed in that prior work
an "enterprise liability" model of this type of regulation, and explore
in this piece and its sequel a "smokers' compensation" version.
Each of us has previously and independently written about
tobacco-related harms, 9 and our work is accurately characterized by
Hanson and Logue as calling for the legal system to respond to the
problem of tobacco-related harms in ways that differ significantly
from the ex post incentive-based liability they champion. We are,
for instance, much less confident than Hanson and Logue that an
approach that incorporates so many aspects of the tort system is the
most appropriate way to resolve the serious loss allocation issues
presented by the health-related effects of smoking. Not surprisingly, we find greater promise than Hanson and Logue in the
construction of more dramatically different alternatives to tort
liability as a responsible method of addressing the concerns raised

Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise
Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 129 (1990) [hereinafter Hanson & Logue, Insurance
Externality]. Hanson and Logue, with Mr. Zamore, have also written a follow-up to The
Costs of Cigarettes, Jon D. Hanson et a1., Smokers' Compensation: Toward a Blueprint for
Federal Regulation, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 519 (1998), [hereinafter Hanson et a1., Blueprint] in
which they devote more attention to an administrative compensation system version of ex
post incentive-based regulation.
S Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1173.
9 Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy and
Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897 (1988) [hereinafter Ausness,
Preemption]; Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An
Alternative to Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1990) [hereinafter Ausness,
Alternative to Strict Liability]; Richard C. Ausness, Paying for the Health Costs of
Smoking: Loss Shifting and Loss Bearing, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 537 (1998) [hereinafter
Ausness, Paying]; Richard C. Ausness, Product Category Liability: A Critical Analysis, 24
N. Ky. L. REV. 423 (1997) [hereinafter Ausness, Category Liability]; Paul A. LeBel,
Beginning the Endgame: The Search for an Injury Compensation System Alternative to
Tort Liability for Tobacco-Related Harms, 24 N. Ky. L. REv. 457 (1997) [hereinafter LeBel,
Endgame]; Paul A. LeBel, Florida Tobacco Litigation Symposium-Putting the 1997
Settlement Into Context, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 731 (1998); Paul A. LeBel, "Of Deaths Put
on by Cunning and Forced Cause'~ Reality Bites the Tobacco Industry, 38 WM. & MARy L.
REV. 605 (1997).
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about smoking and health. While each of us has written about the
merits of a compensation system approach to this and other injury
problems, our understanding of the potential strengths and
demonstrable weaknesses of such an approach leads us to be quite
skeptical about the attempt by Hanson and Logue to construct their
"smokers' compensation" proposal as an ex post incentive-based
system rather than one that is financed by taxes collected ex ante.
Our greatest point of difference with Hanson and Logue,
however, is our strong belief that economic efficiency is inadequate
as an intellectual construct for thinking and talking about improving the performance of the legal system in dealing with tobaccorelated harms. Although Hanson and Logue do refer to considerations other than efficiency as important to a comprehensive
analysis of the problem,lO we believe that the outset of the analysis
is the most appropriate place for the introduction of those other
concerns-among others, what Guido Calabresi calls "other justice
concerns" 11 in his pioneering study of the economics of tort law that
is the intellectual progenitor of the work by Hanson and Logue. 12
Employing a broader analytical framework will, we believe, produce
significantly different conclusions about the advantages and
disadvantages of the various responses that a legal system might
adopt to the problems associated with tobacco-related harms. In
particular, as we will attempt to demonstrate in this Article, the
recognition at the outset of the analysis that the appropriate frame
of reference should be a value system that includes more than
10 Hanson and Logue recognize in a number of places that political and practical
considerations could lead to the adoption of a scheme that deviates from their optimal
approach. See, e.g., Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1305 (acknowledging that
"political reality may require that ..• some protection must be given to the existing
cigarette companies" from retroactive liability); id. at 1300 (noting that concern about
black market in cigarettes could be alleviated by reducing ex post fine to produce less than
optimal deterrence),
II GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-26 (1970).
12 For example, the standard that is set out for determining where to place the costs of
second·hand smoke, Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1314, is a straightforward
application of Calabresi's "cheaper cost avoider" notion. The iDfluence of Calabresi's pathbreaking scholarship is clear in the earlier work of Professors Hanson, Logue, and Croley.
See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 691 n.29; Hanson &
Logue, Insurance Extemality, supra note 7, at 131. The major critical focus in these works
is, understandably enough, on the more recent contributions to the law and economics
literature on tort law.
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economic efficiency will lead to a different conclusion about the
relative merits of an ex post incentive-based approach to responding
to the costs of cigarettes. We will attempt to demonstrate that, as
a matter of theory, our alternative approach will eliminate the
distortion in Hanson and Logue's evaluation of the various approaches that we think can be traced to their narrower perspective.
Although we ultimately arrive at a position that is considerably
more skeptical than Hanson and Logue about reliance on either
enterprise liability or their version of smokers' compensation in the
cigarette context, we would be remiss ifwe did not acknowledge the
significant contributions that The Costs of Cigarettes makes to the
economic literature and to the public policy debate about the legal
system's treatment of the relationship between smoking and health.
Hanson and Logue help to shape that debate by their application to
the cigarette setting of some of the more recent refinements in legal
concepts and doctrines drawn from economic analysis of law and
from political science.
On that score, one could find that a major benefit of Hanson and
Logue's article is their application of a taxonomy of regulatory
responses as a method of evaluating different responses to a
perceived inadequacy of a laissez faire attitude toward the costs
created by smoking. Taking that taxonomy seriously, we can
sharpen the focus on the essential feature of an approach constructed along the lines we have put forward in our previous writing.
Although Hanson and Logue address our work in their discussion of
an ex post regulatory response, IS the taxonomy set out in their
article leads us to conclude that our approach is actually more in the
nature of an ex ante attempt to identify and shift to the tobacco
industry the costs of the harms that the industry will create in the
future.

18

Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 12815·89.
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In a number of respects, Hanson and Logue have attempted to
establish a new starting point for the analysis of the legal problems
associated with smoking. Those who write about tobacco issues and
about injury compensation in general have been given a clear
challenge to previous ways of thinking and a more precise vocabulary with which to respond to that challenge.
Our concern with their work is not limited to the theoretical
construct they set out so impressively. At this political moment,
when the course of legislation, regulation, and litigation seems so
uncertain, the stage is set for a return to basic principles. Given the
demagoguery that has invaded the discourse about tobacco, this is
also a risky political moment. The approach advocated by Hanson
and Logue is particularly risky because of its susceptibility to being
portrayed as a call for a seven-dollar-per-pack increase in cigarette
prices. We fear that characterization could diminish the effectiveness of fresh scholarly approaches to the problem. If Hanson and
Logue are wrong, in other words, it is particularly important at this
time to shift the focus away from their efficiency-centered analysis.
B. OVERVIEW OF TOWARD JUSTICE IN TOBACCO POLICYMAKlNG

In an article as rich as that of Hanson and Logue, one could
easily find a host of topics worthy of extended discussion. Our focus
is on the ways in which the insights of The Costs of Cigarettes can
inform an approach that responds more pragmatically to the
cigarette-specific concerns that obtain in devising a legal regime in
which allocative efficiency is one of a number of (at least) equally
important goals (such as corrective, retributive, and distributive
justice concerns) and constraints (such as political feasibility,
administrative efficiency, and concern about the unintended legal
and economic consequences of the procedural and doctrinal modifications that would have to be adopted for enterprise liability to be
an effective method of shifting the losses associated with the use of
tobacco products). We ultimately conclude that the most appropriate way to proceed is to center the analysis on the justice concerns
that arise in this context and to recognize efficiency concerns as
constraints on and as more explicit costs of solutions that proceed
from that moral center.
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Part II of our Article is a concise presentation of the major points
made by Hanson and Logue. In Part III, we first consider in greater
detail the market failures identified by Hanson and Logue. While
we agree with a good deal of what they say about the performance
of the market, particularly with their conclusion that there is a
compelling case to be made for legal intervention in that market, we
question enough of their analysis that at least some of the prescriptions they draw from that analysis strike us as unwise or unwarranted. Part III then goes on to focus on the central question of The
Costs of Cigarettes: "Assuming that there are problems with the
cigarette market, what regulatory mechanisms should be implemented?"14 Our disagreement with the choice of an ex post
incentive-based system as the virtually exclusive answer to that
question stems for the most part from our skepticism that it is a
question that is reasonably posed in purely or largely economic
terms. Nevertheless, even if one were to step into the analytic
framework adopted by Hanson and Logue, we believe that there
needs to be a more realistic appraisal of the disparity between the
idealized world they describe and the actual setting in which we
must grapple with the social and economic effects of smoking.
In Part IV, drawing on the conclusions reached in the preceding
two Parts, we articulate the demands we think should be met by the
legal system undertaking a responsible approach to the healthrelated costs of smoking. Part IV sets out the policy considerations
that need to be addressed in the cigarette context, and examines the
capabilities of different regulatory approaches to address those
considerations. Part V ties together the strands of the critique of
Hanson and Logue and the policy concerns of our alternative
approach by identifying the justice-oriented claims of various
constituencies and illustrating how a justice-centered set of
solutions might be constructed in response to the complexities of the
costs of smoking.

II. A PRECIS OF THE COSTS OF CIGARETTES
The scope and the complexity of The Costs of Cigarettes are
difficult to capture in a brief summary of its points. Nevertheless,
1~

Id. at 1179.
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a condensation can provide a basis for understanding its strengths
and weaknesses. Five of the tasks undertaken by Hanson and
Logue stand out as likely to be particularly significant in subsequent
discussions of how to structure the legal regime for tobacco: 5
(a) an identification of market failures in the cigarette
context that call for some form of government intervention in that market;
(b) a powerful critique of some of the more conservative
law and economics scholarship that supports the notion
that such intervention is unnecessary;
(c) a classification of types of governmental intervention into a useful taxonomy of regulatory responses;
(d) a description of what Hanson and Logue believe to
be the serious shortcomings of non-incentive-based and
ex ante incentive-based approaches; and
(e) a statement of the benefits that Hanson and Logue
attribute to an ex post form of regulation that is both
incentive-based and victim-initiated.
In this Part, we set out what we believe to be the most significant
points made by Hanson and Logue under each of these five headings. In doing so, we recognize the need to strike a balance between
a comprehensive coverage of a 200-page article with more than 800
footnotes and a fair presentation of the essence of what that article

" In addition to the five matters described below, Hanson and Logue also critique the
elements of the comprehensive national settlement agreement neg6tiated by the industry
and a number of state attorneys general in June 1997. See Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra
note 6, at 1316-49. Hanson and Logue have such a strongly negative reaction to the
agreement that they would prefer to remain under the status quo rather than to have had
the terms of the agreement implemented. Id. at 1181. In their view, a products liability
regime that is moving into a "third wave" of liability for smoking-related harms is a more
promising vehicle for achieving efficiency in the market for cigarettes than the settlement
agreement that they view as such a politically-compromised and conceptually-flawed
measure. Id. at 1349.
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says so that our responses to it will be intelligible. As the remainder of our Article demonstrates, an appreciation of the finer points
of particular aspects of our reaction to Hanson and Logue will
sometimes require us to expand on the summary presented in this
Part.
A. MARKET FAILURES IN THE CIGARETTE INDUSTRY

1. The Promise of the Perfect Market. The Costs of Cigarettes
falls squarely into the body of law and economics scholarship that
identifies the divergence of a real world situation from the conditions of a perfect market and then proposes legal solutions to bring
the actual situation closer to the efficient allocation of resources that
would occur in a perfect market. A perfect market for cigarettes
would have producers and consumers (as well as some important
classes of third parties) operating in an environment in which the
price that the consumer pays for cigarettes will reflect their true
costs ofproduction, including16the costs of personal injuries and other
harm that cigarettes cause.
Economists understand that market failures of various types
could prevent the efficient allocation of resources. According to
Hanson and Logue, conditions of imperfect information and
externalities actually do so in the market for cigarettes. 7 Although
economic analysis of product injury situations typically concentrates8
on care levels of producers and activity levels of consumers,'
Hanson and Logue recognize that the nature of smoking-related
harms implicates a larger number of parties whose behavior could
affect the efficiency of the cigarette market. Economically efficient
conditions in that market could be attained through shifting
6

See Howard C. Klemme, The EnterpriseTheory of Torts, 47 U. COLO.L. REV. 153,
159-60 (1976) ('For the pricing mechanism of the market to achieve this goal of the 'best'
allocation of the community's total limited resources, a supplier of goods and services must
accurately reflect in the price he seeks for his goods or services the 'true' cost of making
them available."); Ellen Wertheimer, Pandora'sHumidor: Tobacco ProducerLiability in
Tort, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 397, 407 (1997) ('From an economic standpoint, the correct price of
a product should reflect all its costs. Only then can one accurately assess the level of
demand for that product.").
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1174-75.
1d. at 1176-77.
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combinations of different variables: (a) when manufacturers reach
the optimal level of investment of resources in controlling the risks
posed by cigarettes (manufacturercare levels); 9 (b) when manufacturers produce the optimal amount of cigarettes (manufacturer
activity levels);2° (c) when smokers consume the optimal number of
cigarettes (consumer activity levels);2 ' (d) when smokers make
optimal use of the product (consumer care levels),22 and (e) when
third parties (such as employers and operators of public spaces)
make an optimal investment in controlling the adverse health
consequences to those who are exposed to smoking by others (third
party care levels).23
If the market were to operate so that rational economic actors
arrived at the cost-justified level of smoking (and of smoking-related
harms), there would be no need or justification for the legal system
to intervene in the range of decisions about production and use of
cigarettes.24 Such intervention is called for, however, when the
market fails in some way to let the parties reach the efficient results
by acting free from legal constraints.25
One of the principles that Hanson and Logue articulate-that the
way the legal system should respond to market failure is contingent
on the particulartype of market failure that occurs 2 -- is a valuable
reminder of the need for precision on empirical and normative
levels. The Costs of Cigarettesbuilds on that principle to construct

"'See id. at 1296-97 (listing a number of modifications of cigarettes that might follow
the imposition of enterprise liability).
2'See id. at 1297 (suggesting that manufacturers reducing sales to minors could have
long-term positive effect of lowering incidence of addiction).
21 See id. at 1275-76 (noting that number of packs of cigarettes purchased can be
inefficient under market failure conditions).
' See id. at 1340 (acknowledging that how cigarettes are smoked can affect risks of
smoking); id. at 1177 n.45 (expressing view that consumer care levels are only modestly
affected by tort law).
23 See id. at 1313 (noting that owners of businesses where exposure to environmental
tobacco smoke occurs could be given incentives to take cost-effective measures to restrict
smoking in public places).
21See id. at 1181 (stating widely held view among legal economists that regulation of
cigarette market is unwarranted if consumers are well aware of risks).
25 See id. at 1263 (noting that "cigarette market is characterized by significant market
failures and... very much in need of regulation").
' See id. at 1180 n.57 ("identify[ing] precise ways in which markets fail... [is] a
necessary condition for offering worthwhile regulatory proposals").
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a sophisticated argument around two important assertions: first,
that there is in fact market failure that interferes with efficient
outcomes for production and consumption of cigarettes, and second,
that the types of market failures that exist in this market call for a
particular kind of legal intervention.
2. The Imperfection of Reality. The failures in the cigarette
market are characterized by what Hanson and Logue label "consumer undeterrability" phenomena, which they describe as situations "where tort law can do very little directly to give consumers
incentives to take efficient precautions beyond adjusting their
activity levels.""7 That undeterrability stems from two types of
market failures: (1) imperfect consumer information about the risks
of smoking,2 8 and (2) the ability of smokers to externalize substantial portions of the costs that are created when those risks are
realized.2 9 Because little can be done when the legal system focuses
on consumers, according to Hanson and Logue, the appropriate way
for the legal system to respond is by imposing liability upon the
manufacturers, so that they have a greater incentive to determine
what measures are available and whether those measures are costjustified."0
Considerable attention is devoted to each of the market failures
that Hanson and Logue find in the cigarette setting. The informational deficiency allows smokers to ignore or mis-estimate the risks
associated with their activity, leading to decisions about whether
and how much to smoke3 ' that are suboptimal when compared with
27 Id. at 1175. As part of our critique, we hope to demonstrate that this description

skews the response to the problem of market failure in the cigarette context. By using as
a starting point the monetary incentives of tort damages to injured parties (albeit
substantially modified in their approach), Hanson and Logue divert attention too early
from other techniques of legal intervention (which we describe below as "direct regulation") that are quite effective at solving some parts of the smoking.related disease
problem. At the same time, the description appears to be overly dismissive of reductions
in consumer activity levels, which can be a very significant improvement over the status
quo.
28 See id. at 1181-1223 (examining impact of imperfect information in undeterrability).
29 See id. at 1223-63 (offering analysis of externalization of costs by smokers).
3Id.

at 1176.

31Id. at

1188-92. Some attention is given to what type of cigarette to smoke, but it is
for
changes in consumer behavior to produce any appreciable difference in the
difficult
overall safety of cigarettes that would make this variable significant. Similarly, there are
occasional references to how to smoke, but Hanson and Logue are skeptical that this
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what their behavior would be if they had accurate information about
those risks. In a similar fashion, the ability to externalize the costs
of smoking leads smokers to make those decisions in a way that is
different from what they would do if the full consequences of the
decisions were imposed upon them.
a. Imperfectly Informed Consumers of Cigarettes. Consumers
of cigarettes are likely to be imperfectly informed of the risks of
smoking for any or all of four different reasons, according to Hanson
and Logue. One of those reasons, referred to as the "third person
effect," involves a cognitive limitation.32 Psychological studies
suggest that individuals distinguish between risks to others and
risks to themselves.3" Everyday experience provides evidence as
well of people whose attitude toward risk is some form of "it can't
happen to me." Thus, even a consumer who is aware of the objective
risks of smoking may discount or ignore this information due to a
belief that the personal risk from smoking is less than the risk that
is posed to others who smoke. 4 This theoretical possibility actually
occurs within the smoking population. According to Hanson and
Logue, survey data indicate that some smokers do believe that the
risk to them is substantially lower than the general risks of
smoking.35

A second informational imperfection identified by Hanson and
Logue is the lack of risk information that is specific to particular
brands of cigarettes. According to them, tobacco companies have
little incentive to develop safer cigarettes because consumers
assume that all cigarettes are equally risky. 6 Furthermore, Hanson
makes enough of a difference to matter very much. They do suggest that a concerted
marketing effort by manufacturers could produce a "safer smoker," i.e., one who is less
likely to begin smoking at an age when there is a high risk of addiction. Id. at 1297.
" In the following Part of this Article, we assert a need to distinguish cognitive
limitations from imperfect information. See infra Part III.A.l.a. For purposes of this

Part's description of the Hanson and Logue article, we adhere to their grouping of both
categories of decisionmaking deficiencies under the heading of imperfect information.
' Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1186 (citing Martin Fishbein, Social
Psychoanalysisof Smoking Behavior, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE
179, 183-84 (J. Richard Eiser ed., 1982)).
Fishbein, supra note 33, at 184.
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1187-88 (citing Michael Schoenbaum, Do
Smokers Understand the Mortality Effects of Smoking? Evidence from the Health and
Retirement Survey, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 755, 755-58 (1997)).
"' Id. at 1188-89.
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and Logue believe that the absence of brand-specific information
about risks causes consumers to underestimate the dangers of
smoking "high-risk" brands, while overestimating the dangers of
3 7
smoking "low-risk" brands.
Yet another inadequacy of information identified by Hanson and
Logue is the lack of a basis for making accurate relative risk
determinations. Inefficient decisions by smokers are more likely
when two relevant comparisons are unreliable. The first is comparing the risk of smoking to the risk associated with engaging in other
kinds of activities and using other products. 3' The point of this
comparison is that the decision to smoke is made within a broader
range of risks that are encountered in daily life. Without accurate
information about the location of smoking on that risk spectrum, an
individual would be unable to put the smoking risks into proper
perspective, and thus may smoke more than would be the case if the
risk differential between smoking and other activities were properly
appreciated.3 ' The second item of relative risk identified by Hanson
and Logue involves the comparison between the risks associated
with smoking and those thought to be associated with not smoking.
Consumers may decide to smoke or, more plausibly, rationalize their
decision to continue smoking by adverting to the effects that they
associate with not smoking, such as weight gain and higher stress
levels. The decisions made by the smokers who mis-estimate this
type of relative risk will tend to be different from those that would
40
be made by perfectly informed consumers.

37Id. at 1189.
3

Id. at 1190-92, 1217-18.

' Id. at 1217-18. Curiously enough, the same sort of phenomenon surfaces when critics
of legal action against tobacco companies invoke the slippery slope argument that if
tobaccois treated this way today, beef and butter producers can expect similar treatment
in the future. Hanson and Logue deal with the slippery slope argument in a convincing
fashion. Id. at 1352 n.784. What is noteworthy is that the public defenders of the tobacco
industry are making the same sort of imperfect relative risk assessment, albeit there it is
the risk of having liability imposed for the harm associated with different products, that
imperfectly
informed smokers are likely to make.
40
Id. at 1190-91. The factors that Hanson and Logue identify as part of the risks of
nonsmoking which consumers tend to exaggerate could appropriately be characterized as
the perceived benefits of the use of the product. The point made by Hanson and Logue
remains the same: an imperfectly informed smoker will overstate the benefits of smoking
to the same degree that he or she will overstate the risks of not smoking. The distinction
is worth noting, however, when one encounters the proposition that smoking is an activity
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A final and quite significant information inadequacy concerns the
effects of the addictive properties of cigarettes. A person who does
not understand the nature and the strength of such addiction is
likely to make substantially different assessments of the risks
associated with decisions about smoking than one who has contemplated addiction.4 1 Hanson and Logue offer a multi-layered
exploration of the psychological and decisionmaking effects of
addiction, concluding that this, too, interferes with the efficient
operation of the market for cigarettes.
Hanson and Logue consider two models of decisionmaking.
According to one model, consumers who purchase cigarettes weigh
the incremental benefit of smoking an additional pack of cigarettes
against the incrementalhealth risks of smoking an additional pack.
Because the incremental risk of smoking is quite small, consumers
who utilize this model of decisionmaking are likely to underestimate
the true risks of smoking.4 2 Professor W. Kip Viscusi, however,
suggests a second model of decisionmaking. According to this
model, consumers who make the initial decision to smoke compare
the lifetime benefits of smoking to the increased lifetime health
risks of smoking.4 3 In Viscusi's view, consumers who utilize this
second model will make economically rational decisions about
44
smoking.
Hanson and Logue argue that the particular model of decisionmaking that is employed will depend upon how much the consumer
knows about the addictive qualities of nicotine. 45 According to them,
a rational consumer who is fully informed about addiction will
conceptualize the decision to smoke as a lifetime choice and will, at
least in theoly, view risks and benefits of smoking in
nonincremental terms.4 6 However, a consumer who believes that
cigarettes are not addictive will assume that he or she can easily
stop smoking at any time in the future. This type of consumer,

that has no utility.
"' See id. at 1196-1202 (examining different risk assessments among smokers).
42 Id. at 1197-98.
43 W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 34 (1992).
44 Id.

Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1198.
46

Id.
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therefore, will ignore the high costs of quitting and will seriously
underestimate the lifetime health costs of smoking.' 7 Hanson and
Logue argue that this second decisionmaking model is more
applicable to smoking decisions, particularly because of the fact that
most beginning smokers are young persons who tend to underestimate the addictive qualities of cigarettes. 8
b. Imperfectly InternalizedCosts of Smoking. The other type of
market failure drawn on by Hanson and Logue to justify legal
intervention in the cigarette market involves externalities; which
are costs that are attributable to one person's activity but inflicted
on another person and not reflected in the cost of the actor's enterprise. When the price of a product reflects its true cost, consumers
will be able to make efficient consumption decisions, even if they
have no specific information about a product's social costs, because
the price they must pay reflects these costs."9 If some of a product's
social costs are externalized to other persons, the price charged for
that product will not provide an accurate signal to consumers, and
overconsumption of the product will occur.' This is the problem
with cigarettes, according to Hanson and Logue: cigarette prices do
not reflect the true social costs of smoking because smokers are able
to externalize some of these costs to nonsmokers. 51

47

Id. at 1200.

48 Id. at

1201-02.
' See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., EncouragingSafety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1290 (1980) (noting importance of internalizing
accident costs).
"' See Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitalsto Recover Expenditures
for the Treatment ofDisease,Injury and DisabilityCaused by bbaccoand Alcohol, 22
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 81, 104 (1994) (stating that overconsumption will occur if demand for
the product is artificially high or if the products price is artificially low).
' See Ausness, CategoryLiability, supranote 9, at 442-43 C[A]t the present time, the
price of cigarettes does not reflect the full health costs of smoking because a substantial
share of these costs are shifted to nonsmokers."); Donald W. Garner, CigaretteDependency
and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal,53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1462 (1980) C'Since
welfare and private insurance pay most of a patient's medical bills, a large portion of
cigarette smoking costs are borne by the public."); Frank Vandall, Reallocatingthe Costs of
Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to CigaretteManufacturers,52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 405, 405 (1991) C(At present non-smokers pay a large portion of the health and
welfare costs of smoking-caused cancer through higher taxes and health insurance
premiums."); Note, Plaintiffs Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against CigaretteManufacturers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 809, 824 (1986) ("These externalities create a problem of
allocative inefficiency- because cigarettes' prices do not reflect their true cost to society,
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In analyzing the nature and effect of the externalities of smoking,
Hanson and Logue distinguish between insurance and noninsurance
externalities, as well as between negative and positive externalities.
Within the insurance externality category, Hanson and Logue are
concerned primarily with identifying the negative externalities of
smoking. 2 As described in the next Subsection, Hanson and Logue
also take issue with the notion that premature death of smokers
produces a positive externality, that is, a net social benefit, that
more than offsets the effect of any negative externality.
Insurance externalities occur when a particularly risky segment
of the population is included in a ratemaking pool with people who
are not exposed to those risks. Most people obtain first-party
insurance, either individually or through group insurance programs,
to provide protection against the financial consequences of death,
disability, medical expenses, property damage, or other losses. 5 4 In
theory, the premiums charged by first-party insurers can inform
consumers about the social costs of some of their lifestyle choices.5 5
For example, in the case of smoking, insurance premiums for
coverage related to health could vary according to the smoking
habits of the insured. Customers who did not smoke would be
offered the best rates; light smokers or those who smoked relatively
safer brands of cigarettes would be charged somewhat more; and
heavy smokers would have to pay the highest insurance premiums.'

consumers misallocate resources by spending money on cigarettes that they would spend
on other
goods if cigarette prices were higher.").
5
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1224-29.
3Id. at 1233.
" Most Americans are covered by health insurance and many persons also have
disability coverage. See George L. Priest, The ContinuingCrisis in Liability, 1 PROD.
LIAB. L.J. 243, 248 (1988) (stating that "the vast majority of the U.S. population possesses
medical coverage, and a large number possess general disability coverage"). In addition,
about two-thirds of the population have some life insurance. Hanson & Logue, Costs;
supra note 6, at 1226 n.270 (citing AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INs., 1996 LIFE INSURANCE
FACT BOOK 6 (1996)). Finally, almost all commercial and residential structures are
protected by fire insurance. Id. at 1226 n.271 (citing Guy Halverson, InsuranceDescribed
as a FinancialNecessity, CHRISTIAN Scl. MONITOR, May 8, 1995, at 9).
' Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1224-25.
Id. at 1225.
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Unfortunately, first-party insurers seldom adjust their rate
structure to reflect the health costs of smoking.5" The same is true
of government-sponsored insurance programs such as Medicare.58
According to Hanson and Logue, only life and disability insurers
take account of smoking-related risks in the premiums they charge
to their customers.5 9 Even those insurers ask only if an applicant is
presently smoking, making no attempt to distinguish between heavy
smokers and light smokers or between former smokers and those
who have never smoked at all.6" Furthermore, even when insurance
companies do make the effort to inquire about the smoking habits
of their customers, there is little the companies can do to verify
answers they receive from applicants. 6
The result of this lack of discrimination between smokers and
nonsmokers and among smokers is that the higher demand that
smokers place on the funds distributed by the insurers does not
correspond to a higher price charged to those policyholders. Instead,
nonsmokers pay a higher premium than they would if smokers were
separately rated and, thus, end up subsidizing a portion of the costs
of smoking. If smokers were forced to pay the full cost of insuring
against the risks associated with smoking, consumption levels
would be based on a more accurate signal about the magnitude of
the costs of smoking.
Noninsurance externalities are costs that nonsmokers bear
because of the decision that other people make about whether, how
much, and where to smoke. The point here, as with imperfect
information and insurance externalities, is that suboptimal levels
of smoking will tend to occur when decisions about whether and how
much to smoke do not reflect those costs.
This type of externality includes two relatively uncontroversial
categories of costs imposed on others, harms related to environmen-

7

5

Id.

' Id. Social "insurance" programs such as Medicaid are also subject to this sort of

externality because they are financed by taxes whose rates are determined by income not
by smoking habits.
59 Id. at 1226.
60

Id. at 1229.

61

Id. at 1227-28.
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tal tobacco (also known as "passive" or "second hand") smoke (ETS)62
and losses suffered by people with strong ties to smokers who die
prematurely. Hanson and Logue observe that the costs of passive
or environmental tobacco smoke are largely externalized to nonsmokers.63 Estimates of ETS-related deaths vary from 2,500 to
about 6,000 per year.6 ETS also causes a large number of nonfatal
injuries.65 Hanson and Logue base their other straightforward
category of externalities on the belief that the families and friends
of smokers suffer substantial pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses
due to smoking. 6 These costs include deaths and injuries from
smoking-related fires, fetal deaths caused by smoking, and increased neonatal intensive care costs for infants born to mothers
who smoke during pregnancy.6
Hanson and Logue include within the category of noninsurance
externalities a cost that may spark more controversy than those just
mentioned. According to the authors, it is appropriate to treat some
portion of the smoker's own costs as an externality. These costs
include uninsured medical expenses and lost wages, as well as the
costs of premature death and disability.68 This somewhat
counterintuitive notion could perhaps be grounded on an understanding of a multiple-self phenomenon touched on in the imperfect
information section of The Costs of Cigarettes. According to this
theory, an individual who experiences present benefits and postponed costs may psychologically externalize those costs to a "future

"2The environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) externality would also affect decisions about
the circumstancesunder which one chooses to smoke. This factor is an illustration of the
way in which the analysis of the cigarette market is considerably more complex than is
captured with a focus that was limited to care levels of manufacturers and activity levels
of smokers.
'3Hanson & Logue, Costs,supra note 6, at 1229.
David B. Ezra, Note, Smoker Battery: An Antidote to Second-Hand Smoke, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1061, 1065 (1990).
' See Gregory P. Taxin, Tobacco Industry Liability for Cigarette-RelatedInjuries:
"Smokers, Give It Up!", 16 J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. 221, 237 (1994) (concluding that ETS
causes nonsmokers to suffer such illnesses as respiratory irritations and nonfatal heart
disease).
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1237-39.
Id. at 1239-40 (citing WILLARD G. MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEALTH
HABITS 83-84 (1991)).
" Id. at 1240-41.
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self,"69 resulting in the same sort of market failure that occurs, for
example, when a smoker escapes the effect of the costs that are
experienced by nonsmokers.
That same point might be made in more conventional terms as
another instance of imperfect information rather than as an
externality. As such, it would contribute to a distortion in the costbenefit analysis of the smoker who fails to account fully for the costs
that may arise only so far in the future that they have no real
meaning today. Characterizing the smoker's own "future self' costs
as an externality, as Hanson and Logue do, however, turns out to be
an important part of their critique of the law and economics
scholarship that disputes the conclusion that smoking is an activity
that currently imposes net social costs. That critique is a second
significant aspect of The Costs of Cigarettes.
B. A CRITIQUE OF THE "CONVENTIONAL WISDOM" IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF TOBACCO-RELATED HARMS

A good deal of the analysis that Hanson and Logue perform of the
cigarette market is critical of "the numerous scholars [who] have
begun to employ efficiency analysis to argue in favor of the status
quo and against holding cigarette manufacturers liable."" ° Two
representatives of that scholarship come in for particularly close
scrutiny: a Rand study of the external costs of poor health habits
conducted by Professor Willard G. Manning and a number of
others," and a body of work produced by Professor W. Kip Viscusi."
On a number of fronts, Hanson and Logue take issue with what they
describe as the conventional wisdom on the economic analysis of the
costs of smoking."

'aId. at 1205-09. Hanson and Logue actually attribute the externality phenomenon of
the "future self' much less specifically to the "numerous consumer-information problems"
they had earlier described as an imperfect information market failure. Id. at 1241.
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1178 n.49.

"MANNING ET AL., supra note 67.

72 The greatest attention is given to VISCUSI, supra note 43. For citations of Viscusi's
other work, see Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1189 n.102, 1209 n.205, 1211
n.211. For an earlier examination of Viscusi's work, see Croley & Hanson, Enterprise
Liability, supra note 7, at 743-51.
" Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1186.
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This exercise is crucial to the policy prescription that Hanson and
Logue offer in The Costs of Cigarettes. If the conventional wisdom
is correct, legal intervention in the affairs of the tobacco industry
might still be justified,7 4 but not on the allocative efficiency basis on
which Hanson and Logue ground their approach. For their assertion that the cigarette market fails in particular ways that call for
the application of an ex post incentive-based liability theory to the
industry to be compelling, they need to refute the scholarship that
contends that the market either is essentially efficient 5 or is
inefficient in a way that makes smokers pay more than they
should.7"
Hanson and Logue dispute a number of strands of the law and
economics scholarship in their work. Three of the specific points
they make are likely to be particularly helpful to participants in the
public policy discourse. On those points, Hanson and Logue take
issue with: (1) the view that "the vast majority of consumers are
well aware of' the risks of smoking;" (2) the attempt to explain
away on a basis other than addiction the disparity between smokers'
behavior and their expressions of a desire to quit;7" and (3) the
conclusion that "the total social benefits of smoking equal or even
exceed the costs,"7 9 a conclusion that they contend is reached both
by "grossly underestimat[ing] the negative externalities created by
smoking"" and by overstating the external benefits of smoking.8 ' If
the "mainstream" economic analysts are wrong on these points, they
argue, a good deal of the efficiency-based support for the status quo
of no liability for the tobacco industry collapses.
1. Consumer Awareness of Risk. Dealing with the "consumer
awareness" contention of the conventional economic wisdom is, of
course, the flip side of the considerable effort that Hanson and
Logue devote to identifying inadequate information as one of the two

' Hanson and Logue point out that even this notion would appear to be "paternalistic"
to many legal economists. Id. at 1181.
5
1d. at 1184.
Id. at 1232-33.
77Id. at 1181.
78
Id. at 1196.
78

Id. at 1232.
soId. at 1236.
a'Id. at 1247.
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chief failures in the market for cigarettes." In the process of
making that argument, they specifically attack reliance on survey
results that are alleged to reveal that, if anything, consumers
overestimate the risks of smoking. Some of that attack is a fairly
technical critique of particular survey methodologies and of the
reliability of the inferences drawn from that data."3 Other portions
of the attack are more accessible to the nonspecialist,"' dealing with
the distorting effects of addiction on economic analysis and with the
spurious case for a net social benefit to smoking.
2. The Effects of Addiction on Economic Analysis. Hanson and
Logue bring to the economic analysis a helpful discussion of the way
that addiction distorts the consumer's assessment of the costs and
benefits of smoking. Those effects of addiction occur principally by
increasing the costs of quitting, thus creating an artificially high
benefit in continuing to smoke, 5 and by extending the time frame
over which the harmful effects of smoking can accumulate. In this
portion of their article, they examine critically the economic
arguments that purportedly demonstrate that cigarettes are not
addictive. Of particular interest is likely to be their refutation of
two industry assertions: first, the interpretation of quitting rates as
indicating that cigarettes are non-addictive, 6 and second, the use of
the R.J. Reynolds experimental marketing of the Premier brand of
cigarette as dual purpose evidence of the non-addictiveness of
cigarettes and of the consumer rejection of safer alternative designs
of cigarettes. 7
Instead of standing for the propositions that conventional
scholarship has drawn, the results of these studies and experiences
are treated by Hanson and Logue as further proof of the ways in
which incorrect and imprecise impressions of the risks of smoking
undercut the idea that the current level of government intervention
in the cigarette market is adequate, if not excessive. The proposi-

82 See

id. at 1181-1223.
" See id. app. at 1354-61 (examining Viscusi's survey data).
8 See id. at 1186-1221 (rebutting "conventionar' wisdom that cigarette smokers are
adequately informed).
Mid.at 1200.
Id.at 1194.
87
Id. at 1209-10.
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tion that the existence of so many ex-smokers is evidence of the nonaddictiveness of cigarettes is challenged by Hanson and Logue as
being based on an overly simplified statement of the data. Instead
of accepting the industry assertion that half of smokers are able to
quit, for example, Hanson and Logue point out that the industry
conclusion is a cumulative figure over twenty-five years of the
people who have quit before dying, rather than an annual rate, and
that even that figure masks the high number of unsuccessful
attempts to quit.88
The Premier experiment was a test marketing of a smokeless
cigarette that proved to be unattractive to consumers.89 Hanson and
Logue convincingly dispute the characterization of the experimental
cigarette as comparable to the normal product, thus upsetting
attempts to draw inferences about consumer reaction to a true
substitute.9" They also question whether consumers really were
informed about the alleged greater safety of the experimental brand,
casting doubt on the legitimacy of the experiment's use as evidence
that consumers will not purchase a safer cigarette.91 If any lesson
is to be drawn from the marketing of Premier, Hanson and Logue
conclude, it is that the failure of the industry to remove nicotine
from the experimental product offers additional evidence of
addictiveness.92
3. A ClearerView of Net Externalities. Challenging the treatment that externalities receive in the conventional economic
scholarship is an important part of the incentive-based regulatory
approach taken by Hanson and Logue. The essence of that approach
is that imposition of liability on cigarette manufacturers is needed
to correct the inefficiency in the cigarette market due to the
artificially low price of cigarettes caused by the shifting of substantial portions of the social costs of smoking to parties other than the
smokers themselves. As Hanson and Logue note, some economists
reach the conclusion that the externalities of smoking are relatively
a Id.at 1195.
See RICHARD KLUoER, ASHES TO ASHES 603-04 (1996) (describing failure of Premier to
satisfy consumers' preferences and characterizing it as a "marketing catastrophe").
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1211-13.
9'Id. at 1210-11.
MId. at 1213.
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minor or that they produce a net positive result. Hanson and Logue
challenge that conclusion as based on flawed assumptions and
incorrect calculations. According to them, a careful look at that
scholarship reveals that "the negative externalities are greater than
these economists have estimated and that the positive externalities
have been overstated." 93
The studies by Manning and Viscusi quantify the externalities at
figures that range from a net social benefit of $0.18 per pack9 4 to an
external cost of $0.52 per pack. 5 Assuming that the current level
of excise taxes represents an internalization of the costs of smokmean
ing,9 6 the fact that those taxes are at least $0.53 a pack would
97
that smokers are already more than "paying their way."
Hanson and Logue construct an avenue for reaching the considerably different conclusion that the net external costs of smoking are
at least $7.00 per pack, if one accepts the quantification of the
various factors used by Manning and Viscusi, and are probably quite
a bit higher than that.9 8 They arrive at their higher figure by
including in the calculation some categories of costs that Manning
and Viscusi exclude, 9 by increasing the figure assigned by Manning
and Viscusi to particular categories of costs,' and by refusing to
accept the Manning and Viscusi characterization of a benefit of
smoking in the form of the putative savings from the premature
deaths of smokers.' 0 '
The plausibility of the criticisms that Hanson and Logue make of
the conventional wisdom on the economics of cigarette smoking,

93Id.at 1224.

This is the low end of Viscusi's estimate of the cost-benefit calculation. Id. at 1235.
This is the high end of the Manning range of figures for the external costs of
smoking. Id. at 1234.
"Hanson and Logue challenge that assumption (we think correctly) on the basis that
the payment of current excise taxes is an internalization of costs other than the healthrelated costs of smoking that their analysis shows to be externalized under the current
legal regime. Id. at 1254-55.
9'Id. at 1235.
at 1243, 1262.
9Id.
"See id. at 1236-43 (including the noninsurance externalities of ETS, costs that are
imposed on family members and other third parties, and the costs to the smokers' "future
selves").
'00 Id.at 1243-46.
1o1
See id. at 1247-60 (criticizing treating premature death as a benefit of smoking on
economic and moral grounds).
'4
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when combined with the more positive assertions they make about
failures in the market for cigarettes, leads to a conclusion that some
form of government intervention is necessary to counteract the
erroneous signal that smokers receive when they make their
decisions based on the purchase price of cigarettes." 2 Their
examination of exactly how that intervention should occur begins
with an exposition of the major options that are available.
C. A TAXONOMY OF REGULATORY RESPONSES

A third important feature of The Costs of Cigarettes is its
classificatory scheme for evaluating various ways in which a legal
system might intervene in a particular product injury context.103
The basic categories of regulation are (a) command-and-control, (b)
performance-based, and (c) incentive-based, with further subdivisions being made within the incentive-based category. 10 4 Although
the dividing lines between categories are admittedly not always
bright,105 the categories do provide a useful taxonomy for conducting
a more focused scrutiny of the options.
1. The Command-and-Control Approach. A command-andcontrol approach is what is understood in common parlance by the
term "regulation," in that it "imposes specific requirements on the
regulated firm.""°6 When employed as a method of responding to
product injury problems, this approach could involve regulations

"' See id. at 1232 C(There are large external costs associated with cigarette smoking,
costs that will not be taken into account by the relevant decisionmakers, unless there is
some form of government intervention.").
,' Hanson and Logue use the term "regulatory approaches" in a broad way to describe
governmental intervention in the operation of a market for goods. That terminology,
which is commonly accepted among economic analysts of law, is unobjectionable as long as
one understands that, in this usage, "regulatory" encompasses claims for the recovery of
damages for personal injury and property damage. More conventional usage among
lawyers might indicate a useful distinction between "direct regulation" as a legislative or
administrative agency rule about a produces design, manufacture, or sale, and "liability"
as an exposure to an enforceable demand to compensate for the harms caused by a
product.

at 1263.
,o See Hanson & Logue, Costs, at 1263 n.422 C'[D]istinctions ... in some instances
1U4Id.

blur.").
' Id. at 1264.
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that specify a product design that must be implemented.1" 7 It could
also involve specifications of the information that must accompany
a product into the marketplace or that must otherwise reach the
Limitations on sale or use of a product
consumer population.'
would also fall into the category of command-and-control regulation.10 9
2. The Performance-BasedApproach. A performance-based
approach in the product injury setting sets out a goal that must be
achieved if sale of the product is to be permitted. Performance
standards could be adopted for the level of risk that a product may
lawfully create for consumers or others affected by the product." 0
Similarly, performance-based regulation could specify a target for
the incidence of use of the product in general or by narrower
segments of the population who are particularly at risk. 1'
Performance-based approaches differ from command-and-control
approaches by relying on the regulated firm or industry to deter2
mine the precise method of attaining the required performance.1
3. The Incentive-Based Approach. Incentive-based approaches
are yet another step removed from the direct specifications of a
command-and-control regulation. This technique operates indirectly
to promote efficiency by forcing a firm to bear the full costs of its
activity or product and to take those costs into account in its
decisionmaking." 3 In the product injury setting, incentive-based
approaches would identify the portion of the social cost that the firm
is able to externalize and then impose on the firm an obligation to
pay that amount." 4 The most market-oriented of the approaches,
incentive-based regulation leaves to the regulated party the decision
of whether it is economically efficient to continue its activity with

'07

1

Id. at 1264, 1338-40.

Id. at 1322-24.
"0 See id. at 1324-30 (discussing proposed marketing restrictions).
" id. at 1266, 1340-41.
. Id. at 1266, 1331-36.
12 Id. at 1268; see also John Braithwaite, The Limits of Economism in Controlling
Harmful CorporateConduct, 16 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 481, 483-84 (1981-1982) (discussing the
advantages of performance-based regulation over command-and-control regulation).
m Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1273.
4
" Id. at 1174.
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the costs fully internalized. " 5 If the firm determines that some
change in its operation is needed, it leaves the extent and type of
that change entirely to the firm.
Hanson and Logue subdivide the incentive-based category into
those that are state-initiated and those that are victim-initiated,'
on the self-evident basis that the terminology suggests. Incentive117
based approaches are further categorized as ex ante or ex post,
according to whether the incentive is applied in the form of a
payment that is exacted before the product reaches consumers or in
the form of a responsibility to compensate for harm after it has
occurred. " 8 Ex ante incentives commonly take the shape of taxes on
units of production set at rates that try to capture the costs of the
harms.'1 9 Ex post incentives are most likely to be awards of
damages for harm that has been inflicted by a product.
The three types of approach are seen by Hanson and Logue as
ranging along a spectrum from least desirable (command-andcontrol) to most desirable (victim-initiated ex post incentivebased)'20 ways to correct the inefficiency attributable to the market
failures they identify in the cigarette setting.' 1 Their location of the
approaches on that spectrum requires a brief overview of what they
find objectionable in the first two approaches and in all of the
incentive-based approaches that are not ex post and victim-initiated,
as well as the benefits they believe will occur under the approach
they advocate.

15

Id. at 1273-74.
Id. at 1263.
117Id. at 1263.
nS See id. at 1268-73 (comparing ex ante and ex post approaches).
The best example of an ex ante incentive-based approach is the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, which imposes on vaccine manufacturers a tax per dose of
vaccine that varies according to the risks associated with the vaccine. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa1 to 300aa-34 (1994).
'" Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1271.
...
Hanson and Logue do acknowledge that the approaches that are less effective in
promoting efficiency may nevertheless offer advantages in more limited ways. See, e.g.,
id. at 1267-68 (use of performance-based approach to reduce youth smoking); id. at 1270
(ex ante tax preferable when monitoring tax compliance is easier than monitoring output
or care level compliance).
5

"
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D. THE INADEQUACIES OF NON-INCENTIVE-BASED AND EX ANTE
APPROACHES TO SMOKING COSTS

1. The Excessive InformationalDemandsof Efficient Regulation.
Each of the options that might be considered an alternative to ex
post incentive-based regulation is found wanting in some significant
way by Hanson and Logue. Although there are variations in their
specification of the shortcomings of the approaches, the central
theme that runs through the criticism is the improbability that the
informational requirements of effective regulation could be
satisfied.122
According to Hanson and Logue, regulatory approaches that
impose requirements, set performance standards, or require the
payment of a tax ex ante to internalize injury costs would demand
that the regulator acquire the level of knowledge that would be
possessed by consumers and producers in a perfect market setting.
For command-and-control regulations to demand that the regulated
parties reach the optimal level of care, Hanson and Logue see a
daunting body of knowledge that the regulator must have. As they
succinctly put the matter, "to determine the optimal manufacturer
care level for a given product, the regulator must construct supply
and demand curves for the product in question-indeed, for all the
different designs of the product in question, including substitute
products."'23 Attempting to regulate with less than that level of
understanding creates the likelihood that the regulation will call for
either more or less than optimal investment in product safety.
Furthermore, they believe that mandating product designs would
have the adverse effect of stifling manufacturers' searches for design
improvements. 124

122Id. at 1271 ("The main reason [for the preferability of an ex post incentive-based
approach] is that ex post regulation requires less information on the part of the regulator.
'23 Id. at 1264. Professor James Henderson drew on the work of Lon Fuller to express
similar skepticism about the ability of legal decisionmakers in products liability litigation
to arrive at appropriate results in the "polycentric" defectiveness issues in design defect
cases. See generally James Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers'Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication,73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973).
124Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1265.
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Because performance-based approaches do not require the
regulator to specify how a standard is to be met, the regulated firm
would be able to rely on its own knowledge of technology to choose
the most cost-effective way of meeting the standard. The flaw that
Hanson and Logue nevertheless find in performance-based standards as an efficiency-maximizing regulatory technique is the same
sort of knowledge limitation that hinders the regulator who employs
command-and-control approaches. Performance targets could only
counteract market failures, they contend, if the regulator could
reach the same comprehensive understanding of costs and benefits
under different circumstances. 2 5 That understanding is no more
realistically within the grasp of the performance regulator than it
is for the command-and-control regulator. Anything less than
perfection in that knowledge would create the risk that the performance standards would require inefficient behavior to meet the
standards or even an unjustified removal of a product from the
market if the standard proves to be unattainable.
Given the heroic demands that Hanson and Logue place on
regulators who attempt to respond to the kinds of market failures
they identify in the cigarette context, it is not surprising that their
primary objection to ex ante versions of incentive-based regulations
similarly rests on the inability of the regulator to know the precise
rate of taxation to levy if the ex ante payment is to force the
internalization of precisely the dimension of social costs that would
otherwise be avoided by the manufacturer. 2 6 In addition to that
shortcoming, which is shared with the previously examined
approaches, ex ante taxation rates are presumed by Hanson and
Logue to be set on an industry-wide basis rather than to reflect the
precise injury-causing experience of individual brands.'
Under
those circumstances, they contend that two types of inefficiency can
occur: manufacturers' incentives to adopt safety innovations would
be lowered,'2 8 and in a process they label "unraveling,"'2 9 consumers
who were only responding to prices reflecting a uniform rate of

"'

Id. at 1267.

"BId. at 1268-69.
'27
Id. at 1269.
12 Id.

'29Id.

at 1271.
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taxation would be drawn toward inefficient choices among brands
with different risk levels. 130

2. Additional Concernsabout the Effects of ParticularRegulatory
Approaches. Although the main thrust of their criticism of the
regulatory approaches that are not ex post incentive-based rests on
the information demands placed on the regulators, Hanson and
Logue catalog a number of other shortcomings that those approaches display. They assert, for example, that under ex ante systems
tobacco companies have an incentive to deceive regulators about the
true costs of the harms caused by cigarettes.'' Because ex ante
payments are based on regulators' forecasts of future costs, the
regulated party presumably gains an advantage by keeping those
forecasts lower than they would be with more accurate information.
Hanson and Logue criticize ex ante approaches as well as ex post
schemes that are state-initiated rather than victim-initiated, for
raising problems of overdeterrence of smokers. This phenomenon,
which they also refer to as errors of "omission," "' occurs when
consumers take the risks of smoking into account in their decisions
but are also subject to the ex ante tax or do not share directly in the
proceeds from the state-initiated incentive process. Under an
analysis that strives for optimal levels of smoking, rather than
merely lower levels, it is understandable that a regulatory sideeffect of too little smoking would be seen as objectionable. While
this side-effect may be understandable, it is questionable on public
policy grounds, at least in the current state of affairs, as we contend
below.
Hanson and Logue contend that there are multiple failures that
would occur upon the adoption of the regulatory approaches that
could be seen as alternatives to the one they advocate. Their
preference is not arrived at simply by a process of elimination that
focuses on the shortcomings of the other approaches, however.
Throughout The Costs of Cigarettes,they elaborate on the positive
features of the approach they favor,

'3
-'
'32

Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1272.
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E. THE BENEFITS OF A VICTIM-INITIATED EX POST INCENTIVE-BASED
RESPONSE TO THE COSTS OF CIGARETTES

The economic efficiency goal articulated by Hanson and Logue
requires that the price of cigarettes should incorporate their real
social costs. In describing how to reach that goal, Hanson and
Logue make clear that they are not going to be satisfied with
cosmetic repairs of particular market outcomes. Instead, they wish
to construct a response that will correct the underlying market
failures that they perceive in the current state of affairs.' That
correction will occur, they allege, under a legal system in which
victims of smoking-related harms have access to a legal remedy of
monetary damages that will be recovered from the manufacturers
whose products are responsible for those harms, and that will
require the manufacturers (and ultimately the smokers) to internalize the currently
externalized and underestimated costs of
4
smoking.

13

The details of how ex post incentive-based regulatory schemes
can accomplish this end occupy a considerable portion of the
attention of Hanson and Logue in The Costs of Cigarettes. As a
prelude to our own critique of their approach, and to counteract any
unintended impression that the best case for their approach is how
it does not suffer from the deficiencies of the other options, we use
this Part to collect in one place the principal claims that are made
for their regulatory approach. Those claims can be identified under
the seven headings that follow.
1. Countering Consumer Misinformation about the Costs of
Smoking. Adopting a regulatory approach that holds the tobacco
industry legally responsible for all the harms caused by cigarettes
will require an increase in the price to internalize these additional
costs. 135

That higher price will in turn force the consumer to

internalize the injury costs of cigarettes, leading consumers to a
13
behavior that mimics that of a perfectly informed consumer. 1
'3 Id. at 1174-75.
'"Id. at 1176.
-

Id. at 1221.

at 1222 C'[Clonsumers would... respond as if they were adding the health costs
of smoking to what had been the nominal costs of smoking." (emphasis added)).
136Id.
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2. Overcoming the Economic Consequences of the Addictive
Nature of Cigarettes. The basic problem that addiction poses for
economic efficiency analysis is that it distorts the present-day
calculation of costs and benefits by smokers. That distortion results
from a separation of the present benefits from the future costs. The
ex post incentive-based liability approach of Hanson and Logue
forces the smoker to take those future costs into account, whichever
model of addiction is accepted, by incorporating into the present
price of cigarettes the total social costs of smoking including those
delayed costs.13
3. Creating an Incentive for Product Safety Innovation in
Cigarettes.Ex post incentive-based regulation imposes on manufacturers a legal responsibility to compensate for all of the harms
caused by smoking, making those harms one of the costs of cigarettes. A manufacturer marketing a safer cigarette will cause fewer
harms, be required to pay less compensation, and be able to charge
lower prices for its cigarettes. This regulatory approach therefore
creates an incentive for manufacturers to make an optimal investment in the safety of their product, 38 lowering the risk to a level at
which the marginal benefits of the harms that are avoided equal the
marginal costs of making the cigarettes safer.
4. Eliminating the Subsidization of Smoking by Nonsmokers.
Under the current legal regime, nonsmokers bear a significant
portion of the costs of smoking. Insurance premiums of nonsmokers
are higher because insurers charge smokers and nonsmokers for
underwriting the costs of the smoking-related expenses that
nonsmokers do not impose upon the insurer. Furthermore,
nonsmokers who suffer harm caused by smokers are bearing those
costs or spreading them through their own devices, rather than
shifting those costs to the smokers who caused them. In addition to
the monetary losses that nonsmokers suffer, smoking creates
nonpecuniary harm such as emotional loss upon the death of a loved
one that cannot be spread through an insurance mechanism.
Moreover, this emotional loss is not shifted to the smokers or

137

Id. at 1222-23.

'38 Id. at 1260-61, 1296-97.
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manufacturers on any reliable basis under current tort law. Ex post
incentive-based liability eliminates those insurance and
noninsurance externalities by requiring manufacturers to compensate for all of those harms and to incorporate those costs into the
prices of their cigarettes, so that the costs are ultimately borne by
the smokers whose behavior causes them. 13 9
5. Requiring Manageable Levels of Knowledge for System
Administrators. The most significant determination that would
need to be made to support the imposition of liability under an ex
post incentive-based scheme is a quantification of the harms that
have been caused by cigarettes. There is no need for the administrator of the system to calculate whether those costs could be
reduced by the adoption of cost-justified safety measures or whether
the losses are such that society would be better off from a resource
allocation perspective if the product were removed from the market
altogether. 4 ' Under this approach, the decisionmaking responsibility for any action following a determination of the magnitude of the
harms caused by smoking shifts to the manufacturers, who are
assumed to be the most knowledgeable about the feasibility of
various options."'
6. Producing New Knowledge about Cigarettes, Costs, and
PreventiveMeasures. Manufacturers who are confronted with legal
responsibility to compensate for the harms caused by smoking will
have an incentive to be as accurate as possible in predicting what
that liability is likely to be, so there is no premium for the industry
to continue its practices of discouraging or withholding the results
of honest research. Similarly, any marketing advantages attributable to greater safety would accrue directly to the manufacturer,
which could translate into a higher market share for a manufacturer
that reached a more sophisticated understanding of the science and
1 42
technology of smoking and health.

1,4But see id. at 1295 (recognizing that in a deterrence-driven economic model, full
compensation would be awarded for economic and noneconomic harms, but acknowledging
that political and administrative complications could result in modifications to that
model).
"oId. at 1273.
'Id. at 1297.
"4 Id. at 1274.
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7. Avoiding the Risk of OverdeterringSmokers. Built into any
efficiency-based economic analysis of the tobacco industry is an
assumption that there is some level of consumption of cigarettes
that is economically efficient. For an efficiency-driven analyst,
smoking too little is as much of a market failure as smoking too
much. Ex post incentive-based regulation leads to the smoker
paying a higher price that reflects the full costs of smoking. The
smoker will make decisions about whether and how much to smoke
based on that price, rather than on the basis of that price plus
whatever knowledge of the risks the smoker has acquired apart
from the price. That knowledge does not enter into the economic
calculation because the smoker will have the assurance that if those
risks are realized for that individual, the compensation that is
received under enterprise liability will offset the costs that are
incurred.'43
III. A CRITIQUE OF HANSON AND LOGUE

Hanson and Logue ask two vitally important questions in The
Costs of Cigarettes: Is government intervention warranted in the
market for cigarettes, and if it is, what sort of intervention is best?
We believe that Hanson and Logue perform a great service in the
careful and thorough answer they give to the first question. After
their article, it will be difficult for what they describe as the
conventional wisdom among the economic analysts of law to
continue to make what Hanson and Logue demonstrate to be
extravagant claims on highly questionable evidence. Although we
have some points of disagreement or skepticism about some of the
details in this part of their article, we believe that the first question
should be answered roughly in the way they answer it. Market
failure unquestionably exists in this setting, and it occurs along the
two major axes that Hanson and Logue describe: smokers making
decisions on the basis of imperfect information about the risks and
harms of smoking, and smokers being able to externalize significant
segments of those costs to third parties.

43

1

Id. at 1274-78.
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For the second question, however, we are considerably less
convinced of the soundness of the conclusion reached by Hanson and
Logue giving the highest priority to implementing an ex post victiminitiated incentive-based regulatory scheme.
Our alternative
contention is that their preferred approach should be used in the
tobacco setting in a role that is subordinate to direct regulation and
ex ante tax assessments.
Some of our questioning of their conclusion derives from the
points on which we disagree with their analysis of the market. That
disagreement may be relatively minor in its effect on the conclusion
that there is a market failure, but it does turn out to have important
consequences for the way one approaches the second question of how
the legal system should respond to that failure.
Our disagreement with the conclusion reached by Hanson and
Logue is also based on some significantly different assessments of
the performance potential of the various regulatory approaches they
describe. To be fair to Hanson and Logue, and in particular to avoid
the appearance of criticizing them simply for not having written a
different article, we also present a critique of their analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of the regulatory approaches if one were
to take as given the failures in the market that they identify. Even
if market failure exists in the market for cigarettes in roughly the
way they describe, we conclude that there are substantial problems
with the way in which they arrive at their answer to the question of
how one ought to respond to that failure.
Section A indicates how we question Hanson and Logue's market
failure analysis, and what we think that difference implies for the
way in which the approach to legal intervention in the market is
constructed. Section B offers a different perspective on the regulatory approaches to the costs of tobacco-related harms. The ultimate
conclusion that we reach in this Part is that sound public policy
requires stepping back and making a fresh start from the point at
which informational inadequacies and externalities are deemed to
occur in the market for cigarettes.
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A. TYPES AND MAGNITUDES OF MARKET FAILURES

1. InformationalImperfections. Hanson and Logue identify four
ways in which a consumer would reach an inefficient decision about
smoking because of what they call imperfect information: (1) lack
of brand-specific information, (2) imperfect relative-risk information, (3) the effects of addiction, and (4) the third-person effect.1 44 In
this Section, we first argue that the third-person effect is not best
classified as an information imperfection. We then proceed to assess
Hanson and Logue's of the other categories of imperfect information
they identify.
a. MislabelingCognitiveLimitation. As suggested earlier, one
of the points on which we would modify Hanson and Logue's
analysis is their inclusion under the label "imperfect information"
of two different phenomena that contribute to consumers underestimating the costs of their activity, thus distorting the decisions they
make about the appropriate level of that activity. The first three
situations described by Hanson and Logue can truly be characterized as imperfect information problems. The third-person effect,
however, we would classify as a cognitive limitation problem. We
would differentiate between imperfect information and cognitive
limitation in deciding how one might counter the effects of these two
45
concepts.

1

Imperfect information is information that is incomplete or
inaccurate; a rational consumer who relies on such information may
very well make the wrong choice even though the decisionmaking
process is sound. This phenomenon is captured by the expression
"garbage in, garbage out." For example, assume that a particular
consumer would decide to smoke if the risk of a particular adverse
health effect of smoking were one in a hundred; however, that same
consumer would not smoke if the risk were one in ten. If accurate
data would lead the consumer to realize that the risk is one in eight,
"4 Id. at 1186.

14 We do not mean to imply that Hanson and Logue have ignored the cognitive
dimension of consumer decisions. They cite to this phenomenon in their description of
different models of how addiction affects behavior. Id. at 1198 n.153. Our point is that
the distinction between these categories of decisionmaking flaws should open the way for

recognizing the value of different types of responses.
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but inaccurate data lead the consumer to calculate that the risk is
one in two hundred, the decision to smoke would be the result of
imperfect information distorting a thought process that was
otherwise sound.
Cognitive limitation, on the other hand, is an imperfection in the
processing of the result of a calculated decision, and prevents
individuals from making rational choices even when they have
access to perfect information.' 46 To continue the illustration in the
preceding paragraph, suppose that same consumer has data from
which to calculate that the risk of that harm is one in ten, and does
actually reach that result. Instead of acting in accordance with that
calculation, however, the consumer processes the result through a
filter that provides distance between what is expected to happen to
that individual and the statistical likelihood. In its extreme form,
this cognitive limitation can be seen in the apparent belief in
immunity from harm that leads young people to behave in a manner
oblivious to patent dangers.
This distinction could be seen as merely of academic interest
were it not for differences in the way of reacting to the different
categories. Hanson and Logue offer ex post payments as the means
of correcting the imperfect information inefficiencies in the cigarette
market, drawing on the standard economic understanding that
higher prices can be a substitute for perfect information. If the only
goal is perfect efficiency, and the only technique for attaining it is
imposing liability on the producer to drive up the price the consumer
pays, then ex post incentives operate similarly in both of the
categories we would distinguish.
If the response to tobacco-related harms broadens to include
other techniques, and the goal is changed to a more realistic one of
improvement over the current state of affairs, then there may be no
" See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products,and Cognitive Limitations,41
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1229-41 (1994) (discussing how cognitive heuristics and biases
interfere with rational decisionmaking); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) (exploring impact of
human cognitive limitations on contract law); Baruch Fischoff, Cognitive Liabilitiesand
ProductsLiability, 1 J. PROD. LiAB. 207 (1977) (examining cognitive limitations in making
decisions regarding risks); Richard G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implicationsof
CognitivePsychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990) (discussing
application of cognitive theory to regulatory policies).
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need to rely exclusively on an economic effect that substitutes for
greater information. Steps could be taken to raise the actual level
of information, so that those with rational decisionmaking processes
could reach more accurate results. Educational campaigns of
various sorts become useful tools in the attempt to deal with a
problem of excessive smoking.
For cognitive limitation, however, the educational process would
have to be different. Here, the need is to change how people
translate information about risk to a general population group into
a perception of the risk to them individually. That alteration would
appear on its face to be a more difficult task than simply putting
more data into the marketplace. Instead, the only way to address
this problem might be to remove the ability to engage in the
decisionmaking process in the first place. For example, if the thirdperson effect were found to be particularly prevalent among young
people, who act in some settings as if they believed themselves to be
immortal, then some improvement could result from a societal
decision to limit exposure to the danger. Bans on sale to and
possession by young people could, therefore, be justified in part not
as a response to their lack of information but rather as a way of
countering their peculiar susceptibility to this cognitive limitation.
b. Overstating the Significance of Imperfect Information.
Within the categories that we would agree are appropriately labeled
imperfect information, Hanson and Logue appear to overstate the
significance of some of the problems they detect in the market for
cigarettes. While no single instance of such overstatement undermines their ultimate conclusion that imperfect information constitutes a market failure in this setting, a consideration of two such
instances-the absence of brand-specific information and the lack
of relative-risk information-will illustrate some of the concerns
raised by their analysis.
i. The Role of Brand-Specific Information. Hanson and Logue
contend that consumers who had information about the relative
risks of specific brands and types of cigarettes would be more likely
to make efficient decisions about smoking. One of the more
unfortunate consequences they attribute to the lack of such
information is a distortion in manufacturers' incentives away from
making cigarettes safer and toward creating an appearance of
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safety. 4 ' Holding manufacturers liable ex post for the harms
associated with their cigarettes is offered as the remedy for this type
of market imperfection. 48 However, Hanson and Logue's treatment
of brand-specific information is less than persuasive on two levels.
First, it is difficult to conclude that the absence of brand-specific
information makes a particularly significant contribution to the
overall problem. Brand-specific information would be more useful
if smoking-related health risks actually varied significantly among
different brands. In fact, however, smoking-related risks appear to
be more generic rather than brand-specific. For example, many
consumers assume that certain types of cigarettes, such as filtertipped or "low tar" cigarettes, are safer than ordinary cigarettes, but
there is no evidence that one brand of filter-tipped or low tar
cigarettes is actually safer than any other, and there is reason for
skepticism about the safety differential of even the crude distinctions among categories of cigarettes.149 Without more reliable
evidence that there is currently a demonstrable and quantifiable
brand-specific risk differential, it is difficult to attach much
significance to this aspect of the imperfect information problem as
it exists today. Furthermore, even if the lack of specific information
does increase the magnitude of the inefficiency of the current
cigarette market, we doubt that the current market sends to the
tobacco industry the disincentive to experiment with greater safety
that Hanson and Logue assert. 5 ° Rather than taking the current
levels of understanding as frozen, we believe that if tobacco
companies were otherwise given an incentive to develop safer
cigarettes, they would have no difficulty informing the public about
the health benefits of such a product. Indeed, the experience in
other segments of the economy suggests that "safety sells," that is,

147Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1190.
4
Id. at 1278.
1 Hanson and Logue are skeptical about the relative safety of low-tar cigarettes. Id.
at 1189. They also suggest that the safety advantages of filter-tipped cigarettes are
largely illusory. Id. at 1190 n.106.
See id. at 1188 (absence of brand-specific risk information leads to smoker assump'5o
tion that "all cigarettes are equally risky, which would remove any incentive that manufacturers otherwise had to make their particular brands less dangerous").
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that risk differentials among brands can be used effectively as a
marketing tool.15 '
The more basic point of disagreement we have with Hanson and
Logue's treatment of this category of imperfect information concerns
their prescription for curing it. Ex post incentive-based liability
could operate in the way they suggest only if manufacturers
carefully segregated the price effects of such liability to the brands
that caused the harms for which liability was imposed. Leaving
aside for the moment the temporal dimension of that process,152 the
plausibility of this solution is undercut by a realistic assessment of
the nature of the tobacco industry. Not only do manufacturers offer
consumers a variety of brands targeted at specific market niches,
they also are increasingly engaged in a range of non-tobacco
enterprises, including the sale of food items.'58 Rational behavior on
the part of such conglomerates would likely try to employ crosssubsidies among their own brands and divisions to maximize the
return on the total enterprise. To the extent that a commanding
market position in light beer, for example, could be used to offset the
full reflection of cost internalization in a brand of cigarettes, ex post
liability will fall short of the efficiency-generating effect that Hanson
and Logue attribute to it.
ii. The Role of Relative Risk Information. Hanson and Logue
cite evidence that suggests that consumers over-estimate
nonsmoking-related risks5 and that consumers also systematically
under-estimate smoking risks.155 In their view, that combination of
inaccuracies in risk assessment produces distortions in the
decisionmaking process of consumers.

s ' One could draw this inference from the safety-conscious marketing campaigns for
Volvo automobiles, for example. See generally Note, HarnessingMadison Avenue:
Advertising and Products Liability Theory, 107 HARV. L. REV. 895 (1994) (exploring "Volvo
effecf' in which safety advertising helps to achieve accident-reduction goal of tort law).
152 See infra Part II.A.1.c.
" See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Asks for Change of Name to RJR Nabisco, WALL ST. J., Feb.
21, 1986, at 8 (discussing name change and noting food sales surpassing tobacco sales).
"' See Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1191-92 (citing OFFICE ON SMOKING &
HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS 207-12 (1989)).
" See supra Part I.A.2.a.
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It is difficult to gauge the impact of this phenomenon on cigarette
consumption levels. In the absence of additional evidence about the
different categories of risks that are at issue here, one might believe
that the effect of the absence of relative-risk information on smoker
activity levels is relatively small. Decisions to begin smoking or to
continue smoking could easily be seen as much more dependent on
the perceived benefits of smoking itself than on a comparison
between smoking and other risky activities.
Even if Hanson and Logue are correct in their description of how
this component of imperfect information contributes to market
failure, their ex post liability remedy omits an important step in
arriving at consumer behavior under perfect market conditions.
Raising the price of cigarettes only changes half of the comparison;
the perception cf the risks of other activities and of the risks of
ceasing to smoke would be unaffected by that price increase. In this
instance, the higher price of cigarettes cannot be seen as a substitute for perfect information, if the perfectly informed consumer
would also be aware of the nature and magnitude of other risks.
The decisions that are made after liability is imposed on cigarette
manufacturers might be less inefficient than those that are reached
without such liability, but they still fall short of the standard of
perfect efficiency that Hanson and Logue require. The consistent
theoretical response of Hanson and Logue, therefore, should be that
ex post liability ought to be attached to those other products and
activities, but they (correctly, in our view) express considerable
skepticism about extending the tobacco analogy too far. 156
In our view, the relative-risk phenomenon offers another and
even stronger illustration of the need to extend the search for
solutions beyond the economic incentives of ex post liability. If a
significant part of the risk relationship is unaffected by the
approach Hanson and Logue advocate, and if it seems unwise to
employ their approach for that part, then the situation calls for a
regulatory response that attacks the actual informational deficits of
the consuming population. Instead of viewing warnings and
educational efforts as peripheral or supplemental to ex post
incentive-based liability, we would put those techniques at the core

" Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1352 n.784.
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of the program to deal with this part of the problem. While this may
appear to be simply a matter of different emphasis, it is nonetheless
a potentially significant difference when one considers the politics
and public relations dimensions of setting the policy agenda.
c. The Disconnect Between Information Deficiencies and the
Payment of HigherPrices. Hanson and Logue identify a number of
conditions that prevent consumers from making perfectly rational
decisions about smoking. It is important not to be overly dismissive
of the fact that most consumers, including young ones, are aware of
the health risks of smoking, particularly the risk of lung cancer,
even if that awareness falls short of perfect accuracy. We also
believe that consumers realize, even if only on the basis of anecdotal
evidence, that for many smokers, smoking is a lifetime habit that is
difficult or impossible to quit.
It is reasonable to believe that smokers do take these considerations into account when they choose to smoke, so the analytical
model that is used should start from a base of a partially informed
consumer population, not a "perfectly uninformed" consumer. As
described below, we would treat as a positive step a move toward a
"better informed" consumer and, thus, would encourage the use of
that admittedly fall short of a goal of perfect
regulatory techniques
157
information.
Suppose that Hanson and Logue are correct in their evaluation
of the data about smoker knowledge and behavior. After all, we do
agree that imperfect information and cognitive limitation affect the
market's ability to function efficiently, even if we are doubtful about
the size and precise operation of that effect. A concern that remains
with us about the Hanson and Logue analysis relates to its use in
supporting the conclusion that the best way to correct this problem
is to hold the tobacco industry liable for past harms suffered by
smokers. Upon examination, the theoretical foundation of that
regulatory approach is not as strong as Hanson and Logue appear
to indicate.
A form of liability under which smoking costs will be reflected in
the price of cigarettes will produce some marginal decrease in
demand. The theoretical underpinnings of Hanson and Logue's
157See infra Part III.B.1.
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approach require a more discriminating inquiry into the temporal
dimensions of the occurrence of the harms and the payment of the
higher prices, if that price increase is to be justified on the basis
that it acts as a substitute for perfect information.
Higher prices that are paid by consumers for cigarettes purchased today will, of course, have had no effect on previous uninformed (or, more accurately, under-informed) decisions about
smoking. Instead, the compensation that is provided today to people
who smoked in the past will be built into the price of cigarettes for
people who smoke in the future. That process may work in the way
suggested by conventional microeconomic theory, that is, with the
price acting as a substitute for perfect information,1 5 8 under
circumstances where the price that a consumer pays today reflects
the costs associated with that purchase, that is, the costs that the
product will create in the future.
The cigarette market has a number of features that make this a
less likely setting in which that result would occur, however. Some
of those features can be traced to the time lag between the use of the
product and the onset of harm for which compensation would be
available. Much of the harm from cigarettes is significantly delayed
from the decision to begin smoking, as Hanson and Logue carefully
establish in their consideration of the effects of addiction.' 59 The
compensation that would be paid under an enterprise liability or
smokers' compensation program along the lines that Hanson and
Logue advocate160 reflects the consequences of consumer behavior
that occurred as long as three or four decades earlier. 61 ' By the
same token, the harms for which ex post liability forces the current
consumer to pay a higher price will not occur until decades in the
future. In addition, in many if not most cases, the harms will
manifest themselves to people who are no longer smoking 6 ' and,

lu See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 97-106 (2d
ed. 1989) (discussing consumer and producer decisions regarding products liability).
"' Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1203-09.
'® Id. at 1295.
"61
In fact, in their later elaboration of portions of their proposal, the compensation is
narrowed to include only a partial award of economic losses. See Hanson et al., Blueprint,
supra note 7, at 553-62 (discussing smokers' compensation scheme),
162
See Hanson & Logue, Costs,supra note 6, at 1195 (citing evidence that over the
course of 25 years, half of the smoking population will have managed to quit).
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thus, no longer paying the price that allegedly includes a component
that reflects the risks about which the consumer is otherwise
imperfectly informed.
Another part of the problem presented by applying this economic
rationale to the cigarette context stems from the dynamic nature of
the relevant bodies of information. Public awareness of smoking
risks is continually growing, we would suggest. If we are correct in
that assumption, then the inaccuracy in risk assessments that were
made in the past is different-in kind and in degree, we would
suspect-from the inaccuracy that exists among smokers today.
Similarly, future potential smokers are likely to make their
decisions in a different informational milieu.
The correction of market imperfection in information for current
smokers should reflect the kind and the degree of their inaccurate
risk assessments. Hanson and Logue necessarily must correct that
imperfection with damages that are awarded to victims of smokingrelated harms who made their decisions on the basis of the risk
assessments of past smokers. If the goal is the perfect efficiency
that Hanson and Logue say it is, the correction of the market's
imperfect information needs to be much more finely calibrated than
can be accomplished with a solution that is based on compensating
for harms that originated in a temporally different market. Even if
one accepts Hanson and Logue's conclusions about imperfect
information, then we are not persuaded that imperfect information
problems, by themselves, would justify the imposition of ex post
liability that attempts to compensate for harm that was caused in
the past.
To conclude, we concur with Hanson and Logue that information
about smoking-related health risks is far from perfect. 6 3 We also
agree that consumers do not always act rationally when they make
decisions about smoking and health. Nevertheless, we doubt that

" One of the most important features of this state of affairs is the extent to which the
industry's long campaign of deliberate misinformation and willful ignorance contributed to
the inaccurate assessments of risk that many smokers have made over the years. As we
will demonstrate below, an optimal solution to the problem of smoking-related costs must
be more sensitive to this aspect of the state of information than the ex post liability
approach of Hanson and Logue.
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it is possible to say with conviction that these problems are of the
magnitude that Hanson and Logue suggest.
Even if they are correct in their description of this way in which
the market fails, however, we doubt that the approach they advocate
can be seen as a solution that is tailored to correcting this particular
form of market failure in the context of tobacco-related harms. At
this stage in our critique, we would emphasize that we are not
objecting to the imposition on the tobacco industry of legal responsibility for current costs of harms attributable to past conduct.
Instead, we find the economic rationale Hanson and Logue rely upon
for that imposition to be weak enough that liability needs to be
supported on other grounds.
2. Externalized Cost Imperfections. The other major category of
market failure that Hanson and Logue explore is the externalization, both negative and positive, of major portions of the costs of
smoking. As indicated above,' 64 when they use the basic quantification made by Manning and Viscusi of various elements of the costs
of cigarettes, Hanson and Logue estimate that these external costs
amount to at least seven dollars a pack.'65 Because of some
disagreements with their treatment of one category in particular, we
believe that they actually make a case for the proposition that the
external costs of smoking, while certainly significant, are substantially lower than their calculation shows them to be.' 66
This Section highlights some points on which we disagree with
the details of Hanson and Logue's analysis of externalities. As was
true of imperfect information, however, we emphasize that our
ultimate conclusion is that they have made a compelling case that
there are significant negative externalities in the market for
cigarettes, and that legal intervention in that market is more than
justified.

See supraPart II.A.2.b.
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1236-43.
'"We make the same disclaimer here that is offered by Hanson and Logue. Id. at
1262. Our analysis is based on the numbers derived from Manning and Viscusi; we
neither endorse those numbers nor attempt to produce independent calculations. Our
point is similar to that of Hanson and Logue: ifthose are the numbers, then plugging
them into a more appropriate analytical framework produces a substantially different
result.
16
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a. InsuranceExternalities. We agree with Hanson and Logue
that a serious insurance externality problem exists. Because most
smoking-related risks are covered by some form of private or social
insurance, smokers rarely pay directly for the full pecuniary costs
of smoking. By itself, however, that is not a particular indictment
of the cigarette market. The mechanism of insurance is designed to
spread risk over a broad base, to protect those upon whom the
economic consequences of a loss might otherwise be concentrated.
The problem that insurance externalities pose in the cigarette
context is the inclusion of smokers in the same risk-spreading
insurance pool as nonsmokers. When smokers and nonsmokers pay
the same rate for their insurance, a substantial portion of the cost
of insuring against the consequences of smoking-related risks shifts
from smokers to nonsmokers.167 Manning's study estimates
insurance externalities at $0.15 per pack. 6 ' Viscusi concludes that
insurance externalities amount to $0.66 per pack.' 69 For the most
part, Hanson and Logue accept Viscusi's figures. 7 °
For purposes of analyzing the argument that Hanson and Logue
make about externalities, we accept that Viscusi's estimates of the
quantification of these categories are essentially correct.171 An
objective of legal intervention in the cigarette market therefore

'67 Id. at 1229.

See Hanson & Logue, Costs, at 1234 (citing MANNING ET AL., supra note 67, at 127).
' See id. at 1235 (citing W. Kip Viscusi, CigaretteTaxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, in 9 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 74 tbl.4 (James M. Porterba
ed., 1995) [hereinafter Viscusi, CigaretteTaxation]). This figure includes $0.50 per pack
for medical expenses, $0.01 per pack for sick leave, $0.13 per pack for group life insurance,
and $0.02 per pack for fire-related property damage. Id. Actually, Viscusi would add
another $0.35 to this figure to reflect lost taxes due to premature disability or death.
Hanson and Logue believe, however, that this type of loss should not be included. Id. at
1243.
1o Id. at 1240. Hanson and Logue disagree, however, with Manning's decision to focus
on group insurance and to exclude individual insurance policies from consideration on the
theory that insurers take smoking risks into account when pricing such policies. Id. at
1243-44.
""One commentator recently estimated that the Medicaid program spends the
equivalent of $0.89 per pack to treat smoking-related illnesses. Michael K. Mahoney,
Comment, Coughing Up the Cash. Should Medicaid Providefor Independent State
Recovery Against Third-PartyTortfeasorsSuch as the Tobacco Industry?, 24 B.C. ENVrL.
AFF. L. REv. 233, 238 (1996). However, Hanson and Logue, as well as Manning and
Viscusi, are concerned with the costs of smoking over a lifetime reduced to present value.
Thus, the figures are not really comparable.
'
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ought to be to acknowledge this externality, and then to decide what
social policy considerations are brought into play by its existence.
The appropriate answer may be to correct this externality through
an incentive-driven liability scheme creating deterrence that leads
toward economic efficiency.'72 It may also be the case that additional policy concerns lead instead to the conclusion that the costs
of these losses are properly distributed widely across the population,
either because of justice considerations or because the administrative expense of segregating smokers from nonsmokers would be
prohibitive. The point is that the decision about what to do with
insurance externalities depends on the goals to be achieved;
expanding the range of goals and acknowledging the tension among
them can increase the appeal of regulatory responses that differ
from the ex post liability advocated by Hanson and Logue.
b. Noninsurance Externalities. Among the noninsurance
externalities of smoking, we agree with Hanson and Logue's
criticism of some of the "conventional wisdom" about how to
characterize categories of harm that smoking causes to others.
However, we do have a fundamental difference of opinion about the
appropriate way to handle the category that, using the Manning and
Viscusi numbers, has the largest figure associated with it. When
that difference of opinion is factored into the calculation of the
magnitude ofnoninsurance externalities, we arrive at a significantly
lower estimate of the net negative externality.
i. Costs Externalizedto Others. As we suggested above, 173 the
least controversial point that Hanson and Logue make about
noninsurance externalities is the proposition that smoking creates
costs to nonsmokers that are externalized by smokers under the
legal regime currently in place. Hanson and Logue are undoubtedly
correct that the health costs of environmental tobacco smoke are
significant and that smokers externalize most of these costs to
nonsmokers. 174

""An extensive analysis of this proposition is found in Hanson & Logue, Insurance
Externality, supra note 7.
""See supra Part II.A.2.b.
...
See Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1229-30; see also Jendi B. Reiter,
Citizens or Sinners?-TheEconomic and PoliticalInequity of "Sin Taxes" on Tobacco and
Alcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 443, 466 (1996) ('Smokers impose costs on
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The magnitude of that externalization is a matter that is less
certain. Hanson and Logue suspect that ETS-related externalized
costs may be as high as $1.00 per pack, but they accept, for the sake
of their overall argument about net externalities, Manning's lower
estimate of $0.14 per pack. 175 The present state of knowledge about
the costs of ETS makes it difficult to conclude whether Hanson and
Logue's estimate of $1.00 per pack is accurate, or whether the
Manning estimate of $0.14 per pack is closer to the truth.176 Indeed,
a recent federal district court decision questioning the reliability of
the Environmental Protection Agency's methodology for calculating
the risks posed by ETS suggests that the uncertainty strikes closer
to the heart of the matter. 177 Where evidence about smoking-related
health costs is uncertain and incomplete, we are inclined to be
conservative about estimating such costs. Therefore, we are more
comfortable, for the time being, with an estimate that is closer to
$0.14 per pack.
According to Hanson and Logue, Manning and Viscusi underestimate the external costs of smoking because they do not take into
account the costs that smokers externalize to family members and
friends. 178 Using Manning's figures, Hanson and Logue quantify
179
that category of costs at $0.25 per pack.
Although Manning and Viscusi have calculated the size of the
smoking-related costs that are borne by family members, they
characterize them as internal rather than external costs because
they believe families act as a single economic unit."s Manning and
Viscusi also omit from their calculations smoking-related costs that
are externalized to friends, as distinguished from family mem-

others directly through environmental tobacco smoke ('ETS'), colloquially known as
'second hand smoke'.").
75ee Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1244.
16
In some of his more recent work, Professor Viscusi has suggested that the external
costs associated with ETS may be as high as $0.41 per pack. See W. Kip Viscusi, Second.
hand Smoke. Facts and Fantasy,Vol. 18 REGULATION, No. 3, at 42,46 (1995).
""Flue-Cured Tobacco Co-op. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435, 465
(M.D.N.C. 1998).
17 Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1230.
79
' Id. at 1242 tbl 1. This figure includes $0.09 per pack for lives lost in fires, $0.14 per
pack for fetal deaths, and $0.02 per pack for neonatal intensive care. Id. at 1242 n.350.
1'MANNING ET AL., supra note 67, at 28-29; Viscusi, CigaretteTaxation, supra note
169, at 71-72.
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bers.' 8' We agree with Hanson and Logue that sound economic
analysis requires that any cost that is borne by someone other than
the smoker should be treated as external unless it has already been
internalized in some way. As Hanson and Logue point out, the
evidence suggests that smokers do not take the costs imposed upon
family members and friends into account when they choose to
smoke."8 2 Therefore, we concur with the conclusion of Hanson and
Logue that these costs, along with ETS costs, can legitimately and
fairly uncontroversially be characterized as negative externalities.
ii. Costs Externalized to 'FutureSelves." In their analysis of
noninsurance externalities, Hanson and Logue characterize the
losses that are shifted by smokers from their current to their future
selves as negative externalities. ' The Manning study calculates
the smoking-related costs of harms that occur to smokers at $5.00
per pack for premature death and disability, $0.86 per pack for lost
wages, and $0.07 per pack for out-of-pocket medical expenses.'84
This amounts to a total of $5.93 per pack for harm to the smoker.
Manning and Viscusi do not regard these costs as negative externalities because they represent losses that are borne by the smokers
themselves.' 85 Manning and Viscusi assume that individuals who
choose to smoke take these costs into account and, thus, fully
internalize them. 186 Hanson and Logue, on the other hand, argue
that smokers are poorly informed about the health risks of
smoking 87 and, therefore, do not consider premature death and
disability as costs of smoking. 8 ' In their view, smokers externalize
these costs from their "present" to their "future selves."' 89

181Some

portion of the costs to friends may be included in the ETS cost calculations of
the economists. The more significant component of this category for the criticism that
Hanson and Logue level at the economists is the non-pecuniary loss that friends and

associates suffer as they perceive the declining health and ultimate death from smokingrelated illnesses. Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1230, 1239.
112 Id. at

1238-39.

'"Id. at 1230.
184 MANNING ET AL., supra note 67, at 8, 21.
MId. at 82.
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1241.
at 1185.
'RId. at 1241.
'MId. at 1209.
'

187Id.
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We find it difficult to accept the notion that costs borne by
smokers themselves can be classified as negative externalities. As
a preliminary matter, Hanson and Logue's definition of externality
is anomalous unless one accepts the bifurcation of a smoker into
present and future selves. According to the orthodox definition, a
negative externality involves a cost imposed by the actor on someone
else, rather than upon the actor. 19
More fundamentally, however, Hanson and Logue seem to be
converting an imperfect information problem into an externality
problem. Earlier, they pointed out that smokers who were fully
informed about the health risks of smoking would take these risks
into account when choosing whether and how much to smoke.
However, because Hanson and Logue believed that smokers were
actually poorly informed about such risks, they concluded that
smokers would fail to take these costs into account when they
choose to smoke. Ignoring those costs would lead to inefficiency in
the decisions that are made about smoking. Having identified the
inefficiency generated by this phenomenon once, Hanson and Logue
are on shakier ground when they return to it under the guise of
discussing negative externalities.
All of this makes a huge difference when it comes to calculating
the total external costs of smoking. As mentioned earlier, Hanson
and Logue begin with the Manning and Viscusi assumptions that
the insurance externalities associated with smoking add up to $0.66
per pack. The decision by Hanson and Logue to characterize losses
to future selves as external costs increases the aggregate figure of
noninsurance externalities from $0.39 to $6.32 per pack, that is, by
a factor of more than sixteen. When they calculate total externalities, the figure they reach for negative externalities associated with

190See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIc FINANCE 53 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that an
externality occurs when "the activity of one person affect[s] the welfare of another in a
way that is not outside the marke"); Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public
Hospitals to Recover Expendituresfor the Treatment of Disease,Injury and Disability
Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81, 103 (1994) CAn externality can
be defined as a cost associated with a market transaction that is absorbed by a party not
involved in the market transaction."); see also Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at
1223 n.263 C'Thus, a negative externality occurs when the activity of one entity imposes a
cost on another in a way that is not fully reflected in market prices.. . ." (emphasis
added)).
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smoking is a total of $6.98 per pack, or more than six-and-a-half
times what it would be without the addition of losses to future
selves.
There are some aspects of the overall Hanson and Logue
contention about externalities that we find persuasive and others
about which we have substantial doubts. In this instance, our
problem lies in Hanson and Logue's methodology that results in the
figure for noninsurance externalities. Again accepting, for the sake
of this study, the figures that Hanson and Logue incorporate from
Manning and Viscusi, we would include in the negative externality
category the $0.66 per pack for smoking-related insurance externalities, as well as the $0.14 per pack attributed to ETS and the $0.25
per pack attributed to costs externalized to family members. Those
three categories bring the total external cost of smoking to $1.05 per
pack. We are considerably more skeptical, however, about the
appropriateness of characterizing the $5.93 cost that smokers
impose upon themselves as an external cost of smoking19 1 and would
not include those within the externality calculation.
We would emphasize that we are not disputing the contention
that the delayed onset of the harms that smokers suffer contributes
to the occurrence of market failure in this setting. Our objection is
to the reasoning that characterizes those delayed costs as externalities. The effect of this disagreement is significant. If the only
technique that is offered to achieve their goal of perfect market
efficiency is ex post liability, then the payments that would be
required under the Hanson and Logue analysis are enormously
higher than any remotely acceptable policy proposal could tolerate.
Using a more conventional understanding of what constitutes an
externality has the benefit of returning the discourse to a focus on
a financial impact that is at least within the realm of plausibility.
Under this view, the market failure is correctable, at least in part,
through measures that educate the consumer about the future costs,
rather than exclusively through legal intervention that raises the
price of cigarettes to incorporate a very high estimate of what those
costs are.
1"1
See Viscusi, supra note 169, at 71 ("Overall, there is little evidence that individuals
confer an adverse externality on their future selves through their smoking behavior.").
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c. Positive Externalities. One of the strongest parts of Hanson
and Logue's article is their taking issue with the contention of the
mainstream economic analysts that smoking produces positive
externalities as well as negative externalities, and that these
19 2
external benefits equal or exceed smoking's external costs.
Manning and Viscusi acknowledge that smokers are subject to
higher medical costs, more work loss days, fewer years of work and
life, and more disability retirements than nonsmokers."' Manning
and Viscusi observe, however, that smokers receive less than
nonsmokers in pensions, in Medicare benefits, and in the coverage
of long-term care expenses."' Manning and Viscusi also point out
that smokers pay substantial amounts of excise taxes and that this
can be regarded as another external benefit of
tax revenue
195
smoking.
Manning's study concludes that the net external costs of smoking
lie somewhere between $0.31 and $0.52 a pack, a figure that is
largely offset by the average combined state and federal excise and
sales taxes on cigarettes of $0.37 per pack. 196 Taking into account
both external costs and external benefits, Viscusi concludes that the
external benefits of smoking outweigh its external costs when excise
and sales tax revenues are taken into account, 9 7 estimating that
smokers provide society with a net external benefit of $0.32 per
pack. 198
Hanson and Logue argue on a number of technical economic
grounds that Manning and Viscusi grossly overestimate the external
benefits of smoking. For example, Manning and Viscusi argue that
smokers' unclaimed pension benefits partially offset the external
costs of smoking.' 99 Manning estimates that unclaimed pension

' See generally Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1232-60.
'9 Id. at 1234-35 (citing MANNING ET AL., supra note 67, at 127; Viscusi, supra note 169,

at 72-73).
'9' Id. at 1234 (citing MANNING ET AL., supranote 67, at 127; Viscusi, supra note 169, at

72-73).
1

MANNING ET AL., supra note 67, at 18; Viscusi, supra note 169, at 57.
MANNING ET AL., supra note 67, at 85.
Viscusi, supra note 169, at 57.
'9 Id. at 74 tbl.4.
'
'

. Hanson & Logue,

Costs, supranote 6, at 1248.
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benefits amount to $0.24 per pack,20 0 while Viscusi's more recent
study estimates unclaimed pension benefits at $1.10 per pack.0 1
Hanson and Logue, on the other hand, conclude that these figures
are too high because they cover defined contribution plans as well
as defined benefit plans. 2 2 Hanson and Logue argue that defined
contribution plans should not be included within the category of
unclaimed pension benefits because payments under such plans do
not necessarily terminate at the death of the primary beneficiary. 0 3
In their view, assets that are transferred at death from the smoker
spouse, should not be treated
to someone else, such as a surviving
20 4
smoking.
of
benefit
as an external
Hanson and Logue also contend that foregone benefits, such as
unclaimed pension entitlements, cannot be characterized as positive
externalities unless their potential loss affects the incentives of the
smokers.20 5 According to them, smokers do not treat foregone future
pension benefits or other external benefits as present costs of
smoking.2 6 If they do not take these future potential losses into
account, there can be no positive externality.20 7 Consequently,
Hanson and Logue argue, external benefits of this sort cannot be
used to offset external costs if economic efficiency is the primary
goal.

20 8

"oMANNING ET AL., supra note 67, at 79 tbl.4-16.
"'0 Viscusi, supra note 169, at 74 tbl.4.
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1245-46.
5

Id.
204 Id.

at 1249.

%I Id.

Id. at 1251.
"

7

Id.

Id. Hanson and Logue do concede that the external benefits of smoking, if they
exist, may be relevant to the distributional issue. From a distributional perspective, it is
usually not good public policy for one group to enjoy the benefits of an activity while
another group is forced to bear the costs. The distributional concern is alleviated,
however, if the group that benefits from an activity transfers sufficient resources to the
group that is injured to offset the harm. Thus, if smokers transfer to nonsmokers
sufficient resources, such as unclaimed pension benefits, to offset insurance externalities
and health costs associated with passive smoke, the balance sheet would be balanced as a
distributional matter. Even if distributional concerns were satisfied in this fashion,
Hanson and Logue would argue for government intervention on accident-cost reduction
grounds. Id. at 1253-54.
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Finally, Hanson and Logue respond to the argument that federal
and state excise taxes already force smokers to internalize the full
costs of smoking. First, they point out that existing taxes amount,
on average, to $0.53 per pack, while the external costs of smoking,
according to their calculations, exceed $7.00 per pack." 9 Therefore,
even if excise taxes do provide some deterrence, Hanson and Logue
believe that the rate of taxation is far less than optimal. Furthermore, they are convinced that excise taxes are less efficient than
other forms of incentive-based regulation, so they reject the notion
that the appropriate way to deal with this disparity between
externalities and excise taxes is to raise existing taxes.2 10 Indeed,
they would appear to contend that it would be preferable to reduce
or eliminate inaccurately assessed redundant excise taxes than to
scale back on the use of incentive-based regulation as the means of
attaining efficiency.2 1' Hanson and Logue further contend that
excise taxes are not intended to internalize the tangible costs of
smoking, but rather are concerned with internalizing the psychic
cost that nonsmokers incur because society allows cigarettes to be
marketed and consumed in the first place.2 1
We agree with Hanson and Logue's claim that Manning and
In
Viscusi overestimate the external benefits of smoking. 213
particular, we accept Hanson and Logue's argument that unclaimed
benefits in defined contribution pension plans should not be
characterized as external benefits.2 14 On the other hand, it is
undeniable that cigarette excise taxes are a cost of smoking that
smokers are forced to internalize. Therefore, we believe that it is
appropriate to take such taxes into account when calculating the
overall costs and benefits of smoking in determining allocative
efficiency.
Hanson and Logue's contention that excise taxes should not be
allowed to offset external costs because they are intended to be "sin
taxes ' 5 misses an important point that needs to be made about the

Id. at
209

1254.
Id.
2 11
Id.
2 12
Id. at 1255.
213Id. at 1236.
210

214

Id. at 1249.
id.at 1255.

215
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link between the payment of a tax and the expenditure of the funds
raised by that tax. As we will explain below, our position is that the
uses to which the revenues generated by current taxes are put must
be given considerable weight when characterizing how they affect
the economic analysis of smoking. Our position, therefore, is that
those taxes are quite relevant to the assessment of the nature and
magnitude of the overall market failure problem. Because such
taxes affect the price smokers must pay, they must be taken into
account when evaluating whether production and activity levels are
at optimum levels. When the question asked is instead what costs
of smoking are being shifted from third parties to smokers through
the imposition of a tax, we believe that a more careful inquiry into
the purpose of the tax is needed.
3. Respondingto Market Failuresunder Conditionsof Uncertainty. Hanson and Logue conclude that the market for cigarettes is
inefficient.21 For the most part, we find this conclusion to be well
supported, though we are concerned that they have overstated the
magnitude of the market failure problem, which could lead to a
political backlash that dooms at the outset any attempt to draft a
sound tobacco policy. That concern leads us to suggest that
particular caution is needed when designing such a policy in
circumstances in which there is uncertainty about the precise
nature and magnitude of the problem and about the unintended
consequences of proposed solutions.
First, with respect to imperfectly informed decisionmaking by
smokers, Hanson and Logue assume that smokers completely ignore
the costs of premature death and disability, estimated to be $5.93
per pack, when they make a decision to smoke. This leads Hanson
and Logue to conclude that the entire costs of premature death and
disability, that is, $5.93 per pack, should be reflected in cigarette
prices.211 We have more confidence in the ability of smokers to
appreciate that there are substantial health risks of smoking and to
include the existence of these costs in their mental calculus when
making decisions related to smoking. Unlike Manning and Viscusi,
we doubt that smokers overestimate the costs of smoking. Rather,
216
217

Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1241.
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we share the belief of Hanson and Logue that smokers systematically underestimate these costs.218 But by how much? In the
absence of more reliable data than are available at this time, we are
reluctant to place a value on this dimension of the market failure
problem, but our underlying premise of partially informed consumers would suggest that any value would be lower than that used by
Hanson and Logue.
Second, like Hanson and Logue, we believe that smokers
externalize a considerable portion of the cost of smoking to nonsmokers. For example, substantial smoking costs are externalized
to private insurers and public social insurance programs. ETS costs
are also largely externalized to nonsmokers. Finally, certain costs
are shifted to family members and friends of smokers. According to
Hanson and Logue, these costs total at least $1.05 per pack.219 At
the same time, however, we do not find persuasive Hanson and
Logue's claim that one should treat as an externality the $5.93 in
premature death and disability costs that present smokers ignore
because they are suffered by their future selves. Furthermore, we
believe that the analysis of the allocative efficiency that exists in the
market for cigarettes ought to include the excise taxes paid by
smokers as part of the purchase price of cigarettes. If our premises
are employed, we conclude that the net negative externality costs
are considerably closer to the $0.52 a pack estimated by the
conventional economic analysis rather than the $7.00 per pack
figure suggested by Hanson and Logue. Thus, we agree with
Hanson and Logue that the market for cigarettes is inefficient, but
we would take issue with them about the severity of the problem.
The difference between the figure Hanson and Logue derive and
one that we would think more plausible is important for a number
of reasons, but none of those reasons is more significant than its
effect on the selection of an appropriate method for the legal system
to intervene. In the next Section, we shift the focus of our critique
to the way in which Hanson and Logue analyze the different
regulatory approaches to market failures. As we approach that
analysis of possible legal interventions, we believe that the economic
218

Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1242 tbl.1. This figure includes $0.66 per pack for insurance externalities,
$0.14 per pack for ETS costs, and $0.25 per pack for costs imposed on the family and
friends of smokers. Id.
219
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analysis should be understood as supporting the following working
propositions:
* there clearly are market failures in the market for cigarettes;
* the economics-based argument for legal intervention in the
cigarette market is very strong; and
• there is considerably more uncertainty about the dimension
(if not the direction2 2 ) of that market failure than Hanson and
Logue or the economic analyses they rely on seem to acknowledge.
Given that state of affairs, and acknowledging the politically and
economically precarious position of tobacco policy proposals at this
time, we believe that the construction of a legal regime should be
guided by a principle that can be articulated as follows:
When the legal system intervenes under conditions of significant uncertainty about the nature and magnitude of market
failure, there is a particularresponsibility to design a regime
that:
(i) comes close to an accuratecorrectionof the market failure,
or
(ii) minimizes the adverse effects of inaccuracy,or
(iii) advances some important social interest even at the
expense ofpossible inaccuracyin the correctionof the market
failure.
That principle plays an important role in our assessment of the
Hanson and Logue analysis of the different responses that the legal
system might employ. The most apparent consequence of that

" We are assuming, along with Hanson and Logue, that Viscusi's conclusion that
smoking creates a net positive externality is unproven.
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principle is a considerable skepticism about the wisdom of unidimensional all-or-nothing legal interventions.
B. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY APPROACHES TO MARKET FAILURES

Having concluded that "an idealized regime of enterprise liability"'2 2 satisfactorily addresses the two significant categories of
market failure they identify in the cigarette setting, Hanson and
Logue go on to explore two additional questions. The first question
is whether other techniques of legal intervention are also capable of
correcting those market failures. Our disagreement with the way
that Hanson and Logue answer this question centers around what
we believe to be the unnecessarily restrictive idea of "perfect
efficiency" that runs through their discussion of. all of the other
approaches.
The second question they pose is whether there are "real world
factors" that cause their approach to operate less well.22 2 In
evaluating the ultimate policy proposal that Hanson and Logue
offer, that second question proves to be an even more significant
inquiry. A thorough critique of their proposal needs to distinguish
between two separate aspects of the question. The first aspect calls
for a consideration of whether their approach actually has the
comparative advantage over the other approaches that they claim.
Even apart from the comparison to other approaches, the related
but more revealing consideration, we believe, is whether their
analysis of the merits of their approach survives the transportation
from an idealized setting to something that is as complex and fluid
as the socio-economic-political environment in which a responsible
policy proposal for dealing with the health effects of smoking will be
tested. Our contention is that Hanson and Logue fail to make their
case on both aspects: the comparative advantage that they ascribe
to their approach diminishes significantly in the real world, and
even when considered by itself, attainment of the benefits of their
approach is considerably less plausible than Hanson and Logue
appear to believe.

"' Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1263.
Id. at 1263.
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It is important to note that we say "appear to believe" in that last
sentence. That qualification is necessary because of the ambivalence that intrudes into the discussion of their approach: after
setting out the arguments for an ex post incentive-based liability,
they then give a good deal of attention to a "smokers' compensation '' 223 approach that deviates from the idealized liability model in
fundamental ways that suggest they appreciate the constraints that
a real world setting would place on the success of their preferred
approach. Our skepticism about their conclusion stems from a belief
that their appreciation of those constraints does not go far enough
in recognizing the impracticability of their scheme as well as the
considerably lower likelihood of its purported benefits being
realized.
1. The Systemic Weakness: Information Demands and the
Definition of Efficiency. Each of the disfavored regulatory approaches to the kinds of market failures that exist in the cigarette,
setting is found wanting by Hanson and Logue primarily because of
the inability of the relevant decisionmaker to acquire the information necessary to achieve the perfect efficiency that they articulate
as the goal. Command-and-control requirements will not attain
efficiency unless the regulator knows precisely what goes into the
market's determination of efficient care and activity levels.22 4
Performance standards will fail unless the person setting the
standard is able to make a similar determination to support the
level of performance that is selected. 225 Ex ante approaches
substitute, in their most likely form, a pre-marketing monetary
payment for each unit of production, but the amount of that ex ante
payment cannot produce efficiency unless the assessor knows the
magnitude of the externalities that need to be rectified and the
information imperfections that need to be cured. 2 6 In eachinstance,
then, the efficiency goal being sought cannot be reached because of
the impossibility of a regulator making a reliable and accurate

224 Id. at
22 Id. at

1283-84.
1264-65.

m Id. at 1267.
"

See id. at 1268-70 (discussing informational needs of regulators).
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determination of the factors that mimic the action of a perfect
market.
227
As we will explain in more detail in the next Part of our Article,
we think that focusing on economic efficiency as the primary goal
leads to an analysis that is so circumscribed as to be unhelpful, if
not outright harmful, to a productive consideration of the tobacco
problem. The point we make here, though, is that even if one were
to posit efficiency as the goal, Hanson and Logue use the narrowest
possible conception of that goal, ensuring that no approach (including their own, as we will show) could ever hope to reach it. If one
were to operate within the confines of their efficiency-centered
economic analysis, a modification of the efficiency concept would
alter in a positive and realistic way the evaluation of the efficiencygenerating potential of the different approaches to legal intervention
in the market for cigarettes.
a. The Idealized Target of Perfect Efficiency. In their criticism
of alternatives to ex post incentive-based regulation, Hanson and
Logue evaluate those approaches against a standard of an idealized
world in which efficiency is an all-or-nothing proposition: it either
exists or it does not. If perfection is what is sought, it is not
surprising that heroic measures will be required to achieve it, and
that such attributes will rarely be found in the world in which the
theories must be implemented. 2 8
Rejecting regulatory approaches that fail to produce perfect
efficiency would exemplify the maxim that the perfect is the enemy
of the good. If the concept of efficiency is limited to the conventional
definition of marginal costs equaling marginal benefits,229 arriving
at that point requires a precision in measurement and an ability to
act that are unlikely to be found anywhere outside of the hypotheti-

22See infra Part IV.A.
"2 See Harold Demsetz, Informationand Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (characterizing as the "nirvanaeffect" a choice "between an ideal norm
and an existing 'imperfect' institutional arrangement," as opposed to "a comparative
institutionapproach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional
arrangements" (emphasis in original)).
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF
THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 18 (1992). Professor Rose-Ackerman notes that

"[u]tilitarian and cost-benefit tests are not identical," id., but the conceptions of efficiency
we examine in the following paragraphs are adaptable to both.
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cal universe of economists' assumptions. One of the lessons of the
economic analysis of law, however, has been that we do not need to
limit ourselves in that way. Posing the central question in different
ways can still permit us to benefit from the insight obtainable from
looking at a state of affairs through the prism of efficiency considerations. Two other conceptions of efficiency are particularly useful
when addressing the Hanson and Logue question of how one should
evaluate different schemes for intervening in the market for
cigarettes.230
b. Pareto Efficiency. The first supplemental conception of
efficiency that needs to be considered is derived from the work of
Vilfredo Pareto. Attempting to break free from the comparative
231
interpersonal utility dilemma of classical utilitarian thought,
Pareto criteria offer a less demanding notion of efficiency. A
condition is Paretooptimalwhen the situation of no person could be
improved except at the expense of some other person.232 Pareto
optimality has much the same all-or-nothing implausibility as the
perfect efficiency employed as a goal in the more rigorous aspects of
Hanson and Logue's analysis. There is another Pareto condition,
however, that makes it possible to view matters against a "more-orless" rather than an "all-or-nothing" template. A condition is Pareto
superiorwhen the situation of at least one person is improved and
the situation of no person is worsened.233
The principal benefit of bringing Pareto analysis into the tobacco
policy arena is that it introduces the useful notion that value is
added to the analysis when it is possible to identify a state of affairs
as better than another, even if not perfect. When evaluating
approaches to the tobacco-related health problem, it would be quite
helpful to be able to say that an approach is likely to result in an
improvement in efficiency rather than simply to dismiss it as
unlikely to lead to perfect efficiency, particularly when there is no
approach that can plausibly claim to attain that ideal.

m See JEFFRiE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 212-218 (1984) (discussing principles of economic
efficiency).
23 1
Id. at 212.
2Id.
at 213.
2. Id.
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c. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency. A similar broadening of the
efficiency concept occurs in the "new welfare economics" 3- 4 work of
Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks. The Kaldor-Hicks conception of
efficiency relaxes the demand that there be no worsening of any
person's situation in order for a condition to be efficient in the
Pareto optimality sense. Under this test, a condition can be found
to be efficient if the gains to those whose situation is improved are
greater than the losses of those whose situation is worsened." 5 It
is important to note that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not require
that anything be done in this situation; it merely identifies as
efficient a situation in which there is a net social gain.
The most significant consequence of introducing Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency into the evaluation of different approaches to dealing with
the costs of cigarettes is the opening up of a wider range of action
that arises from the determination that winners win more than
losers lose. If the losses to the losers could be offset out of the gains
to the winners, then there is a potential for attaining a state of
affairs that would still be efficient in Kaldor-Hicks terms but could
also be Pareto superior if those losses were actually offset.2" 6
d. The Effects of a Relaxed Conception of Efficiency in the
Development of Tobacco Policy. While admittedly still falling short
of perfect efficiency, this alternative conception of efficiency proves
to be extremely useful on at least three dimensions that fit into our
critique of Hanson and Logue and that assist us in our development
of a different analytical construct.
First, it characterizes as an efficient outcome a result
that is an improvement over the prior state of affairs.

2M4JOHN HIcKs, WEALTH AND WELFARE: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON ECONOMIc THEORY xi

(1981).
MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 230, at 217.

Id. ('If compensation were paid to losers a Kaldor-Hicks efficient move would
become a Pareto superior one."). The accuracy of that characterization in practice depends
on the amount of the transaction costs needed to provide compensation. If transaction
costs are greater than the difference between the gains to the winners and the losses to
the losers, requiring compensation would be inefficient. See Jules L. Coleman, The
Economic Analysis of Law, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, &THE LAW 83, 84 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982) [hereinafter NOMOS XXIV] (explaining
Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
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The possibility of such a finding is essential in any
realistic appraisal of the economic advantages of different ways of intervening in the market for cigarettes.
Second, it opens up the very important opportunity to
layer a number ofjustice concerns on top of the economic
analysis. A simultaneous incorporation of justice
concerns is one of the most significant demands that
should be made of a public policy assessment of the
cigarette market.
Third, it strongly suggests a compensatory approach to
the central Hanson and Logue question of how to
intervene in the imperfect market, and thus offers a
theoretical support of what we believe is one of the most
important components of a multi-dimensional approach
to this complex problem."'
This modification of efficiency theory has very real significance
in the consideration of the merits of the various categories of
regulatory approaches. Take, for example, a performance-based
regulation in the form of a rule that cigarettes may not be marketed
with a nicotine content above a certain level. That rule would likely
produce some losses to the tobacco industry; if it did not, then one
would have expected the industry to adopt such a move on its own.
Smokers themselves may also experience a reduced pleasure from
smoking cigarettes that comply with that rule. More importantly,
studies of the ways in which a smokers' behavior might change to
compensate for the lower nicotine content suggest that at least some
smokers will experience adverse health consequences because of the
reduction in nicotine levels. 3 8 It would still be possible to say that

' See infra Part V.A (discussion ofjustice claims for compensation of smokers and
others adversely affected by smoking).
' See, e.g., William N. Evans & Matthew C. Farrelly, The CompensatingBehavior of
Smokers: Taxes, Tar, and Nicotine, 29 RAND J. ECON. 578 (1998) (concluding that higher
taxes lead to some smokers shifting to consumption of higher tar and nicotine cigarettes,
reducing the health benefits from the lower demand attributable to the higher price).
Studies such as this one support Hanson and Logue's contention that ex ante incentivebased schemes are not likely to produce an optimal activity level on the part of smokers.
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1275-76. Our point, however, is that such a
technique is an important component of a multidimensional policy scheme in which the
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the rule was an efficiency-promoting step, however. If the positive
health and economic consequences of such a requirement2. 9 were
determined to exceed the adverse consequences to the industry and
to its customers, then the approach would be efficient under KaldorHicks principles.
The major advantage of changing the template against which the
regulatory approaches are measured, in our view, is that doing so
alleviates the recurring problem that Hanson and Logue find in the
approaches other than the one they advocate. Instead of requiring
the precise measurement needed to attain perfect efficiency, this
alternative notion of efficiency leaves room for approval of an
approach that could be based on admittedly rougher but more
practicable judgments about the types and dimensions of gains and
losses. It thus enables a policymaker to keep on the table a number
of regulatory approaches that Hanson and Logue dismiss on the way
to an advocacy of their approach.
2. The Overly CriticalView of ParticularRegulatoryApproaches.
The other substantial area of our disagreement with the Hanson
and Logue treatment of the regulatory approaches relates more to
the specific shortcomings they identify in some approaches and the
particular advantages of their preferred approach. While the
preceding discussion identified what we believe to be a systemic or
theoretical weakness in their analysis, this part of our critique is
centered more on the assumptions that are made about the
operation of the different approaches.
a. The Responsivenessof Command-and-ControlRegulators. As
pointed out above, we believe that one can say that command-andcontrol regulations are capable of producing greater efficiency if one
expands the idea of efficiency to allow room for a positive result that
falls short of perfection. Even if one were to be limited to the perfect
efficiency goal of Hanson and Logue, we question the assumption

disadvantages of one component could be offset by another component. In this instance,
for example, a cap on permissible nicotine and tar levels could minimize the adverse
health effects of this compensating behavior.

' One could assume that those positive consequences could include such benefits as a
reduction in the likelihood of addiction or the diversion of disposable income from
cigarette purchases to other uses that do not carry the same risk of significant future
health care expenses.
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about the unresponsiveness of both regulators and regulated firms
that is implicit in the Hanson and Logue criticism of this type of
regulatory approach. According to Hanson and Logue, if by some
miracle a regulator were to happen upon a requirement that
produced efficiency at the present moment, the regulator would be
unlikely to adapt to changing circumstances. 24° In addition, they
assert that the regulated firms would be deprived of an incentive to
develop new technologies.2 4 '
Hanson and Logue are undoubtedly correct in their concerns
about the relationship between regulators and regulated industries.
A substantial body of literature sounds cautionary notes about such
phenomena as industry capture of agencies and unintended
consequences of regulations.2 4 2 Our difference with Hanson and
Logue is more a matter of how one responds to the existence of those
risks. If command-and-control regulations are capable of producing
significant social good, 243 then we believe that the appropriate
response to the potentially efficiency-threatening effects of regulations is to build in as much protection from those effects as is
feasible and otherwise justified.
In any event, we are not persuaded that the magnitude of the
problem is as great as Hanson and Logue suggest. Regulatory
agencies could very well be capable of periodic reassessment of a
situation and corrective action called for by that reassessment.
Furthermore, we think that the experience in other regulatory
settings suggests that the tobacco companies are unlikely to be
subject to the technology-freezing effects that Hanson and Logue
predict. In our view, it is just as likely, if not more likely, that the
regulated firms will devote resources to research and development
efforts that can improve market share and lower costs within a
particular regulatory regime. If the specific regulatory demands
24 Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1265.
241Id. at

1339.

22 See, e.g., Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective

on Tort Reform, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1129, 1181 (1994) (describing effect of funding cuts and
anti-regulatory rhetoric on agency morale); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages
and Regulated Products,42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1347-52 (1993) (discussing regulatory
failures at the FDA).
2 Part IV.B. infra sets forth the bases for our strong belief that command-and-control
regulations do produce significant social good.
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prove to be inappropriate as their consequences are felt, we think
that the history of the regulatory state in this country provides a
basis for predicting that the political process would be employed by
the industry in ways that can bring the task of dealing with those
objections to prominence in the regulatory agenda.2 44
b. Realistic Sanctionsfor Performance-BasedRegulations. Our
principal reaction to the Hanson and Logue treatment of performance-based regulation is based on the same disagreement with the
ultimate goal that we have identified above. If securing an improvement in the state of affairs is substituted for the attainment of
optimality, then performance-based regulations offer significant
opportunities to improve safety and to move toward a correction of
market imperfections.
When considering how performance standards will actually
operate, however, it is important to set up a plausible hypothesis.
Hanson and Logue stack the deck against such standards when they
use as a model a regulation that sets a nicotine level standard that
would be enforced by a ban on cigarettes. 4 5 It is more likely that
the consequence of missing the performance standard would be a
monetary penalty rather than a ban of the product. 46 Sanctions
that are perceived as unrealistically harsh can change the operation

24 The experience with National Highway Traffic Safety Administration occupant
protection system requirements for motor vehicles is one example of agency responsiveness to practicability concerns raised by a regulated industry. For a detailed account of
the regulation of auto safety see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFsT, THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFiTY (1990). The Clean Air Act offers another illustration of an effective industry
assertion of the economic consequences of proposed regulation. For a thorough examination of its history see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAIIDIRTY AIR
(1981).
" Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1267. They repeat this depiction of a
sanction in connection with performance-based standards for youth smoking levels. Id. at
1268.
24'Bans are more likely to be used as a sanction after it has been determined that there
is no reason to subject society to the risks associated with a product and no way to
eliminate those risks from the product. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2057 (1994) (stating procedure for banning hazardous products). We are not saying that
bans are an impossible sanction; rather, we are expressing skepticism that they are a
plausible component of a performance-based regulation of the kind that Hanson and
Logue discuss.

1999]

TOBACCO POLICYMAKING

759

of the decisionmaking process in ways that distort the overall
assessment of that approach. 47
Hanson and Logue arguably illustrate this distortion in their
critique of the performance-based regulations set out in the 1997
settlement agreement.24 They express considerable skepticism that
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would act aggressively as
an efficiency-enhancing regulator, basing that opinion on the failure
of the agency to utilize the authority it has arguably had for many
years.24 9
We would point to that same history of regulatory inertia as an
illustration of why performance-based regulations need to be
evaluated under an operating assumption that reasonable sanctions
would be attached to non-attainment. The most likely explanation
for the FDA's record of limited action on tobacco products prior to
1995250 is an understandable reluctance to have exercised an
authority that was never more than implicit in a way that might
have resulted in an explicit removal of that authority from the
agency. It is virtually certain that any move toward banning
cigarettes would have had that effect. Indeed, the explicit exclusion
of tobacco products from the regulatory authority delegated by the
major consumer protection legislation from 1966 to 1976251 justifies
an inference that Congressional reaction to the FDA stepping
forward on this issue would have been strong and swift, perhaps

2. One could refer t0 the evidence of prosecutors making lower charging decisions

because of discomfort with mandatory sentencing requirements that are seen as too
drastic. See generallyJeffrey Standen, PleaBargainingin the Shadow of the Guidelines,
81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1505-12 (1993) (noting that enhanced prosecutorial discretion
under the guidelines cuts both ways). The point we are making is that there must be a
realistic chance of the agency enforcing a standard if the standard is going to serve as a
model of how such a regulatory approach will work.
2
' See Hanson & Logue, Costs supranote 6, at 1340-41 (discussing weakness of FDA's
authority to promulgate performance standards).
249 Id. at 1341.
' The first significant foray by the FDA was its issuance of a proposed rule in that
year. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco Products To Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41314 (1995)
(proposed Aug. 11, 1995).
2' See RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 375 (1996) (citing instances of congressional
exclusion of tobacco products from the scope of the Fair Labeling and Packaging Act of
1966, the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972,
and the Toxic Substances Act of 1976).
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even threatening the agency's ability to act in other areas of its
responsibility.
When the focus shifts to a consideration of sanctions that do not
threaten the viability of the industry, such as those contained in the
1997 settlement agreement, it is more likely that performance-based
regulations will become an effective tool in the regulatory mix,
capable of producing results that are efficient in the less demanding
sense described above and that are beneficial on other dimensions
as well. Indeed, the fact that the penalty proposed for failing to
meet the performance standard for reducing the level of underage
smoking does not threaten the survival of the industry could be seen
as one of its strengths, rather than as simply another weakness.2 52
A performance-based regulation of this sort could, in conjunction
with and as part of a comprehensive and multidimensional scheme,
provide at least some incentive for the industry to address the
problem dealt with by the regulation. One could see standards of
this sort as more hortatory than punitive, attempting to overcome
inertia within the industry and beginning a push in a socially
desirable direction.
c. The Positive Effects of Regulation through Ex Ante Taxes.
Hanson and Logue's position on ex ante taxes on cigarettes offers a
clear example of how the quest for the perfect can distract attention
from the benefits of an incremental advance to the good. While they
are undoubtedly correct in their belief that an excise tax on
cigarettes would not be levied at the rate that would produce perfect
efficiency in the market,2 53 we think that even within their own
analytical framework they are insufficiently appreciative of the
benefits that do flow from such a tax.
We contend later in this Article that excise taxes are the single
most effective method of responding to a number of the serious
justice concerns that are encountered in the tobacco setting. Even
if we were to set aside those justice concerns for the moment and
concentrate on the goal of allocative efficiency in the tobacco

" See Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1332-33 (criticizing small increase in
price that would be needed to cover the penalty for non-attainment of youth smoking
levels under look-back provisions of 1997 proposed settlement).
253 See id. at 1269-71 (discussing difficulty in arriving at efficient tax rate).
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industry, ex ante taxes do more to enhance efficiency than any other
form of legal intervention. It is evident that the driving force behind
Hanson and Logue's legal intervention in the cigarette market is the
reduction in demand attributable to the higher price that will result
from the implementation of their approach. For the most part, the
benefits of their approach would occur regardless of the specific
mechanism that leads to that higher price.254 In the situation where
the current price of cigarettes is as dramatically lower than its
social costs as Hanson and Logue say it is, we think that the
appropriate reaction to ex ante regulation through increased rates
of excise taxes should be more approving of the efficiency gains than
critical of its failure to attain optimality. Their recognition that
excise taxes could move the "aggregate activity levels ...closer to
' needs to be kept in the proper perspective.
the optimal levels"255
This regulatory approach is capable of having a significant and
direct effect on the level of consumption, 256 and may be the only
effective way of using a pricing mechanism to accomplish that result
at reasonable levels of administrative expense.
Some other aspects of Hanson and Logue's treatment of excise
taxes are less than compelling. One of their concerns is the adverse
effect of a single rate of taxation. Their position is that a failure to
discriminate in tax rates among products with different risk levels
can lower the incentive for manufacturers to invest in greater
safety.257 They are also concerned about the potential for "errors of
commission" and "errors of omission" as smokers consume too much
or too little, respectively, of the product as compared to their

" The expectation that there will be activity level efficiency gains is consistent with
the statement in the text. While the occurrence of care level gains are arguably a
different matter, we suspect that those are less likely to result from the Hanson and
Logue approach, so the improbability of their occurring as a result of ex ante taxation is
not a comparative disadvantage of this regulatory approach.
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1273.
2 The statement by Hanson and Logue that excise tax rates could be adjusted to
correct problems that flow from an incorrect rate, id. at 1272-1273, seems to be an
acknowledgement of the point that we made above that one of the strengths of regulatory
approaches that involve legislative or administrative agency action is the ability to
monitor and respond to the consequences of the action. See supraPart HI.B.2.a.
" Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1271-72.

762

GEORGIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 33:693

consumption levels if they were perfectly and individually informed
of the risks.2
We are not persuaded that the safety disincentive that concerns
Hanson and Logue is a serious risk. Experience in other product
settings, such as automobiles, would suggest that there is a market
niche that a producer can claim by marketing with a focus on
safety. 59 To be sure, filling that niche would require the firms in
the tobacco industry to engage in meaningful competition on
something other than brand identity and price. Allegations have
been made that the industry has violated antitrust laws by conspiring to fix product quality,2 ' and the continuation of such conspiracies would make competition over product safety less likely. As long
as the anticompetitive practices of the industry were kept in check,
however, we would anticipate a recognition of the potential for
market advantages by members of the tobacco industry as a
response to enhanced regulation and higher rates of taxation.
A very real concern is the phenomenon that Hanson and Logue
refer to as "errors of commission"-excessive rates of smoking
because of smokers underestimating the risk of a particular brand
of cigarette. 2"' That phenomenon is not a reason to be skeptical
about the effectiveness of excise taxes. In no other aspect are the
incremental efficiency gains from excise taxes more likely to occur.
The higher price attributable to the excise tax has a beneficial effect
in lowering demand among consumers prone to this type of inefficient behavior. Furthermore, as a practical matter, excise taxes
that were levied specifically for public policy reasons rather than for
general revenue-raising purposes would almost certainly distinguish
among categories of cigarettes according to at least rough measures
of their risk differentials. s 2

2.

Id. at 1272.

See Daniel Givelber, CigaretteLaw, 73 IND. L.J. 867, 887 (1998) (noting theory and
explaining why practice of tobacco industry has not been consistent with theory); Note,
supra note 151, at 895 (exploring "Volvo effect in which safety advertising helps to
achieve accident-reduction goal of tort law).

I See Einer Elhauge, Foul Smoke, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1998, at A15 (discussing
allegation that "cigarette manufacturers have agreed among themselves not to compete on
product safety").
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1271-72.
See Evans & Farrelly, supranote 238, at 594 (proposing that excise taxes should be
assessed on the basis of tar and nicotine content of cigarettes).
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Errors of "omission" present a more curious feature of the tobacco
setting.2 6 s Hanson and Logue place this label on what might be
described as a "double counting" phenomenon. A rational consumer
who was perfectly informed about the risks of smoking would make
efficient decisions about smoking. Imposition of an excise tax on the
cigarettes purchased by that consumer would add to, rather than
substitute for, the deterrence produced by perfect information,
causing the consumer to smoke too little. This analysis highlights
the problem of using cigarettes as the proving ground for economic
theory that may have considerable value in other settings. When a
product has as little (or no) social utility as is often claimed about
cigarettes, then any putative errors of omission could be seen
instead as an incidental and indirect means of obtaining the benefits
of reduced smoking. What may appear at first glance to be a
theoretical drawback to this regulatory approach from an economic
perspective could, thus, be transformed into what is actually a
practical benefit when additional perspectives are introduced into
the policy analysis.
By and large, our critique of the details of Hanson and Logue's
treatment of command-and-control, performance-based, and ex ante
excise tax regulations identifies instances in which we think they
have overestimated the drawbacks of the approaches or underappreciated the contributions that the approaches make to a multipronged attack on the problem. Although it is true that they do
acknowledge that these other approaches have merit in certain
circumstances,26 4 it is nevertheless also true that they consign these
approaches to roles that are supplemental to their preferred
approach. It is to the purported advantages of this approach that
we now turn.
d. The Drawbacks to Regulation through Ex Post Liability.
Just as we have suggested that Hanson and Logue undervalue the

Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1272.
See id. at 1267-68 (discussing advantages of performance-based regulation over
command-and-control regulation); id. at 1270 (detailing occasions when ex ante,
performance-based, and command-and-control regulation have beneficial uses); id. at
1272-73 (analyzing positive effects of ex ante taxes); see also Hanson et al., Blueprint,
supranote 7, at 527-28 (criticizing command-and-control, performance-based regulation,
and excise taxes while recognizing that those approaches should at times be used).
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other approaches, our critique of their evaluation of their ex post
victim-initiated incentive-based approach leads us to conclude that
they overestimate the benefits that would flow from the adoption of
that approach. In some instances, we think their analysis makes
assumptions that are difficult to credit, while in others, they
downplay problems that we consider to be significant obstacles to
the accomplishment of their objective.
Arguably, the single greatest shortcoming in the justification of
enterprise liability and smokers' compensation is the belief that an
ex post liability approach uses a decisionmaking process that leads
to an efficient result. The predicate to their approach, Hanson and
Logue contend, is "the regulator... charging the manufacturer, ex
post, for any costs that the product winds up causing."2 5 When the
manufacturer continues to operate in a legal regime in which it
knows that charge will be assessed, it must incorporate its exposure
to liability into its decisionmaking about product design and
production levels, with the consumer ultimately required to
internalize the costs that previously were externalized.2 66 We
believe that it is unrealistic to assume that the quantification of
"any costs" the product causes is any more within the grasp of
decisionmakers who would be called upon to determine it than are
the tasks for which Hanson and Logue found regulators to be illequipped in the other approaches. Deciding what counts as a cost
of smoking and assigning a value to those costs introduce elements
that are conceptually controversial and factually indeterminate.
Even if some consensus could be reached about how to make
those decisions, the tobacco setting contains features that make the
Hanson and Logue result of efficient levels of care and activity less
likely to occur here than in other injury contexts. In their discussion of imperfect information as a contributor to market failure,
Hanson and Logue correctly note that a distinctive characteristic of
smoking-related harms is the lengthy time gap between the activity
and the onset of the harm.2 67 When the legal system intervenes
employing a technique that has a focus on ex post liability, the costs

'2 Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1273.
266Id.
27

Id. at 1203-06.
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that are attributed to smoking will be assessed at a much later time
than the decisions about use were actually made.
Under the approach advocated by Hanson and Logue, the
cigarette manufacturers' "ex ante expected cost calculation" and
"determin[ation], ex ante [ofj optimal product design . . . and

optimal quantity"268 will be made on the basis of the prediction of an
ex post liability assessment that is removed in time from either of
two critical dates: the time in the past when the person currently
being compensated decided whether and how much to smoke, and
the time in the future when the harms to current smokers manifest
themselves in order to be valued and compensated. Under those
circumstances, it is simply implausible to conclude that the effects
of compensation under this sort of legal regulation will any more
closely correspond to the perfect efficiency that their economic model
holds out as the goal than the other approaches that they denigrate.
As they develop their approach and criticize the proposed 1997
settlement, Hanson and Logue make a number of adjustments or
accommodations that cause the compensation provided under their
approach to deviate from the initial premise that it would entail a
full ex post assessment of any costs that are caused by smoking. For
example, as a way of avoiding anticipated moral hazard objections
to their approach, they limit the compensation they would provide
to "compensation that is currently provided through public and
' One of Hanson and Logue's most
private insurance mechanisms."269
compelling accomplishments in The Costs of Cigarettes is their
demonstration that substantial costs of smoking are externalized
under the current legal regime. It is disconcerting, to put it mildly,
to find them so willing to remove from their compensation scheme
the categories of costs that are most likely to be externalized under
the current state of affairs and that are not now covered by private
and public insurance. Those categories would include pain and
suffering of the smokers who develop health problems, emotional
distress of the family members of those ill smokers, and
noneconomic losses to the survivors of smokers who die from
smoking-related illnesses. A scheme that excludes compensation for
these categories of losses is a far cry from one that reaches perfect
2
"0Id.
2

at 1273.
59Id. at 1280.
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efficiency through a simple ex post charge of any costs that are
caused by smoking.
The modification of their approach to exclude compensation for
particular categories of very real harms is an instance in which
Hanson and Logue attempt to accommodate the strains of transferring the abstract economic model to an operational setting, and do
so only at significant cost to the integrity of their model. Their
description of how their approach would work also includes
examples of what we would refer to as a "spill-over effect." By this
term, we refer to the situation in which a doctrinal modification
designed to deal with the unique properties of a particular injury
situation is not easily confined within that situation, and begins to
affect the shape of the doctrine in other applications. Mass tort
litigation in the last three decades abounds with illustrations of this
phenomenon: the "market share liability" theory developed to deal
with the indeterminacy of causation in the DES cases; 270 the
distortion of the state-of-the-art defense in the asbestos cases when
rehashing the issue of whether the industry could have known about
the risks of exposure that insulation installers experienced became
a pointless exercise in raising the costs of litigation;2 71 the stress on
the evidentiary process in the Bendectin cases when the legal
system was asked to make decisions about liability when the
scientific evidence was still lacking;272 and the stretching of the

270See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (holding DES manufacturer liable under market share approach), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Smith v.
Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991) (holding blood products manufacturer
liable under market share liability); Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984)

(holding DES manufacturer liable under market share liability); see also David A. Fischer,
ProductsLiability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1981)
(presenting basic contours of market share liability).
" See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982)

(holding state-of-the art defense unavailable in failure to warn case, in part because it
would "greatly add to costs both sides incur in trying a case"); Patricia M. Danzon, Tort
Reform and the Role of Government in PrivateInsuranceMarkets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517,
535-36 (1985) (discussing efficiency considerations of state-of-the-art defense).
72 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (establishing test
for admissibility of scientific evidence); MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDE TIN AND BIRTH
DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996) (detailing
history, structure, and consequences of Bendectin litigation); Heidi L. Feldman, Science
and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing
admissibility of scientific evidence).
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boundaries of the class action prerequisites to fit the demands of
potential classes that are both huge and amorphous.
The clearest instance of a potential spill over in the Hanson and
Logue approach occurs in connection with their discussion of the
transition issues that are raised by imposing significant liability for
harms caused by conduct that occurred decades in the past. After
a careful account of the risk of insolvency that the industry would
face if their scheme were to be implemented, Hanson and Logue
characterize those fears in a number of ways: as exaggerated, as not
unique to their approach, and as a necessary corollary to a commitment to a free market system.2 "4 As part of their response, they
suggest that one way to deal with the problem of firms that were
judgment-proof would be "to eliminate or weaken the doctrine of
limited shareholder liability," allowing claimants to "go after the
assets not only of the cigarette companies themselves but also of the
tobacco company shareholders."275
It is difficult to tell how serious Hanson and Logue are about this
feature of their discussion. They go on to suggest that a "financial
responsibility" requirement could be imposed on firms in the
industry,276 but that does nothing to address the problems attributable to liability for harms caused well prior to the adoption of the
plan. Our concern is that a proposal that requires such a dramatic
departure from a central premise of a settled body of law is considerably weakened, either because of the improbability of its occurrence
or because of the serious consequences that could be expected to
follow its occurrence in this specific setting.
Let us make clear the nature of our critique. We are not critical
of Hanson and Logue for advocating a system that attempts to
compensate for some of the harms of smoking. As we will show
below, we think that compensation of a particular sort is an
essential component of a socially responsible approach to the

" See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995) (ordering
class certification in action on behalf of all nicotine-dependent smokers and their dependents), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
""See Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1301-12 (discounting fears of collapse of
tobacco industry).
' Id. at 1309-10.
2'aId. at 1311.
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problem. The objection that we offer here is that, on their own
terms, the approach advocated by Hanson and Logue cannot be
justified on an efficiency basis. Indeed, given the analysis that we
offer in the next Part of our article, it would appear that a version
of the ex ante excise tax method of legal intervention in the market
for cigarettes offers the greatest promise of promoting efficiency.
The central theme of our critique of this approach to the costs of
cigarettes contains a clear lesson for how to proceed. If the approach preferred by Hanson and Logue is incapable of achieving the
goal they identify as paramount in their analysis, then something
has to change. Either one must modify the rationale asserted for
their method, or one must place greater reliance on other approaches that may be similarly handicapped when it comes to
attaining perfect efficiency but that serve social policy objectives
other than efficiency.
Our critique of Hanson and Logue's analysis should not detract
from the realization that they offer many insights into the pluses
and minuses of the various approaches to dealing with the costs of
cigarettes. The legal, economic, and administrative commentary
that follows their work will necessarily be enriched by the breadth
and depth of those insights.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that we draw from an examination
of the treatment that Hanson and Logue give to the various
regulatory approaches is that the appropriate way to take advantage of the work they have done is to incorporate it into a substantially different method of tackling the question of how the legal
system should respond to the harmful consequences of tobacco
products. The next Part of our Article presents a "fresh start" at
answering that question, one that we believe has considerable
promise as a practicable and politically feasible method of responding to the economic, medical, legal, and social justice implications of
smoking-related harm.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND SMOKING ISSUES:
A FRESH START
For all of its considerable sophistication and insight into the
economics of smoking-related harms, we conclude that Hanson and
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Logue's narrow focus on economic efficiency fails to accommodate
other vitally important factors that should drive the analysis. In
identifying both the policy ends and the methodological means that
must be taken into account in any realistic attempt to confront the
health-related harms associated with smoking, a "fresh start" is
both timely and needed.
It would be presumptuous to start anew without indicating the
route to be taken and explaining why that path is different from
what has come before. Our intent in this fresh start is to pave the
way for constructing a tobacco policy built from components that are
derived from an exercise in comprehensive policy analysis, rather
than the result of "coincidence" 77 or the vagaries of the political
process."7
The appropriate methodology for that policymaking
effort is to identify the policy considerations that need to be
addressed and then to select the most effective means of accommodating those considerations, recognizing that tensions among these
various policies need to be acknowledged forthrightly and dealt with
as well as possible.
A number of the components of a tobacco policy developed in this
way correspond to statutory and regulatory measures that have
been proposed or enacted in the past. In our view, while that may
demonstrate the political viability of those measures, it is not a
sufficient reason for their inclusion within an overall policy. Our
purpose is ultimately to highlight a range of measures that are
derived from the policy considerations we outline and that are
sensitive to the constraints presented by current political and
economic conditions.
We come at the project of developing a tobacco policy with a belief
that justice considerations have priority over purely economic
concerns or political matters. Once these justice concerns have been

7'See id. at 1342 C'[T]he coincidence of the amount of the payments under the [1997
negotiated settlement] agreement [between the tobacco companies and the attorneys
general] and the amount necessary to cover future Medicaid costs could be just that-pure
coincidence.").
27 One account of the origin of the 1997 settlemenes $368 billion figure attributes it to
White House deputy counsel Bruce Lindsey's calculation on a napkin at a meeting with
some of the key negotiators. CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO:
HOW THE STATES TOOK ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTs, at 219-20 (1998).
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articulated and their strength determined, 9 ' efficiency considerations and the political environment can serve as constraints on the
solutions that are proposed, even if only to acknowledge that a
substantial loss of efficiency might be required to address a
particular justice consideration or that the most desirable outcome
from a justice perspective has no realistic chance of being adopted
because of intractable political opposition. In a sense, then, we have
reversed the polarity on the moral compass that drives law and
economics analysis. Unlike Calabresi and those who follow in his
steps, we begin with an analysis of the demands of justice and then
bring "other efficiency" and political concerns into play, rather than
starting with efficiency and noting "other justice" concerns that may
0
28

exist.

One of the risks of an academic policymaking enterprise is that
it never develops a clear focus and remains little more than a
laundry list of items that should be included in a nebulous balancing
of interests. 28 ' While there can be a significant benefit from the
effort to locate all of the interests that are implicated in a situation,
our hope is that a greater structure can be given to the process by
indicating the order in which the relevant considerations are to be
addressed. 2
Our decision to place justice concerns at the heart of the
policymaking process has an important methodological consequence.
Once justice considerations have been identified, our approach
would not allow them to be trumped by considerations that rank
lower in the hierarchy. Economic and political concerns will
necessarily inform the policy discussion about the wisdom and the
feasibility of promoting those justice concerns through particular
27 The justifications for the details of the proposals that follow are based on principles
in the Dworkinian sense of standards to be observed because of"a requirement of justice
or fairness or some other dimension of morality," RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 22 (1978), and that exert stronger or weaker force depending on the particular
application to which they are put. Id. at 26.
8

CALABRESI, supranote 11, at 24-26.
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 73 (1985) (describing the philosophical

flaw in interest balancing).
' For a thoughtful exploration of how to order values and interests in tort law, see
David G. Owen, PhilosophicalFoundationsof Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 201, 216-20 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS].
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proposals. Even in the construction of specific program components,
however, the notion of hierarchy implies that economic considerations and political constraints should impinge upon the satisfaction
of justice-based claims only in the least intrusive manner. The
approach we advocate thus turns a free-for-all balancing process
into an analysis that is conducted according to ground rules about
when and to what extent particular considerations will be permitted
to interfere with the implementation of policies designed to promote
other concerns.
Section A offers a brief identification of the different policy
considerations that need to be addressed in formulating a tobacco
policy. In Section B, we examine the various regulatory approaches
to determine how the different forms of legal intervention might
address those policy considerations. Much of what Hanson and
Logue have said about the inefficiency that remains in the market
for cigarettes even after the application of most regulatory approaches will be taken as given. Our purpose here is to identify
what these different approaches might do well, rather than to
relegate them to an inferior status because of their inadequacies
when viewed solely from an economic efficiency perspective.
The approach that we describe here arguably has an important
pragmatic dimension. Given the highly politicized atmosphere that
invariably develops around discussions of tobacco legislation, there
is a special need for sensitivity to the strength of the forces that are
at odds in this setting. Proposals that proceed from questionable
premises will have a brief shelf-life under the intense scrutiny they
will receive in such a charged policy arena. Similar reservations are
warranted for proposals that take no notice of the reality that the
"other side" has interests that have to be acknowledged as real and
as entitled to inclusion within the debate.
In a setting like this, we believe that a justice-centered approach
has particular appeal for a number of reasons. First, it opens the
discussion with the most important issue. Our central question is
what is right, rather than what is most efficient, or what is most
politically expedient. Second, by staking out greater justice as a
legitimate end, it opens the door for the development of policy
proposals aimed at goals that are significant and achievable.
Solutions that are not perfect can be viewed as promising first steps,

772

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:693

rather than being discarded because they fail to resolve all aspects
of an extremely complex set of problems. Third, by acknowledging
the full range of interests that are affected by the issues surrounding legal intervention in the tobacco setting, it holds out the promise
that all the relevant constituencies can be kept in the discussion.
No solution is ever going to garner sufficient political support if it
dismisses all of the interests of a significant constituency. The
policy debate is best served when it takes place in a form that
invites inclusion in the discussion rather than one that assures
rejection because of the exclusion of a set of interests. Placing those
interests in a moral framework allows the initial focus to be a
consideration of which justice principles underlie our social policy.
Building on whatever agreement can be developed at that level, the
policy debate can then turn to a full airing of the nature and
strength of the justice base of the different interests.
A. THE RANGE OF POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TOBACCO SETTING

The description of the policy considerations that need to be
addressed in the tobacco setting distinguishes among justice
concerns, economic considerations, and political constraints. As was
true of Hanson and Logue's taxonomy of regulatory approaches, we
do not pretend that the boundaries between these categories are
necessarily clearly defined or immutable.2 8 3 Although the categorization can become a matter of contention, we believe that even a
rough characterization of the nature of a policy concern is essential
to the prioritization that is required under our justice-centered
approach to policymaking.
1. Justice Concerns. This Section describes four considerations
that we believe need to be at the heart of the development of a
sound tobacco policy. Those considerations are corrective justice,
retributive justice, distributive justice, and personal autonomy.

' See Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1263 n.422 (acknowledging that the
distinctions they draw "are not perfect and in some instances blur"); see also JEFFRIE G.
MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 114 (1988) (citing view that retribution is a species of distributive justice); Richard W. Wright, Rights, Justice,and Tort Law,
in PHILosoPmIcAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 282, at 159, 175 (classifying retributive
justice as a subset of corrective justice).

1999]

TOBACCO POLICYMAKING

We have chosen to characterize this cluster of considerations as
"justice concerns" for two reasons. First, from a purely semantic
perspective, we were reluctant to describe these concerns in
negative terms, i.e., as "non-economic"' or "non-political." Because
we believe these concerns should be the central features of a tobacco
policy, it is important to begin with a positive statement that
captures in ordinary language terms the force that they should
have. Second, and more importantly, describing these matters as
"justice concerns" is usefully evocative of subsequent steps in the
policymaking process that we advocate. On one level, the label
"justice concerns" suggests that these matters are valued in their
own right, rather than merely as instrumental measures toward
another overarching goal. Furthermore, the use of the term "justice
concerns" suggests that an identification of these matters will have
consequences for the policy discourse, most notably by opening the
way for a consideration of the justice-based claims that various
parties could assert in the tobacco setting. In sum, locating these
considerations at the heart of the policymaking process and
describing them as justice concerns helps to frame the debate in
what we believe is a desirable and useful manner.
We do not attempt in the confines of this Article to offer philosophical justifications of the theories ofjustice that underlie each of
these concerns. The literature on justice and rights is massive, and
the theories are often illuminating. Our exercise begins at a later
stage, when someone whose well-being is affected by a tobacco policy
offers a plausible assertion that some fundamental matter of justice
for that person needs to be taken into account. There is certainly a
place for the close analysis of different conceptions of justice,
especially in a society which displays as much moral pluralism as
ours. Nevertheless, our belief is this is not that place. For our
purposes, an assertion is entitled to recognition in the policymaking
process when it is based on a justice principle that has been
accepted within our political and legal discourse. The likelihood of
a consensus developing around an assertion would increase if it
were supportable by more than one theory of justice that operates
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within that arena, 8 4 but consensus at that level of theory is not a
prerequisite under our approach.
a. Corrective Justice. Corrective justice is concerned with
wrongful gains and losses.2 85 The traditional concept of corrective
justice focuses on the problem of unjust enrichment, that is, when
one party directly gains something at the expense of another. 86 In
such cases, restitution satisfies the requirements of corrective
justice by returning the property to its rightful owner, while at the
same time depriving the wrongdoer of any ill-gotten gains. 87 It has
also been suggested that those who engage in wrongdoing have a
moral duty to compensate injured parties even though they do not
realize any financial gain from their wrongdoing at the victim's
expense.8 8 Under this theory, for example, a speeding motorist who
negligently injures a pedestrian would be obligated to compensate
the injured party even though the tortfeasor did not profit financially from the victim's injury.89 Finally, there is another principle
that provides that one who benefits from a lawful, but dangerous,
activity is morally obligated to compensate those who are injured by
the activity, particularly nonparticipants. 290 This notion provides
moral support for the concept of enterprise liability29' and might be
included within an expansive definition of corrective justice.
Principles of corrective justice are highly relevant to the smoking
issue. The predatory marketing practices of tobacco companies,
' See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical
Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 282, at 99, 108-111 (stating that the
wealth maximization theory of Chicago-school law and economics is consistent with
Aristotelian and Kantian deontological theories of justice).
Ausness, Alternative to Strict Liability, supra note 9, at 1093.
See Alan L. Calnan, Distributiveand CorrectiveJustice Issues in Contemporary
Tobacco Litigation,27 Sw. U. L. REV. 577, 602-03 (1998) (arguing that corrective justice
requires
wrongdoer to reimburse victim for exact amount of loss).
7
18Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL.
L. REV. 297, 330.
Calnan, supra note 286, at 603-04.
See Jules Coleman, CorrectiveJustice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421,
425 (1982) (describing this scenario but suggesting that such a duty to compensate may be
based on distributive rather than corrective justice concerns).
Wertheimer, supranote 16, at 408.
2DSee Fleming James, Jr., An Evaluationof the FaultConcept, 32 TENN. L. REV. 394,
399-400 (1965) C"This point of view, which may be called enterprise liability, is most
simply stated by the proposition that an activity... should pay for the accident loss it
causes because, as a general proposition, each enterprise in our society should pay its own
way.").
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coupled with their refusal to disclose health risks and their alleged
manipulation of nicotine levels in cigarettes would certainly qualify
as wrongdoing.292 Moreover, this wrongful conduct has undeniably
caused serious injuries to smokers and nonsmokers alike. Consequently, principles of corrective justice appear to support liability
regimes that compel tobacco companies to compensate smoking
victims for their injuries. Principles of corrective justice, at least
under an expansive version of that concept, may also be invoked to
justify a compensation scheme which requires smokers (as opposed
to tobacco companies) to compensate nonsmokers who suffer
tobacco-related harms, even though smokers have not personally
engaged in any unlawful conduct.
b. Retributive Justice. Retributive principles dictate that
punishment be imposed when the actor has voluntarily and
inexcusably committed a wrongful act.29 At the same time,
principles of retributive justice also provide that punishment should
only be imposed when the wrongdoer's guilt is established pursuant
to a fair and reliable adjudicative process and for offenses that have
been authoritatively declared to be wrongful before their commission.294 Moreover, any punishment imposed on a wrongdoer
must
295
offense.
the
of
gravity
the
to
proportioned
be reasonably
Punishment of wrongdoing serves a number of socially useful
functions. First, it helps to restore the injured party's emotional
equilibrium .296 Although the criminal process traditionally provides
a means of vindication for victims of wrongdoing, tort liability can
also act as a vindicatory mechanism.297 For example, the trial of tort

22 See infra notes 301-305 and accompanying text.
" Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairnessand Efficiency in the Law of PunitiveDamages, 56 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1, 5 (1982).
'Id. at 5-7.
' Id. at 6.

David G. Owen, PunitiveDamages in ProductsLiability Litigation,74 MICH. L. REV.
1257, 1279 (1976).
" See Joseph W. Little, Up With Torts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861, 869 (1987) (Damaged people want compensation; there is no denying that. They also want accountability,
which in a civilized society means access to a forum and a set of rules by which they may
publicly prove themselves right and someone else wrong."); Steven D. Smith, The Critics
and the "Crisis" A Reassessment of the Current Conceptionsof Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 765, 783-85 (1987) (discussing the need to respond to the "sense of injustice" felt by
accident victims).
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claims provides a public forum for victims to tell their story and to
receive emotional support from the community.2 9 8
Punishment may also express society's disapproval of the
defendant's conduct and act as an affirmation of its commitment to
prevailing moral and legal standards.29 9 The retributive process can
also reinforce community norms of conduct and rectitude by
providing a degree of public accountability for those who violate
them."'0 In particular, moral values are strengthened when
powerful violators, such as government institutions and large
corporations, are publicly called to account.
Principles of retributive justice should not be ignored when we
are dealing with smoking-related issues. As mentioned above,
tobacco companies are highly culpable. 0 1 Through their agents,
tobacco companies have concealed information from the public, 0 2
denied, in the face of overwhelming scientific evidence, that smoking
is harmful,0 3 engaged in advertising practices that were intended

2 Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promiseof Neocontract, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 1177, 1218 (1990) CThis opportunity to speak and be heard about personal tragedy
may be the most important feature of tort for accident victims, more important in some
ways than obtaining monetary compensation."); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts:
Thoughts on the Liability Crisis,Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J.
848, 862 (1990) ('Tort litigation provides a place for victims to tell their stories to the
public and make the perpetrators listen.").
29 ARTHUR GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND MORAL LAW 93 (1953) ("Retribution in
punishment is an expression of the community's disapproval of crime, and if this retribution is not given recognition the disapproval may also disappear.").
' See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standardof Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1227 (1993) CThis goal (of vindication] is achieved through
compensating the victim, the sense of retribution and rectification that attaches to that
compensation and the reallocation of loss that takes place"); Timothy D. Lytton,
Responsibilityfor Human Suffering: Awareness, Participation,and the Frontiersof Tort
Law, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 470, 504 (1993) C'Tort law not only remedies injustice by
imposing damage awards, it also exposes normative features of relations between parties
by articulating and applying conceptions of responsibility.").
" A selection of tobacco industry documents from the Medicaid third.party liability
action in Florida can be found in Symposium, Transcriptof The FloridaTobacco Litiga.
tion-Fact,Law, Policy, and Significance,25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 815-90 (1998).
2 See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product CategoryLiability
and Alternative FeasibleDesigns in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429, 145253 (1994) (declaring that "there is evidence that the cigarette industry as a whole has
worked long and hard to conceal the true extent of the dangers of smoking").
"'sSee Robert T. Krebs, Note, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.: Class Treatment of
Mass Torts Is Going Up in Smoke, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 673, 676 (1997) (stating that "[e]ven
after the [1964 Surgeon Generars] Report, the tobacco companies claimed there was a lack
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to encourage illegal cigarette sales to minors,0 4 and allegedly
manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes in order to keep their
customers addicted."0 5 Arguably, acts such as these cry out for
retribution.
c. DistributiveJustice. Distributive justice is concerned with
the allocation of goods or resources among individuals.0 6 Criteria
for a just distribution are not universal but often vary according to
the moral or cultural values of a society. 0 7 Thus, in some societies,
resources might be distributed according to rank or social status. In
this country, however, merit, need, and risk creation are traditional
distributive criteria."' Thus, those who are economically productive
should be permitted to enjoy the wealth they have created. 0 9 At the
same time, principles of distributive justice support the distribution
of extra benefits to our most needy and dependent citizens.3 10
Finally, society has a moral obligation to restrain those who impose
risks upon others.3 11
Many forms of tobacco regulation have potentially adverse
distributive effects. For example, in a society where smokers tend
to be economically less well-off than nonsmokers,3 12 incentive-based
regulations that raise the price of cigarettes will fall most heavily
upon the less wealthy elements of the population. That in itself may
not be a compelling reason to keep the price low. Distributive
concerns may also be implicated, however, if the social cost of caring

of direct causal link between smoking and cancers").
' See Frank J. Vandall, Reallocatingthe Costs of Smoking: The Applicationof Absolute
Liability to CigaretteManufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 420 (1991) (claiming that
cigarette marketing is directed at underage consumers).
See Karen E. Meade, Comment, BreakingThrough the Tobacco Industry's Smoke
Screen: State Lawsuits for Reimbursement of Medical Expenses, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 113,
133-35 (1996) (stating that documents obtained from Brown & Williamson's files revealed
that tobacco companies manipulated nicotine levels).
07 Calnan, supra note 286, at 589.
10 Id. at 589-90.
*d See ALAN CALNAN. JUSTIcE AND TORT LAW 85-98 (1997) (discussing different

distributive criteria).
Id. at 88.
1

-oId. at 88-89.

311

Id.

Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L. REV. 509,
526-27 (1989) (declaring that persons of low social and economic status are more likely to
smoke than those who are relatively better off).
312 See Alan
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for those who are harmed by cigarettes is shifted away from the
people whose behavior leads to the harm and is spread across
members of the population who do not smoke or derive any direct
benefit from smoking. Those concerns may be alleviated by
measures that concentrate the financial cost on those whose
behavior creates the risk, as well as by steps to reduce the total
harm that is caused.31 3 In addition, regulatory efforts that substantially reduce the market for cigarettes will cause great financial
hardship for certain segments of the population such as tobacco
3 14
farmers and their employees, many of whom are not wealthy.
d. PersonalAutonomy. The principle of personal autonomy
means that individuals should be free to shape their own destinies.3 15 This principle is deeply embedded in our political and legal
culture, and is protected by public and private law. Constitutional
guarantees in the Bill of Rights uphold the personal autonomy of
individuals against overreaching by the government, while tort law
protects against unwarranted interference with personal autonomy
by private institutions and individuals.316
Government actions that prohibit the sale of cigarettes to adults,
or that deliberately raise cigarette prices in order to restrict
consumption, impair the ability of consumers to decide for themselves whether or how much to smoke. Restrictions on advertising
and promotional activities by tobacco companies also affect personal
S,' See Jules

Coleman, The Practiceof CorrectiveJustice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA-

TIONS, supranote 282, at 53, 68-69 (distinguishing loss distribution schemes from
corrective justice). But see Wright, supra note 283, at 159, 180 (asserting that utilitarian
loss-spreading, not distributive justice, is the basis for injury compensation schemes in
which those engaged in risky activities pay ex ante according to some measure of anticipated harm).
" See Ausness, Preemption,supra note 9, at 955-57 (discussing the economic effects of
tobacco regulation on third parties).
" See Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND.
L.J. 727, 727 (1993) CTo the liberal individual (that is, the typical American) it [autonomy]
means the ability and opportunity to choose one's course of action and to act to effectuate
one's choice."). For a discussion of the historical development of the concept of personal
autonomy see Adam B. Seligman, Individualism as Principle-Its Emergence,
Institutionalization,and Contradictions,72 IND. L.J. 503, 514-24 (1997).
"' David G.Owen, The Moral Foundationsof PunitiveDamages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705,
708 (1989); see also John B. Attanasio, AggregateAutonomy, the Difference Principle,and
the CalabresianApproach to ProductsLiability, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 282, at 299-318 (maintaining that autonomy is the dominant, though not exclusive,
value that shapes tort law).
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autonomy by limiting information about available product choices.
However, the marketing efforts of tobacco companies may also have
an impact upon the personal autonomy of consumers. Thus, for
example, false statements about the health effects of smoking make
it impossible for consumers to make rational choices about
smoking.3 1 In addition, the marketing of a product known to be
dangerous arguably constitutes a direct assault on the physical
integrity of those consumers who are injured by smoking.
2. Economic Considerations.
a. Allocative Efficiency. Allocative efficiency is concerned with
the distribution of resources in a way that maximizes social welfare.
In our economic system, market forces play the predominant role in
directing resources to their most productive uses, that is, the uses
most preferred by consumers. 318 However, as Hanson and Logue
point out, various conditions may impair the market's ability to
allocate resources efficiently. 3 9 For example, accident costs will 3be
20
excessive if producers fail to invest adequately in product safety.
Accident costs may also be too high if consumers fail to take future
costs into account when they make consumption decisions or if
consumers externalize accident costs to others.321
Hanson and Logue maintain that the market for cigarettes is
inefficient because neither tobacco companies nor smokers fully
internalize the social costs of smoking when they make production
and consumption decisions. Accordingly, allocative efficiency would
be enhanced if the legal system were to intervene to force greater
internalization of those social costs. 32 2 We agree with much of
Hanson and Logue's economic analysis, although as indicated in

317 See Attanasio, supra note 316, at 317 ("Truth helps to determine the extent of actual
choice. One would encounter grave difficulty formulating one's life plan without accurate
information.... For example, one cannot assume a risk that, because of inaccurate
information, one does not realize exists.").
15
See A. Mitchell Polinsky, EconomicAnalysis as a PotentiallyDefective Product: A
Buyer's Guide to Posner'sEconomic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1666-67
(1974) (discussing how an efficient market will allocate resources in accordance with
consumer preferences).
...
Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1175-78.
3"Id. at 1177.
32
Id. at 1176-77.

,'2 Id.
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Part III, we do have questions about whether the situation is quite
as serious as they claim.
b. Loss Spreading. Another efficiency-oriented goal in this
setting is to minimize the economic dislocation, known as secondary
accident costs, associated with product-related injuries. 23 Economic
theory assumes that secondary accident costs can be reduced if
primary accident costs are spread among a large group instead of
being concentrated on individual victims. 24 The declining marginal
utility of money theory is one of the traditional justifications for
spreading losses. 5 According to this theory, as a person's wealth
increases, each additional dollar provides less utility than the
previous dollar.32 6 Therefore, overall utility is increased if the highutility dollars lost by accident victims are replaced by lower-utility
dollars provided by members of a large risk pool.
Various mechanisms may be employed to spread losses. Firstparty insurance is the loss-spreading device that most individuals
use. This involves commercial insurers who pool together large
numbers of persons to diversify risk, while at the same time
segregating those persons into smaller risk pools for purposes of
These techniques allow insurance
calculating premiums .3"
companies to calculate risk exposure accurately while, providing
their customers with competitive rates. Private insurers currently
provide an array of insurance coverage, including health, life,
disability, property damage, and liability insurance.

.1 See CALABRESI, supranote 11, at 27.

See Stanley Ingber, RethinkingIntangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAUF. L.
REV. 772, 794 (1985) ("Spreading the impact of loss over time or among a class of individuals will decrease economic dislocation, thereby reducing secondary costs.!).
'a See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 517-18 (1961) (discussing social and economic justifications for loss
spreading).
See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain.
and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1794 (1995) C'That principle
holds that, in general, the marginal utility a person derives from her first dollar is greater
than the marginal utility the person derives from her second dollar."); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 70 (1990)
("Most people believe that money is subject to declining marginal utility. That is, as a
person's wealth increases, she derives less utility from each individual dollar.").
17 See George L. Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1540-45 (1987).
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Government programs also serve as a mechanism for loss
spreading. Some programs, such as Medicare, resemble private
insurance in the sense that individuals pay for insurance protection
by contributing premiums. Unlike private insurance, however,
government loss-spreading programs usually charge the same
premium to every participant. Other programs, such as Medicaid,
are financed from general revenues rather than by premiums from
members of a defined risk pool. Consequently, taxpayers, rather
than insureds, ultimately bear losses that occur."'
In theory, product sellers, particularly manufacturers, can spread
losses in much the same manner as employers.3 29 Producers can
either purchase liability insurance from private insurers or they can
self-insure. In either case, they can pass the cost of compensation
on to their customers in the form of higher prices.33 At least in the
case of producers who sell to a mass market, the incremental cost to
customers is likely to be quite small."' Furthermore, it is assumed
that producer liability provides cheaper and more comprehensive
protection for some categories of harm to injured consumers than
they could obtain by purchasing their own first-party insurance
coverage.332
c. Administrative Efficiency. Administrative efficiency is
33 3
concerned with minimizing administrative or transaction costs.

2
" Thus, it may be more accurate to characterize Medicaid and similar programs as
wealth transfer schemes rather than as insurance arrangements.
' See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1980) (The
manufacturer can spread the risk through insurance and price adjustments, whereas the
individual might suffer a crushing financial blow underwriting the loss himself.").
' See Page Keeton, ProductsLiability-Some ObservationsAbout Allocation of Risks,
64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1966) CThe assumption is that the manufacturer can shift
the loss to the consumers by charging higher prices for the products.").
•"See James B. Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel UnderAssault, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 13, 16 (1978) C'Since the retailer, manufacturer and others participating in
the marketing chain possess a reasonably vast marketing public, the proportionate
increase in cost to the public is theoretically minimal when compared to the loss suffered
by the injured consumer.").
" First-party insurance typically provides no coverage for pain and suffering. George
L. Priest, Can Absolute ManufacturerLiability Be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237, 24243 (1992). Such losses are, of course, fully recoverable under tort law, at least in the
absence of tort reform legislation setting caps on the amount of nonpecuniary loss that can
be compensated.
' CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 225.
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Administrative efficiency is not so much an end in itself as it is a
factor that must be taken into account when making policy decisions.33 4 For example, administrative costs may completely foreclose
a regulatory option when the allocative efficiency gains associated
with that approach are outweighed by its administrative costs.
Thus, in the absence of strong noneconomic imperatives, we would
expect policymakers to reject a regulatory option that saves x dollars
in accident costs if it costs 2x dollars to implement. Even among
cost-effective options, administrative efficiency may dictate that one
approach be preferred over another more costly alternative when
efficiency gains are the same. Thus, if we assume that both
alternative A and alternative B each save 5x dollars in accident
costs, and if we further assume that alternative A costs x dollars to
implement, while alternative B costs 2x dollars to implement, it
would be more efficient, all other things being equal, to choose
alternative A. Finally, considerations of administrative efficiency
might influence the specific design of a particular regulatory choice.
Thus, for example, in formulating regulations or designing compensation systems, policymakers may choose to simplify factfinding
with respect to issues like causation or damages, which are
potentially very complex in tobacco policymaking, in order to keep
administrative costs within reasonable bounds. Consequently,
administrative costs may limit the scope or design of particular
regulatory options.
3. Political Constraints. Regulatory policy with respect to
smoking not only gives rise to legal, economic and moral questions;
it also involves hard-nosed politics. Various groups, such as those
injured by exposure to cigarette smoke, public health officials,
insurance companies, and Medicare and Medicaid administrators,
all have a stake in securing measures to control cigarette consumption or in forcing greater internalization by smokers and manufacturers of smoking-related costs. However, other groups, at least
equally powerful, such as tobacco companies, tobacco farmers, the
advertising media, and firms that benefit from the sale of cigarettes,
are likely to oppose such measures. Given the stakes involved and

LeBel, Endgame, supranote 9, at 473.
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the experience of the last few decades, we can expect the debate
about smoking policy to continue to be spirited and contentious.
One would hope that the political process would be able to resolve
the smoking issue in a way that best promotes the public interest.
Unfortunately, public choice theory and recent experiences with
federal tobacco legislation suggest otherwise. Public choice theory
treats legislation as a commodity that is sold by legislators to
interest groups. 335 According to this decidedly unromanticized view
of the legislative process, legislators offer taxes, subsidies, regulations and other forms of government intervention as a means of
enhancing the welfare of various groups. 336 Groups with conflicting
interests must then bid for the sort of legislation that best fits their
needs. Payment to legislators in return for these favors may take
the form of campaign contributions, political support, or other
favors.337 If the market for legislation is efficient, legislation will be
338
enacted that benefits those who derive the greatest value from it.

Public choice theory also suggests that proposed legislation
concentrating burdens or benefits within a narrow segment of the
population is more likely to generate interest group activity than
proposals that distribute costs or benefits more broadly. 3 Thus,
interest groups will bid to get legislation enacted that channels
benefits in their direction and they will bid to prevent legislation
from being enacted that imposes economic or regulatory burdens on
them. By the same token, a "free rider" phenomenon makes it more
difficult to energize interest group support for legislative proposals
that diffuse burdens or benefits among a broad spectrum of the

' One branch of public choice theory treats legislative voting as an activity in which
rational behavior by individual legislators may lead to results that only a minority of
citizens support. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533,
547-48 (1983). The other branch of public choice theory, and the one that we are concerned with, focuses on the interaction between interest groups and legislators.
' Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market
Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46 (1988).
' William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an InterestGroup Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975).
' Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics,and the Readingof Statutes and the
Constitution,49 U. CIE. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982).
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REV. 275, 286-87 (1988) (examining
free rider problem and interest group formation).
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population. 40 Thus, legislation is unlikely to emerge when, because
of diluted benefits, there is little organized demand for it, and when
there is strong opposition to it from interest groups objecting to its
concentrated costs. 341 Finally, because legislators want to maximize
the benefits they receive from interest groups, when a particular
legislative proposal provides both concentrated costs and benefits,
legislators will often search for compromise positions in order to
avoid alienating supporters with competing interests. 4 2
Recent events suggest that the public choice model has much to
tell us about the probable course of tobacco regulation. In the spring
of 1998, there seemed to be a good deal of support for a legislative
package based on the proposed settlement between the cigarette
companies and various state officials. 43 Initially, tobacco companies
did not oppose the proposed statute, presumably because they felt
that they could live with the regulatory provisions and pass any
costs imposed by the legislation on to their customers. However, as
the proposed legislation became increasingly burdensome to the
tobacco industry, the industry reversed its position and began to
oppose the bill.3 44 As predicted by public choice theory, the tobacco
industry and other special interests then devoted considerable
political and financial resources to defeat the proposed legislation. 4 5
On the other hand, since the benefits of the proposed regulatory
scheme were widespread and diffuse, those who would have

340

See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL

INTRODUCTION 23-24 (1991) (describing the economic theory of legislation but also

criticizing the narrowness of the theory's focus, particularly in its exclusion of a role for
ideology).
34 Eskridge, supranote 339, at 288-89.
3 2
Macey, supra note 336, at 46.
See Tobacco Products Control Act of 1998, S. 1415, 105th Cong., originally introduced by Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) on November 7, 1997, and subsequently approved
in a modified version on April 1, 1998, by a 19-1 vote of the Senate Commerce Committee
chaired by Senator McCain.
"' See Steven F. Goldstone, Speech to National Press Club (Apr. 8, 1998), availablein
LEXIS, News Library, Script File (announcement by tobacco company CEO of opposition
to bill approved by Senate Commerce Committee).
' See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, Big Tobacco to FightLegislation with Ad Blitz, Lobbying
Network, WASH. POST, April 30, 1998, at A6 (discussing industry's campaign attempting to
convince viewers that legislation will lead to tax increases and black market); Melinda
Henneberger, A Big Ad Campaign Helps Stall the Bill to Reduce Smoking, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 1998, at Al (discussing tobacco industry's ad campaign).

1999]

TOBACCO POLICYMAKING

785

benefitted from this legislation failed to organize effectively and,
thus, failed to compete for legislative favor. As a consequence, the
46
bill ultimately failed to pass in the Senate.3
All of this suggests that the influence of raw politics on the
legislative process cannot be ignored. In particular, public choice
theory suggests that any legislative proposal to regulate smoking
should avoid concentrating costs on a single group, such as the
tobacco industry, especially if the benefits of the legislation are
viewed as diffuse, such as reduced levels of underage smoking, and
not immediate in nature.

B. A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE ON THE METHODS OF LEGAL
INTERVENTION IN THE TOBACCO SETTING
It is sometimes said that this country is unique in its propensity
to treat so many social problems as susceptible to legal solutions.3 47
If "over-legalization" is a legitimate complaint about our society,
then it ought to be counted as a strength that the legal system
makes available such a wide range of techniques for attacking
problems.
We have earlier noted the indebtedness that participants in the
policy debate over smoking-related harms owe to Hanson and Logue
for, among other things, the taxonomy of regulatory approaches that
they employ in The Costs of Cigarettes.348 Although we disagree
with the priority they assign to ex post incentive-based responses,
we acknowledge that they have sharpened the focus on the
strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches.
Hanson and Logue's assessment of the different approaches takes
place in the context of an economic efficiency goal. In the preceding
Section, we have set out the considerations that we contend should
'o 144 CONG. REC. S6486 (daily ed. June 17, 199§) (recommittal of Tobacco Products
Control Act of 1998, S. 1415, following unsuccessful attempts by legislative supporters of
the measure
to invoke cloture and cut off debate).
7
1
See, e.g., Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power,Public Value, and Private
Right, 26 ENVTL. L. 1, 25 (1996) C'Translation of political issues into legal issues and
issues of 'rights'... reflects traditional American ways of confronting difficult social
problems").
'Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1263.
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be included within the construction of a tobacco policy. As a
corollary to that expanded set of ends, this Section looks at the
regulatory approaches to determine which of the means are
particularly well-adapted to promoting those ends. 49
For the most part, in this Section we use the same categorization
that Hanson and Logue have employed in their work: commandand-control regulation, performance-based regulation, and incentive-based regulation (further divided between ex ante and ex post,
as well as between victim-initiated and state-initiated). We do
make two refinements of that classificatory scheme, however, to
improve the understanding of how, and how well, the legal system
can respond to the problems generated by smoking. First, in
keeping with the concern we expressed earlier, 5 ' we would draw an
initial distinction between "direct regulation" and "incentive-based
control." While this distinction may appear to be merely a semantic
difference from Hanson and Logue, we think it captures an important ordinary language conceptualization of the ways in which a
legal system can act. In essence, that division is between direct and
indirect control, or from another perspective, between control that
focuses on how the regulated party acts and control that focuses on
the consequences of that party's action.3 5 ' We have placed both
command-and-control and performance-based approaches within the
category of direct regulation. We also have retained the subcategories that Hanson and Logue set out within our category of incentivebased controls, that is, ex ante taxation and ex post liability.
The other modification that we make to the Hanson and Logue
taxonomy is the addition of a third subcategory within incentivebased controls. Both of the Hanson and Logue subcategories employ
incentives in a negative way, by requiring the regulated party to pay
ex ante or ex post a sum of money to the state or to the victims of its

"' For an analysis of legal intervention that focuses more closely on dealing with the
economic effects of smoking, see Ausness, Paying,supranote 9.
o See supra note 103 (noting that term "regulatory" should be understood to include
private causes of action as well as governmental intervention).
" See also Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEG. STuD. 661, 671 (1998)
(explaining that law regulates directly when "it tells individuals how they ought to behave
and it threatens a punishment if they deviate from that directed behavior"; it regulates
indirectly when it "changes the constraints of' another structure, such as the market,
citing taxes on cigarettes as an illustration).
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activity. A more complete view of the options for legal regulation of
tobacco would bring the notion of positive incentives into the mix,
and we do so here, using "subsidies" as this third type of incentivebased control.
1. Direct Regulation. Shifting the focus from how direct
regulation cannot achieve perfect efficiency to how it enables other
policy considerations to be addressed will establish a more positive
view of the importance of this regulatory technique within an overall
tobacco policy. Perhaps the greatest strength of direct regulation is
its ability to respond quickly when the direction of reform is known
and agreed upon. Hanson and Logue are unquestionably correct
when they note the improbability of a regulatory agency being able
to construct accurate supply and demand curves for all possible
circumstances within a particular market,3 52 but the ability to
predict market behavior under various conditions is not necessarily
the appropriate question to ask. Reasonable policymaking on a
subject that is both as controversial and as subject to uncertainty as
tobacco can legitimately proceed from an identification of the
directionof desired change, even while conceding uncertainty about
the precise magnitude of the change that is needed.
Direct regulation is also the most effective method of implementing basic value judgments that a society has made about an activity.
When there is widespread agreement, for example, that the next
generation of youth should be protected from exploitation, direct
regulation of the behavior of the potential exploiters and of the
victims can be used to promote the goal of intergenerational justice.
The mandate of direct regulation can lower the risk of frustration
of societal goals, by taking out of the hands of the regulated party at
least some of the options that would interfere with those goals. The
effectiveness of incentive-based regulation by definition depends on
the parties' behavior responding to the incentive. Economic analysis
of incentives recognizes that in many instances a party's behavior
353
can remain the same, even though it would now be more costly.
SHanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1264-65.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972)
("'*then the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident victims rather than incur the larger
cost of avoiding liabiLty.").
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To refer again to the youth smoking context, when the decision has
been made to reduce the incidence of smoking by young people,
direct regulation in the form of restrictions on sale and possession,
or as performance standards that must be met, can serve as
benchmarks against which to measure and react to the behavior of
the regulated parties. Enforcement of marketing restrictions or
sanctions for nonattainment can keep the focus on the behavior
itself, rather than on the indirect gains attributable to the operation
of market forces through a pricing mechanism that may or may not
be effective. 54 When securing the change in behavior is deemed to
be more important than allowing the autonomy to choose between
modifying the behavior or paying the higher cost resulting from
application of the incentive, direct regulation can be a more effective
form of governmental intervention.
Another significant positive feature of direct regulation is the
administrative efficiency advantage it can have over other forms of
legal intervention. Regulations can be comparatively inexpensive
for government to adopt and enforce when they are uniform,
imposed at the source of the problem, and restrict the need for the
exercise of discretion, as they could be in the tobacco context.
Regulations that call for less interpretation of their applicability and
scope can also lower the investment that the regulated parties have
to make in planning their behavior.
Retributive considerations can be addressed by direct regulation
in the form of sanctions for violations. In some circumstances, the
retribution may occur in the form of financial penalties paid by a
corporate entity. In others, the responsibility may be affixed to
individuals whose misconduct was particularly egregious, and may
open the door not only to personal financial obligations but to
penalties in the form of loss of liberty as well.
Retributive concerns have two dimensions-punishment and
protection from punishment. In addition to providing notice that
deviations will be punished, direct regulation can serve as a method
of creating and reinforcing a sense of security that certain behavior
will not be subject to retribution. Unsettling expectations can have

" See, e.g., Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1332-33 (suggesting that even the
fine that could be imposed under the proposed tobacco settlement of 1997 for
nonattainment of youth smoking reduction goals was far too low to induce compliance).
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dramatic effects on the economy. Regulations that mandate
particular behavior can also be enacted so that they create safe
harbors within which activity can proceed without fear of a subsequent determination355that the behavior will be found wrongful and
a sanction imposed.
2. Incentive-Based Controls.
a. Ex Ante Taxation. Ex ante taxation is the lowest cost
method of forcing manufacturers and consumers to internalize costs
associated with a product. As long as the goal is the realistic one of
greater social cost internalization, rather than the idealized goal of
perfect cost internalization, levying an excise tax promotes
allocative efficiency without requiring administrative expenses that
cut deeply into that efficiency gain.
Ex ante taxation allows the legal system to impose a portion of
the social costs of a product at the point in the distribution process
where it is thought to be most effective. If, for example, a legislature concluded that a tax increase would be most effective if it were
reflected in the price that consumers pay, it could impose the tax at
the retail level, rather than at the production level where manufacturers may blunt its force by dispersing it throughout the enterprise. In addition, ex ante taxation assures that the costs will be
spread across the industry in proportion to whatever unit of
taxation is chosen.356 In contrast to ex post liability, the cost
internalization effect of ex ante taxation does not depend on the
fortuity of potential claimants coming forward.
Ex ante taxation is also an effective way of creating a funding
source for future projects.357 The stream of revenue is fairly
predictable, allowing for greater confidence in the investment in an
administrative structure to accomplish particular ends. More than

' See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58c-5c (West 1998) (prohibiting award of punitive
damages under some circumstances where product is regulated by Food and Drug
Administration).
" See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4131 (establishing the rate of taxation used to finance the
compensation fund under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.).
" Each of us has written in more detail about the benefits of using excise taxes to
finance solutions to particular problems. See PAULA. LEBEL, JOHN BARLEYCORN MuST
PAY: COMPENSATING THE VICTIMS OF DRINKING DRIVERS 225-338 (1992) (alcohol-related

automobile accidents); Ausness, Paying,supra note 9, at 568-75 (tobacco); LeBel, Endgame, supra note 9, at 483-93 (tobacco).
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any other regulatory technique, ex ante taxation serves as a method
of linking payments by manufacturers and consumers to particular
public policy targets. The revenues generated by the tax can be
earmarked for projects that directly address the consequences of the
product's use, attempting to reduce the incidence of harm in the
future as well as to spread the costs of those consequences over a
population segment that is more closely identified with the production of the harm.3 58
b. Ex Post Liability. Hanson and Logue distinguish between ex
post liability schemes that are state-initiated and those that are
initiated by the victims of the activity on which liability is being
imposed. 35 9 The policy considerations that are beneficially addressed by ex post liability can be different depending on which type
of initiation of the liability process is permitted.
State-initiated liability schemes can eliminate a layer of administrative expense by taking some litigation costs out of the liability
process and by meeting some other costs in ways that are likely to
be less expensive than victim-initiated systems. For example,
administrative costs can be lower for state initiated liability
programs in which liability is established for broad classes of
victims or harms, without a need for individual victims to come
forward. Furthermore, even if individual identification is part of a
compensation program that is funded by an ex post imposition of
liability, state initiation of the determination of liability can achieve
economies of scale in the establishment of the obligation to pay,
leaving the distribution of payments to victims to an administrative
claims process that can be streamlined to reduce the costly step of
individualized fact determinations, to minimize delay, and to lower
the need for claimants to secure private representation.
Corrective justice concerns can be met directly by state-initiated
ex post liability if one were to view the victim as the state that is
initiating the claim. That notion of the state-as-victim is the basis
for Medicaid third-party subrogation provisions that are written into

"m See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. oh. 64C, § 7()
(West 1996) (Health Care Protection
Fund to finance health programs related to smoking, financed by additional excise tax on
cigarettes).
" Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1263.
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federal and state law with coverage that extends well beyond the
cigarette context. 360 In addition, corrective justice concerns can be
met more indirectly if the funds recovered in the liability process are
used for the benefit of those who have been victimized by the
activity being held liable. In this situation, the state would be seen
as the surrogate for those who have been harmed.
A similar sort of corrective justice consideration could be
addressed by ex post state-initiated liability if the harm is seen as
some social cost that is widely distributed across the population and
is higher for each individual than it would be if it were more
concentrated on those responsible for creating the costs. If the taxes
necessary to support Medicaid, for example, could be reduced
because smoking-related health care costs were being recovered
from the tobacco industry, then the overpayment of those taxes by
nonsmokers would be corrected by the liability scheme.
Victim-initiated ex post liability is the most direct method of
promoting a corrective justice goal. The underlying premise is that
the wrongdoer pays a specific victim for the harm caused to that
victim. In a sense, this liability method is corrective justice on a
retail basis, as opposed to the wholesale corrective justice of stateinitiated ex post liability or ex ante taxation. At the same time,
retributive justice considerations can also be addressed by incorporating some punitive element into the payments that are ordered
after liability has been established and the level of culpability has
been determined to rise to the appropriate level.
c. Subsidies. Subsidies can be effective techniques for promoting public policy objectives directly. Subsidies can work in two
distinct ways. First, they could influence particular behavior in a
way that is less intrusive than direct regulation. Second, they could
be employed to reduce the hardship associated with certain
government actions. For example, a legislature could offer tax
reductions to firms that meet policy goals or whose conduct
contributes to some identified social good. That example illustrates

' See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 409.910(7)(B)(1) (1990 & 1996 Supp.) (providing for reimbursement of State expenses). Although the Florida version of the Medicaid third-party
liability statute is not on its face limited to tobacco, it has received that narrowing
construction by executive order of the governor. Symposium, supra note 301, at 739
(transcript of remarks by Governor Lawton Chiles).
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how a policy justification could have been developed for the tax
break that was a widely criticized and ultimately repealed component of the Congressional effort to implement the 1997 settlement.3 6 1 We are not saying that this particular tax credit was
justified; indeed, the secrecy with which it was enacted raises
questions about its legitimacy. The point is that subsidies can play
an important role as incentives for parties to cooperate in the
development and implementation of a policy that serves the overall
public good.
When legitimate social ends are accurately seen as being in
tension, subsidies can be used to reduce the harm suffered by those
whose interests are adversely affected in order to promote the
greater overall good. If a tobacco policy were to lead to a shrinking
of the tobacco industry, subsidies would be an important part of the
effort to minimize the economic dislocation associated with that
contraction.
V. JUSTICE AND TOBACCO POLICY: TRANSLATING THEORY
INTO PRACTICE
In Part IV, we offered a "fresh start" for tobacco policymaking by
identifying the policy considerations that must be taken into account
in any realistic attempt to confront the health-related harms
associated with smoking, and by assessing the capability of different
methods of regulation to address those considerations. We are now
in a position to demonstrate the operation of our justice-centered
approach to tobacco policy.
That approach begins with a translation of the policy considerations that were identified in Part IV.B. into a series of justice
claims derived from those considerations. Section A describes the
major claims that could be asserted in the context of developing a
tobacco policy. In Section B, we use those justice claims as the basis
for justifying a number of components of a comprehensive tobacco

' Congress enacted a $50 billion tax credit for the tobacco industry in the summer of
1997, but following intense criticism, the credit was repealed by the Senate on September
10 and by the House of Representatives a week later. Ceci Connolly & John E. Yang, Like
Senate, House Votes to Repeal $50 Billion Tax Break for Tobacco Firms,WASH. POST, Sept.
18, 1997, at A7.

1999]

TOBACCO POLICYMAKING

793

policy. The description of those components illustrates the methodology that we set out in Part IV.A.: justice claims are identified, the
feasibility of enforcing those claims in particular ways is determined
after looking at economic considerations and political constraints,
and the most effective techniques for legal intervention are called
into play.
At the outset of this exercise, we offer this disclaimer: This
Article has had two significant goals. The first has been to question
the appropriateness of analyzing tobacco policy from a predominantly economic perspective. We have used the work of Hanson and
Logue as the vehicle for raising this issue, viewing their work as the
most important of the recent economic analyses of the legal system's
treatment of tobacco-related problems.
A second goal is to describe an approach that we believe to be
more appropriate for dealing with the complexity and the controversy that surround tobacco policymaking. We do not pretend that our
description of that approach is fully fleshed out. The two Sections
of this Part will provide a view of the framework of the analytical
approach we propose and will illustrate the type of policy justifications that can be constructed using that framework. Considerable
work is required for any approach, ours included, to be successful in
integrating all of the facets and implications of the current state of
affairs into a tobacco policy that is comprehensive, coherent, and
principled. Our hope is that the model we set out here offers a
useful avenue for arriving at such a policy objective.
A. JUSTICE CLAIMS IN THE TOBACCO SETTING
The initial step in the construction of a policymaking approach
that is centered around justice concerns is an identification of the
parties who can legitimately assert a justice-based claim.3"' When
the policymaking context revolves around the adverse consequences
of smoking, the roster of those with a call on our attention includes
smokers, nonsmokers, the tobacco industry (which we further
separate into the cigarette manufacturers themselves and other
" In some instances, as will be seen below, the formulation of the inquiry focuses on
those for whom claims can be asserted.
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tobacco-related enterprises, such as growers and distributors), those
in the next generations who will assume some of the burden and be
exposed to some of the risk of those adverse consequences, and
citizens of foreign nations.
1. Claims on Behalf of Smokers. Personal autonomy considerations lie at the heart of the justice claims that can be asserted by
smokers. Consumption of cigarettes is a hazardous activity, but
that characterization is certainly not unique to smoking. A good
deal of modern life is risky, even foolishly harmful to one's self when
viewed objectively, but nevertheless considered to be within the
province of individual choice. Within limits defined by the rights of
others, smokers should be entitled to choose to experience the
different levels of pleasure associated with smoking. 36 3 Consequently, autonomy concerns militate against an outright ban on the
production and distribution of tobacco products.
However, the autonomy of the smoker to decide what risks to
encounter to gain pleasure is diminished by factors that make the
decision to smoke less informed than it otherwise might be.
Informed choice is hindered most directly by industry conduct that
distorts the appreciation of the health risks of smoking. An
autonomy-centered claim by smokers would demand protection
against such industry practices as misrepresentations about the
health effects of cigarettes, concealment of the results of tobaccorelated health research, and efforts to interfere with the operation
of normal scientific and medical research processes.
Even if the stream of information is not blocked by the practices
that should be prohibited, the exercise of choice by the smoker can
be affected by other practices. Included within this category are
industry measures directed at the consumer and at the product. For
choice to be free, consumers need to be protected from predatory
marketing practices by the industry. The most significant aspect of
this protection relates to efforts to attract those who are below the
age at which smoking is legal, and that issue is addressed below364
as part of the intergenerational justice concerns. Although underage smokers are the most apparent victims of predatory marketing
Those pleasures are described in ROBERT KLEIN, CIGARETTES ARE SUBLIME (1993).
See infra Part V.A.4.
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practices, the legitimacy of the decisions made by adult smokers
could also be affected by marketing techniques that undermine the
information about the risks and benefits of smoking. Sophisticated
advertising campaigns that make subtle claims about a lifestyle
enhancement attributable to smoking are one example of this sort
of practice.36 5 Consumer-oriented practices that would be prohibited
by concern for a smoker's autonomy also include public relations
efforts outside of the direct advertising context, such as the
continued assertion of scientifically unreasonable claims.
Industry practices in product design can also be considered
predatory when they interfere with the decisionmaking process of
an informed consumer. Enhancing the addictive properties of
cigarettes constitutes the clearest example of this sort of practice.
Although addictiveness may be a property of cigarettes that is
inseparable from the pleasure of smoking, in the same sense that an
intoxicating effect is an inherent part of the pleasure of consumption
of alcohol, consumer autonomy requires that, at the very least, the
magnitude of the addictiveness should not be manipulated without
clear communication to the smoker of the greater risk that is being
encountered.
The addictive nature of cigarettes raises another autonomy
concern. The range of decisions open to a consumer includes not
only whether to begin smoking and how much to smoke, but also
whether to discontinue smoking. Industry conduct that contributes
to a lack of appreciation of the dimension of the difficulty that
addictiveness lends to that decision would be implicated by this
concern. Furthermore, insofar as addiction is a consequence of a
deliberate choice by the tobacco industry to maintain consumer
demand levels, corrective justice notions support a claim by smokers
that the industry contribute to efforts to counteract the addictive
effects of cigarettes. The entire burden of such efforts would not
shift to the industry, however, because smokers themselves bear

s' The restriction of advertising and promotional speech that does not constitute
fraudulent or misleading communication poses serious constitutional and sociological
questions. For an insightful consideration of those questions, see generally R. GEORGE
WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS: FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL CULTURE 78-107 (1997).
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some of the responsibility for undertaking the behavior that
realistically must have been known to be difficult to cease.
Individual responsibility is the corollary to personal autonomy,
and its impact for tobacco policymaking extends well beyond the
addiction context. After decades of widely disseminated information
that smoking is hazardous to health, it is simply implausible to
entertain justice claims from smokers if those claims ignore the
substantial responsibility that smokers themselves bear for the
adverse health effects of their decisions. Nevertheless, it is just as
implausible to believe that the decisions of smokers have been
unaffected by the decades of deception, manipulation, and concealment on the part of the tobacco industry. When both aspects of this
situation are taken into account, the result is that smokers have a
legitimate corrective justice claim arising out of the ill health
suffered from consumption of cigarettes, but that claim is weakened
by the individual responsibility for the behavior that exposes them
to the risk of disease.
In theory, one could hope for some finely calibrated scale of
justice that would produce a measurement of the extent to which the
corrective justice claims by smokers were actually offset by their
own responsibility for proceeding with an ill-informed but nevertheless not totally uninformed course of conduct. In practice, of course,
policy decisions are necessarily less precise and admittedly fall short
of perfect justice. At the very least, however, even a rough judgment
about the corrective justice calculus for the health consequences of
smoking leads to a conclusion that recovery by individual smokers
of the costs of their tobacco-related disease should be viewed with
considerable skepticism, if not rejected altogether.
Rejecting liability to individual smokers as part of a tobacco
policy can be supported on efficiency grounds as well. Liability
claims ultimately result in a shifting of costs among smokers, i.e.,
from the smokers who pay the higher price for cigarettes to those
smokers who are successful in their actions to recover damages.
Administrative efficiency considerations suggest that first-party
insurers are a better vehicle for effectuating that sort of transfer,
particularly if the insurance industry responds to incentives to
perform greater segregation of smokers in the insurance ratemaking
process.
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Even though corrective justice principles may not, on balance,
lead to a policy of awarding smokers compensation for the harm
they suffer from cigarettes, retributive justice considerations come
into play when a decades-long history of industry lies and cover-ups
has contributed to the public health situation in which we find
ourselves. Smokers, as well as others, could have their retributive
justice interests vindicated by a sanction imposed on the industry.
Fines are the most obvious way of punishing the industry, and the
industry could be required to make a suitably large payment as one
component of a comprehensive tobacco policy.' 6 6
Safety concerns play a significant role in tobacco policymaking.
Smokers have an interest in not suffering needlessly in order to
obtain the pleasure they seek from smoking. On that ground, and
heavily reinforced by allocative efficiency principles, tobacco
companies could be required by command-and-control or performance-based regulation to reduce the adverse health effects
associated with smoking to the maximum feasible extent.
2. Claims on Behalf of Nonsmokers. Nonsmokers can be
impacted by the costs of cigarettes in a variety of ways. When
considering the justice claims that might be asserted on their behalf,
it is useful to distinguish among the different roles that nonsmokers
might occupy in relation to tobacco. The four principal roles are
those of taxpayers, insureds, family members and close friends of
smokers who suffer tobacco-related disease or death, and persons
exposed to smoke and other harmful effects of cigarette consumption
by others.
As taxpayers, nonsmokers have a legal responsibility to provide
revenue for social programs to deal with the consequences of
smoking, even though they do not experience the pleasures associated with smoking. The Medicaid third-party liability claims at the
heart of the state attorneys general actions against the tobacco
industry are an indirect form of assertion of a claim of this sort on
behalf of taxpayers.
When the interests of nonsmoker taxpayers themselves are
considered, as opposed to the notion of the state as victim, the first

6 Apparently the 1997 settlement agreement set this figure at $60 billion.
MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supranote 278, at 220.
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instinct may be to characterize the justice claim as one of corrective
justice: tobacco companies and smokers cause financial harm to
nonsmokers whose share of the fiscal responsibility is higher than
it otherwise would be. On reflection, however, it appears that
claims of this sort could also rest on distributive justice grounds.
Operating on distributive justice principles, responsibility for
causation of the harm would be matched with an obligation to
support the programs that are needed to deal with the harm.
Administrative efficiency provides one rationale for basing this
obligation on distributive rather than corrective justice grounds.
Categories of smoking-related costs can be aggregated and shifted
to the tobacco industry without a need for the more precise moral
calculus that corrective justice could require. Former smokers, for
example, would present an issue under corrective justice-how
much of the smoking-related cost is attributable to their smoking-that can be avoided under a distributive justice scheme that
used the tobacco industry as a vehicle for distributing those costs.
A similar claim can be made on behalf of nonsmokers who pay
insurance premiums for coverage that extends to the losses suffered
by smokers. Rather than spreading the costs of smoking over
insurance pools that include people who do not contribute to the
causation of those costs, distributive justice principles could support
a demand that the tobacco industry be required to pay for those
costs in a more direct fashion. Administrative efficiency might
suggest that payment to health care providers themselves would be
a superior method of vindicating this interest,"' although as a
practical matter, the payments may need to be channeled to public
and private insurers as intermediaries. With the industry assuming
some of the responsibility for paying the health care costs of
smoking, the effect here, as with taxpayers, is to reduce the amount
of those costs that would have to be spread over the population of
nonsmokers.
Family members and close friends of smokers who become ill or
die because of cigarette consumption could raise a corrective justice
claim against the industry whose egregious conduct over the last
four or five decades has expanded the scope of the problem. This

' Ausness, Paying, supra note 9, at 573.
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claim is similar to the corrective justice claim of smokers themselves, but because in this instance it is asserted by those who are
morally blameless with regard to the decision to smoke, it may be
entitled to somewhat greater recognition on an individual basis.
While smokers are generally excluded from compensation under the
principles developed under our approach, nonsmokers could be given
some nominal participation in the proceeds of a monetary sanction
imposed on the industry, perhaps in the form of a modest death
benefit to a surviving spouse or dependent child.368
The remaining role in which nonsmokers can be affected by the
consumption of cigarettes is as passive victims of the harms caused
by smokers to others. The adverse health effects of environmental
tobacco smoke would clearly fall into this category, as would the
prenatal harm experienced by children of smokers. Collateral
damage from smoking-related fires constitute another form of loss
that can be inflicted on nonsmokers. Corrective justice may be the
most appropriate foundation for claims of this sort, with a demand
that those responsible for the harm-smokers and the industry
itself---compensate for the harm suffered by the nonsmokers. Here,
as with other justice claims, administrative efficiency considerations
may affect the manner in which this interest is vindicated, but the
claim itself is one of the strongest demands that justice can make for
individual compensation.
3. Claims on Behalf of the Tobacco Industry. The temptation to
demonize the tobacco industry is strong, but sound public policymaking requires that its interests be taken into account as well.
Incorporating those interests within the same analytical framework
that is used to acknowledge claims of other constituencies can avoid
the extremes of assigning no merit to the claims that arise from the
industry, on the one hand, or of resigning oneself to the political
influence that such a wealthy industry can purchase.
The economic actors who are involved in some way in the
production and marketing of cigarettes occupy a number of different
roles. While their differences call for somewhat different approaches, the central claim that can be asserted on behalf of all of
them is to ease the transition from a state of affairs in which they
LeBel, Endgame, supranote 9, at 492-93.
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were subjected to virtually no legal responsibility for the harm
caused by tobacco products to a new regime in which that responsibility is substantial. The regulatory technique that lends itself most
readily to accommodating these transitional claims is the subsidy.
A useful distinction can be drawn among the agricultural, the
manufacturing, and the distribution aspects of the tobacco industry.
Tobacco growers and those whose livelihood revolves around
providing goods and services to this agricultural segment have
legitimate claims that the serious social problems associated with
tobacco consumption should not be solved in a way that results in a
disproportionate impact on them.
Just as loss spreading concerns lead to measures to distribute the
financial consequences of personal injury across a broad spectrum
of the population, so too can subsidies serve a similar distributive
function for the economic dislocation attendant upon a shift in the
public attitude toward and the legal regulation of tobacco. The
subsidies could take various forms. Farming as a way of life is
central to the image of this country, and those who engage in it
deserve some support. If land on which tobacco is now being grown
would not be as profitable if diverted to other agricultural uses, then
sound social policy could indicate the application of subsidies to
those other crops. In a sense, then, the price support structure
would shift from tobacco to alternative crops. People who chose to
leave farming altogether could be supported in employment training
and relocation. Impact payments could be made to communities
that suffer serious economic loss as a result of implementation of a
new tobacco policy, in much the same way that the federal government provides payments to local communities around military bases
to offset the increased demands for services as a result of the
military presence.36 9
The manufacturers of cigarettes are arguably in a more ambiguous moral position than tobacco growers. The wrongful conduct on
the part of the firms within the tobacco industry creates justice
claims of other parties and at the same time weakens the claims
that might be asserted on behalf of the industry. The minimum
claims that could be raised by the industry include the right to face

See 20 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7714 (1994).
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punishment that is proportional to the offense and the right not to
be punished for offenses that were not authoritatively declared to be
wrongful at the time of commission. Stating these claims in the
abstract is one thing; translating them into concrete determinations
of the magnitude of the wrong is a good deal more difficult. At the
least, sanctions that threaten the economic viability of the industry
need to be approached with the same level of awareness and
deliberation that would be used if similarly serious sanctions were
considered for an individual.
If a comprehensive tobacco policymaking process results in a
continued presence of cigarettes on the market, the industry would
have additional assertions that it could make. A legal product
properly made is entitled to be distributed in ways that do not
unreasonably interfere with the operation of the industry or the
satisfaction of consumer demand. Consideration of the justice
claims on behalf of smokers identified constraints on advertising
and public relations efforts by the industry, but outside of those
constraints, the industry should be able to present its product to the
public in ways that are comparable to other legal, but risky,
products or activities.
If a tobacco policy were to be adopted in a responsible way and
with widespread support, the industry would also be entitled to rely
on compliance with the terms of that policy as protection from
future sanctions being imposed. While this reliance would operate
in the form of a "safe harbor" for regulatory compliance,37 the basic
thrust of the claim extends beyond specific government mandates.
The essence of this claim is that a comprehensive public policy
adopted in a responsible way creates, in effect, a new social compact
with respect to tobacco. The terms of a policy of that sort are
entitled to considerably greater respect in the future than could
reasonably be claimed for any of the particular elements of a legal
regime that has developed as haphazardly and as irresponsibly as
the one that currently exists for tobacco.

"o See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong"RegulatoryComplianceDefense,
55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1213 (1996) (taking position that compliance with certain federal
safety standards should protect sellers from liability).
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Should legal intervention in the tobacco industry result in
downsizing, then people who are employed in the industry or who
depend on the industry should receive the same relief from economic
dislocation that was described earlier for agricultural workers.
Subsidies for job retraining, relocation, and easing the impact on
local communities are as necessary in this context as they are in the
agricultural context, however much the farm setting may be
distinguished by being viewed through the lens of romance and
national myth.
4. Claims on Behalf of Future Generations. The obligations of
intergenerational justice can run in two directions. The clearest
example of the recognition of such an obligation from younger to
older generations in this country is Social Security." 1 In the tobacco
setting, the obligation to future generations is likely to be a more
significant matter. Justice claims on behalf of future generations
can be seen as arising from near term and from longer term
perspectives. The distinguishing characteristic of claims of this sort
is their demand that present action must offer protection for the
interests of those who are not yet part of the public policymaking
process. Gains and losses for current players are not the only
elements that enter the moral calculus. Justice requires that the
position of those who are to follow must be given respect.
In the near term, the focus of intergenerational justice is on
young people who are below the age at which fully informed and
responsible decisions are likely to be made about the use of tobacco
products. At its most fundamental level, this claim asserts that the
members of the next generation of adults must not be seen as
objects of pure economic exploitation. The current industry practice
of cultivating "replacement smokers" from those who are young
enough to be impressionable and who are also more likely to become
addicted violates that demand. To meet the minimum requirements
ofjustice in this regard, the tobacco industry would have to postpone
the initial lure for use of its products until the targets reach an age
"" See Gary S. Becker & Kevin W. Murphy, The Family and The State, 31 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 9 (1988) (characterizing Social Security as part of a social compact between
generations); Robert B. Reich, Whatever Happened to the American Social Compact?, 50
ME. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (identifying social insurance, including Social Security, as an

integral component of this country's social compact).
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at which the decision would be more rational and informed. Society
at large, through its governmental institutions, has a comparable
responsibility to establish and enforce meaningful and effective
protective measures for young people.
The long term intergenerational justice claims in the tobacco
setting demand that the social, economic, and political issues be
dealt with responsibly and in a timely fashion. Simply blundering
along in a manner that is responsive only to the strongest and most
immediate stimulus fails to satisfy the entitlements of generations
as yet unborn. The duty of those in positions of responsibility today
is to take steps to assure that the problems that can be addressed
in the short term are not put off, and that long term solutions are
put into place to the maximum extent feasible.
5. Claims on Behalf of Citizens of ForeignCountries. A common
characterization of the agreement that was reached by the tobacco
industry and the attorneys general of a majority of the states in the
summer of 1997 described that ultimately fruitless venture as a
"global" settlement. That characterization displays the same hubris
that is found in labeling the contest to decide supremacy among
thirty baseball teams from this country and Canada as the "World"
Series. In the tobacco setting, however, the misnomer may too
easily serve as a way of papering over a very serious issue of
international justice.
Citizens of other countries are arguably entitled not to be
exploited in ways that would not be tolerated for our own citizens. 72
The readiness with which the major tobacco firms approached the
settlement that had a price tag of more than $367 billion over
twenty-five years may be viewed as Hanson and Logue and others
have done, that is, as indicating that the industry is so profitable
and the sting of the settlement is so minimal that little good is being
accomplished by going forward along that path.373 Another,

72

In effect, we would interject into the policy arena an international corrective

justice element, as a counterpart to the international distributive justice idea raised by
others. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, InternationalDistributiveJustice, in NOMOS XXIV,
supra note 236, at 275 (applying distributive justice principles to relations between

states).
...See Hanson & Logue, Costs, supranote 6, at 1345-49 (assessing proposed
settlement).
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somewhat more sinister, explanation sees the national tobacco
policy as a relatively insignificant part of the future marketing
strategies of the multinational tobacco industry. Any restrictions on
sales and profits domestically can, in this view, be more than offset
by the enormous potential of markets that are only now opening up
37 4
to the leading firms of the industry.
Unless the citizens of foreign nations are explicitly deemed to be
entitled to less protection and respect than our own citizens,
international justice concerns require that their interests be
reflected in any policy that is developed in this country. We would
not go so far as to say that all aspects of a tobacco policy should
apply equally inside and outside the borders of this country. Our
focus is more prohibitive than integrative: the demand is that
foreign citizens not be more exploited than our own citizens, rather
than that the full range of rights afforded to our citizens be open to
citizens of other countries. Accordingly, the financial components
of the policy would not be available on an international basis, but
any feature of a tobacco policy that places demands on the industry
with regard to the design and manufacture, the information
conveyed, and the marketing of cigarettes needs to be as applicable
to foreign sales as they are to the domestic market.
B. COMPONENTS OF A JUSTICE-CENTERED TOBACCO POLICY:
ILLUSTRATING THE NEW APPROACH
The last portion of our examination of the legal system's intervention in the tobacco industry brings together the policy considerations
and the justice claims in specific policy proposals to employ the
various regulatory techniques in a comprehensive integrated multifaceted tobacco policy. The discussions within the preceding Section
and in Part IV anticipate the items that we would include within a
tobacco policy. At the same time, we would extend to this part of
our exercise the disclaimer that we are illustrating an analytical
model rather than pretending to have worked out all the details of
the policy that meets the goals we have identified.

3
See KLUGER, supra note 89, at 709-22 (describing efforts by tobacco companies to
enter foreign markets and United States government support of those efforts).
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The components of a tobacco policy can be divided into financial,
liability, marketing, and safety categories. For each of these
categories, we set out the principal measures that are called for by
our examination of the elements of a justice-based approach.
1. FinancialComponents. The central feature of a tobacco policy
developed along the lines we have pursued is a higher tax on
cigarettes with the revenue raised by that tax being devoted to
specific tobacco-related projects. This tax would be levied ex ante at
the source of production of cigarettes. The revenue collected in this
way would be spent on health care, on smoking cessation and
avoidance programs, and on subsidies to minimize the economic
dislocation following the adoption of a tobacco policy that reduces
the level of consumption of cigarettes.
The most important of the uses of the increased tax revenue is
the payment of some of the costs of treating tobacco-related illness.
To lower administrative costs, we would have these payments made
directly from the revenue collection agency to the health care
financing agency of the state and perhaps to private insurers of
health care expenses, distributed proportionally to the representation of smokers within the relevant population. As a result of this
transfer of funds, the expenditure of other public and private funds
for health care costs would be lower than they otherwise would be. 75
Nonsmokers would thus be subjected to less of a direct economic
burden of caring for smokers.
The distributive effect of this component of the tobacco policy
could be enhanced in a number of ways. Private insurers could, for
example, be required to segregate current smokers and former
smokers with a medically significant history of smoking from
nonsmokers as a condition for receipt of payments from the tax
revenue generated in this fashion. As an additional incentive not to
smoke, insurance premiums for the nonsmoking population could be
reduced at a greater rate than the premiums that smokers pay. In

.7 It should be noted that this does not necessarily mean that taxes to support public
programs and premiums for health insurance would fall from their current levels. The
best that may be expected would be a decrease in the rate of growth. Yet, in a period of
rapidly increasing health care cost projections, even that decrease in cost would have a
positive effect on the economy.
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both instances, the effect would be to shift more of the financial
burden of health care from nonsmokers to smokers.
The revenue from this increased tax on cigarettes supports the
two other major financial components of the policy. Funds collected
in this way would be used to support programs to encourage people
not to begin smoking and to stop smoking if they have already
begun. To be used most effectively, the funds for this element of the
policy should support research as well as operational programs.
Because the industry plays such an important role in the national
economy, and regionally may be even more critical, the tax payments would also be used to fund measures to ease the effects of a
decline in the size of the industry. Those measures would include
worker retraining and relocation, farm subsidies for alternative
crops, and research efforts to identify profitable alternative uses of
the agricultural resources currently devoted to tobacco.
The relative share of the revenue spent on the different components of the policy would need to be adjusted over time to reflect
changes that occur in the tobacco environment. Initially, smoking
avoidance and cessation programs would receive significant funding,
with less spent on impact payments. As the effect of those programs
and the higher price begins to be felt, the need for easing the impact
of industry downsizing would become more pressing, leading to more
spending on that component. These two components can be seen as
occupying a reciprocal relationship. As fewer people smoke, the
need for impact payments increases; similarly, as the industry
shrinks, the anti-smoking campaigns would require less of an
investment.
Tobacco proposals that impose prohibitive taxes or that subject
the industry to massive liability have a built-in flaw that limits
their effectiveness: the beneficial uses of the funds raised in taxes
or collected as damages are threatened as the financial viability of
the industry becomes more perilous. If former smokers are going to
be compensated at levels that bankrupt the industry, then the
source of funding for other aspects of reform will disappear.
An advantage of our policy approach is that it assumes that the
industry will continue to function, but in a manner by which it
internalizes more of its costs than under the current legal regime.
The increased taxes required under our approach would be expected
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to have a depressing effect on marginal demand, which admittedly
would mean that the future revenue stream would be lowered. That
lower demand indicates, however, that the future social costs of
cigarettes are going to be lower. Overall, as the various components
of the policy operate to shrink the percentage of the population that
smokes, the harmful effects of smoking would diminish as well. A
decline in the revenue collected from cigarettes would therefore be
a sign of the success of the policy.
2. Liability Components. Our approach gives little weight to the
claims of smokers to be compensated for the harm they have
suffered as a result of cigarette consumption. Instead, our focus for
the financial aspects of the policymaking process is on requiring the
tobacco industry to shoulder a portion of the financial responsibility
for the health care costs related to smoking. Accordingly, the
tobacco policy developed in the manner we propose would include an
immunity provision protecting the industry from liability to smokers
for personal injury caused by smoking.
Nonsmokers are concededly less complicit in the harms they
suffer. In particular, nonsmokers who are injured as a result of
environmental tobacco smoke have a stronger moral claim to be
compensated for that harm. The legal basis for such a recovery is,
however, still relatively undeveloped. Our approach to this aspect
of tobacco liability would be to extend the retroactive immunity
described above so that it encompasses past claims for ETS harm.
Responsibility for the costs of treating these harms would be
partially shifted to the industry under the health care payment
feature of the financial component of our policy.
Prospective liability for harm to nonsmokers may be a useful
adjunct to the financial component, increasing the incentive for the
industry to take steps to reduce the incidence of this harm. In this
instance, the range of options available to the industry include
modifying the product design so that fewer harms occur, raising the
price of the product so that liability costs are covered, or encouraging third parties (such as managers of workplaces and public places)
to take steps to reduce the level of exposure to the harmful effects
of smoking. The legal intervention of ex post liability would
therefore be brought into play in this limited arena where the
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benefits of using the approach are identifiable and the potential
detriment is fairly limited.
No tobacco policymaking enterprise can proceed without an
acknowledgment of the wrongful conduct of the industry over many,
many years. Our approach would include elements that address
this conduct, without undermining the retroactive immunity from
individual claims.
First, the industry would be required to pay a substantial sum of
money specifically designated as a punitive measure for its long
history of misconduct. To assure that any such punishment remains
within the realm of just treatment of the industry, it will be
important for it to be linked specifically to conduct, such as fraud,
that was wrong, and known to be wrong, at the time the conduct
occurred.37 6
Second, noncompliance with any of the provisions of the new
comprehensive tobacco policy would subject the offenders to
significant fines, set at a level that exceeded the financial gain to the
offender by some multiple high enough to act as a substantial
deterrent. 3 7
3. Marketing Components. The two previous components of our
approach to developing a tobacco policy have concentrated on ex
ante taxation and ex post liability payments. In addition to the
economic incentives and disincentives those components provide,
our approach would make significant use of direct regulatory
techniques. A major target of that regulation would be the marketing practices of the tobacco industry.
The first element of this policy component would be informational. In addition to the current warnings on cigarettes, more effective
" The idea that there is an important distinction between a moral wrong and conduct
that was illegal at the time of action has been articulated by Jeremy Bentham in terms
that could be applicable to the tobacco industry in recent years. Bentham noted the
importance of "defining an offence, and giving a clear and precise idea of it. For example,
hard-heartedness,ingratitude, perfidy, and other vices which the popular sanction
punishes, cannot come under the power of the law, unless they are defined as exactly as
theft, homicide, or perjury." JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINcIPLES OF LEGISLATION, in
THEORY OF LEGISLATION 1, 60-61 (Richard Hildreth trans., 1950) (emphasis added).
3" We would address in this way the concern expressed by Hanson and Logue that
portions of the 1997 settlement agreement could profitably be ignored by the industry.
See, e.g., Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1332-34 (discussing underage smoking
targets).

1999]

TOBACCO POLICYMAIUNG

809

means of informing the public about the risks of smoking would be
required. The hallmark of any regulation adopted as part of this
effort must be effectiveness. The history of the tobacco industry
creates an understandable air of skepticism about measures that
result in unintended consequences.3 7 8 Research and monitoring

would be essential aspects of this regulatory approach.
Restrictions on permissible targets of marketing campaigns
would be the second essential element of this policy component. Age
restrictions on sale and possession would be maintained and would
be required to be enforced in meaningful ways. Advertising and
public relations efforts would have to be conducted in ways that do
not undermine the policy decision to postpone the allowable onset
of smoking to an age when the decisions that are made about
tobacco use are less likely to be as peer-oriented and impressionable.
4. Safety Components. Economic incentives will, under optimal
circumstances, lead indirectly to greater safety, but direct regulation
also has an important role to play in this component of a tobacco
policy. As an initial matter, tobacco products need to be regulated
to identify and eliminate harmful additives and contaminants that
pose a risk independent of the "normal" carcinogenicity, addictiveness, and cardiopulmonary effects of cigarettes. Disclosure of
contents to regulators is an important part of this regulatory effort,
but the only way to assure the integrity of the products distributed
to consumers is to inspect them and certify their safety.37
The promise of a perfectly safe cigarette may be more illusory
than real. A product that has none of the risks of cigarettes as
currently designed may lack so many of the features that make
smoking pleasurable that it is no longer a cigarette in any meaningful sense. Requiring the elimination of all risk is, therefore, not
a plausible part of a tobacco policy-it is instead the central element
of a prohibitionist program. That being said, however, it is undoubt*78 See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 89, at 377 (noting that a ban on broadcast

advertising of cigarettes and corollary lifting of an anti-smoking public service advertising
requirement led to increase in tobacco sales).
" The 1997 settlement agreement provided for disclosure of non-tobacco ingredients
to the FDA, which was given responsibility to evaluate the safety of those ingredients, but
the inspection requirement was concentrated on records rather than on the cigarettes
themselves. See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supranote 278, at 280-82 (describing the provisions
of Title I, § F of the settlement agreement).
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edly true that cigarettes currently possess excessive risk that could
be wrung out of the product through design modifications that do
not substantially diminish the smoking experience. Research into
such changes needs to be encouraged, as does the implementation
of desirable safety modifications. In an illustration of the symbiotic
relationship among the components of a tobacco policy, the taxation
under the financial component could vary according to the risk
posed by the different product designs."' Over time, one would
expect a differential tax rate to provide an incentive for research
and development and an increased market share for cigarettes that
are less dangerous.
VI. CONCLUSION

Hanson and Logue have identified a number of serious market
failures with respect to the sale of cigarettes. These include
information inadequacies, cognitive limitations, insurance externalities and noninsurance externalities.3 8 ' According to Hanson and
Logue, consumers underestimate the costs of smoking because they
lack accurate information about the addictive nature and long-term
health consequences of smoking.38 2 Moreover, even when such
information is available, smokers are frequently unable to process
it properly.183 In addition, smokers are often able to externalize
smoking-related costs to nonsmokers. For example, private insurers
seldom distinguish between smokers and nonsmokers when they set
premium rates even though smokers file more claims.38 4 Smokers
also externalize costs of ETS to nonsmokers. 3 5 Finally, according
to Hanson and Logue, smokers externalize costs from their present
38 6
to their future selves.
Hanson and Logue find that these market failures cause cigarette
manufacturers to spend too little on safety and also cause smokers
'3 See Evans & Farrelly, supra note 238, at 594 (stating that tax based on tar and
nicotine content is more appropriate public health policy instrument than uniform tax).
3"1 See generally Hanson & Logue, Costs, supra note 6, at 1181-1263.
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Furthermore, they conclude the

market for cigarettes is so inefficient that government intervention
is warranted.38 8 However, Hanson and Logue reject such conventional responses as command-and-control regulations, performancebased standards, and ex ante incentive-based regulations.389
Instead, they propose a number of ex post incentive-based victiminitiated regulatory initiatives. One approach would hold tobacco
companies strictly liable in tort for the adverse health consequences
of smoking. 390 The other would establish a smokers' compensation
program under which injured parties could submit claims to an
administrative tribunal.3 91
While acknowledging the value of Hanson and Logue's work, we
disagree with their normative perspective. Hanson and Logue's
approach depicts the smoking issue in predominantly economic
terms. Their solution is to correct the particular market failures
involved, by raising the price of cigarettes, so that cigarette
consumption will eventually settle at an optimal level. This
perspective, while valid, is incomplete because it largely ignores the
moral aspects of the problem.
We have taken a different path. First of all, we have assumed
that moral issues are more important than economics, at least as far
as tobacco policymaking is concerned. Consequently, our analysis
began with an enumeration of the moral principles that must be
taken into account in any comprehensive governmental response to
the problem of smoking and health. These moral principles included
corrective justice, retributive justice, distributive justice and
personal autonomy. We then identified various groups who might
make justice-based claims to protection or compensation. These
included smokers, nonsmokers, various constituents of the tobacco
industry, future generations, and citizens of foreign countries. We
then illustrated how to base specific elements of a policy proposal for
governmental action on those claims.

3 7 Id. at 1175-77.

-Id. at 1263.
'fId.at 1264-73.
3" Id. at 1282-83.
:" Id. at 1283-96. See generally Hanson et al., Blueprint, supranote 7 (proposing
smokers compensation scheme).
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Our approach includes financial, liability, marketing, and safety
components. The centerpiece of a policy developed under our
approach is an excise tax levied on cigarette producers. The revenue
raised by this tax would help to pay for health care research,
consumer education, treatment of the health effects of smoking, and
reduction of any economic dislocation caused by contraction of the
tobacco industry. We would provide immunity from tort liability for
the tobacco industry, but we would provide for civil or criminal
liability for past actions that were clearly criminal or fraudulent at
the time they were done. Our proposal would also vigorously
regulate the marketing practices of the tobacco industry, particularly as they relate to underage consumers. Finally, our proposal
would provide statutory authority for the federal government to
impose reasonable safety goals on the tobacco industry.
Our approach would not eliminate cigarettes from the scene, nor
would it ensure that they would be completely safe. It would
ensure, however, that smokers paid for more of the social costs of
smoking, and it would probably increase the costs of cigarettes
sufficiently to reduce existing demand somewhat. In addition to
promoting these instrumental objectives, our approach would also
assure that the tobacco policymaking process will reflect our
nation's commitment to a number of important moral values,
lending greater legitimacy and stability to a policy so developed.

